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ABSTRACT

EMERGING IN THE IMAGE OF GOD: FROM EVOLUTION TO
ETHICS IN A SECOND NAÏVETÉ UNDERSTANDING OF
CHRISTIAN ANTHROPOLOGY
Jason P. Roberts, B.A., M.A.
Marquette University, 2013
Through a careful integration of theological, philosophical, and the natural
scientific sources, the biblical concepts of the image of God and the knowledge of good
and evil have the potential to remain important and appropriate descriptors of the human
condition, including the possibility and necessity of human morality. This study employs
French philosopher Paul Ricoeur’s notion of “second naïveté” understanding to
demonstrate the hermeneutical significance of contemporary biocultural evolutionary
theory for reinterpreting and reappropriating these ancient symbols of Christian
anthropology as terms equipped to encapsulate a morally fruitful and intellectually honest
conceptual framework for constructing, conducting, and evaluating theological
anthropology and ethics today. Forging and polishing this hermeneutical lens for the
purpose of recasting a biblically-based picture of humanity involves alloying these
ancient concepts with others from the interrelated fields of cognitive linguistics,
evolutionary psychology, and emergence. Viewed through this lens, the opening chapters
of Genesis describe human beings as creatures wrought of the creation and embedded
within it to the same extent as all other creatures. Though ordinary in every other aspect,
human creatures are unique in that they have emerged with an ambivalent condition of
freedom through which they bear the vocation to re-present the creative beneficence of
the God who shares power and does not create through violence.
I defend this thesis in seven chapters. In the first chapter, I introduce the research
topic, goals, and hermeneutical procedure for this study. Chapters 2 and 3 describe
biocultural evolution and evolutionary psychology within a non-reductive emergentist
perspective as sources and resources for contemporary theological anthropology. In
chapter 4, I propose an articulation of the doctrine of the imago Dei within this
evolutionary worldview. Chapter 5 situates the knowledge of good and evil vis-à-vis
biocultural evolution and recent biblical studies. I then construct a proposal in chapter 6
for how this second naïveté understanding of the image of God and the knowledge of
good and evil opens up new frameworks and frontiers for fundamental theological ethics.
Finally, chapter 7 offers a summative and prospective conclusion to this study and its
likely impact on my future research.

i

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Jason P. Roberts, B.A., M.A.
This doctoral dissertation represents the culmination of more than a decade of
theological learning—of faith seeking understanding. I am grateful for my undergraduate
professors who saw my academic promise and my graduate professors who have helped
to hone my skills and direct my interests as a scholar and teacher. I owe a special debt of
thanks to the members of my dissertation committee: Jame Schaefer, Ph.D. (chair); Rev.
Bryan Massingale, S.T.D; Robert Masson, Ph.D.; and Deirdre Dempsey, Ph.D. I must
also mention Drs. Philip Hefner, Mary Gerhart, and Allan Melvin Russell whose
inspiring and encouraging words in publication and in person have contributed a great
deal to this project. Finally, I extend my unending gratitude and love to my wife and son.
Addie and Quinton, thank you for sharing this adventure with me.

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS………………………………………………………………………… i
LIST OF FIGURES………………………………………………………………………………… v
CHAPTER 1
TOWARD A SECOND NAÏVETÉ: BIOCULTURAL EVOLUTION AS
HERMENEUTICAL LENS………………………………………………………………………… 1
Statement of the Problem and Research Goals…………………………………………….. 2
Second Naïveté Defined…………………………………………………………………….8
Present Status of the Problem……………………………………………………………… 18
Hermeneutics of Emergent Meaning………………………………………………………. 25

CHAPTER 2
BIOCULTURAL EVOLUTION AND EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY:
INTEGRATING CONCEPTS……………………………………………………………………… 44
Biocultural Evolution Defined……………………………………………………………... 45
Biocultural Evolution and Symbolization………………………………………………….. 52
Biocultural Evolution and “Full” Humanity……………………………………………….. 57
Biocultural Evolution, Domain Specificity, and Conceptual Integration…………………...66
Biocultural Evolution, the “Symbolic Threshold,” and the Image of God………………… 73
Evolutionary Psychology, the Image of God, and the Knowledge of Good and Evil……... 81
Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………………. 88

CHAPTER 3
EMERGENCE: CREATING CAUSES, CREATURES, MEANINGS, MINDS………………... 91
Counting the (Emergent) Cause……………………………………………………………. 92
Three Orders of Emergent Causality………………………………………………………. 99
Comparing, Contrasting, and Constructing Deacon’s Emergentist Schema………………. 102
The False Dichotomy of “Weak” vs. “Strong” Emergence……………………… 103
The False Equation of Reductive and Nonreductive Physicalism………………... 109
“Orders” vs. “Levels” of Emergence……………………………………………. 114
The Emergence of the imago Dei ex absentia via Homeo-, Morpho-, and Teleodynamics.. 116

iii

Homeodynamics and Efficient Causality…………………………………………. 122
Morphodynamics and Formal Causality…………………………………………. 125
Teleodynamics and Final Causality……………………………………………… 128
Non-Darwinian Teleodynamics……………………………………………………………. 130
Sentience and Value……………………………………………………………… 132
Consciousness and Morality……………………………………………………… 134
Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………………. 136

CHAPTER 4
THE IMAGO DEI: WITHIN A BIBLICAL AND EVOLUIONARY
VIEW OF THE WORLD…………………………………………………………………………... 138
The Emergent Meaning of the Image of God in Genesis and Contemporary Interpretation. 140
The Image of God as a Product of Nature in Genesis and Biocultural Evolution…………. 153
Imaging God as an Emergent Vocation……………………………………………………. 159
Imaging God with a Condition of Freedom………………………………………………... 170
Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………………. 174

CHAPTER 5
THE KNOWLEDGE OF GOOD AND EVIL: WITHIN A BIBLICAL AND EVOLUIONARY
VIEW OF THE WORLD…………………………………………………………………………... 179
The Emergent Meaning of the Knowledge of Good and Evil in Genesis and
Contemporary Interpretation……………………………………………………………….. 181
The Biblical Meaning of the Knowledge of Good and Evil……………………… 185
The Royal and Legal Background for the Knowledge of Good and Evil………... 188
Section Summary and Conclusion………………………………………………... 193
The Knowledge of Good and Evil as a Product of Nature in Genesis and
Biocultural Evolution………………………………………………………………………. 194
Creaturely Sources of the Knowledge of Good and Evil in Eden………………... 194
Natural Sources of the Knowledge of Good and Evil in Biocultural Evolution…..203
Knowing Good and Evil as an Emergent Vocation………………………………………... 209
Called Up and Called Out—Exegetical Considerations…………………………. 210
Called Up and Called Out—Evolutionary Considerations………………………. 213

iv

Knowing good and Evil as Imaging God with a Condition of Freedom…………………... 216
Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………………. 222

CHAPTER 6
ETHICS: IMAGING GOD WITH A KNOWLEDGE OF GOOD AND EVIL……………... 228
Negative Contrast Experience (NCE), Knowing Good and Evil, and Imaging God………. 231
NCE as Impetus and Condition of Possibility for Ethics………………………… 232
NCE as Self-evidently Constitutive of Human-being…………………………….. 234
NCE as Pointing to Its Positive Counterpart…………………………………….. 237
“Religion has an ethical foundation, but ethics cries out for religion”
—P. McAuliffe……………………………………………………………………. 242
Foundational Moral Experience (FME), knowing good and evil, and imaging God……… 244
FME as Impetus and Condition of Possibility for Ethics………………………… 245
FME as Self-evidently Constitutive of Human-being…………………………….. 247
FME as Pointing to Its Negative Counterpart…………………………………… 249
FME at the “Intersections” of Science, Theology, and Ethics……………………251
Mimetic desire (MD), Knowing Good and Evil, and Imaging God……………………….. 257
MD as Impetus and Condition of Possibility for Ethics………………………….. 258
MD as Self-evidently Constitutive of Human-being……………………………… 259
MD as Making Possible the NCE and FME……………………………………… 265
MD, Ethics, and “the uniqueness of the Bible”—R. Girard……………………... 267
Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………………. 273

CHAPTER 7
CONCLUDING REMARKS………………………………………………………………………. 278
Summary of Chapters……………………………………………………………………… 279
Implications for Future Research…………………………………………………………... 287
The imago trinitatis……………………………………………………………….. 287
Creation, Divine Action, and Christology………………………………………... 291
“Fall” and Original Sin, Soteriology, and Eschatology…………………………. 296

BIBLIOGRAPHY………………………………………………………………………………….. 301

v

LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1: (Double-Scope) Conceptual Integration “Basic Diagram”……………… 33
Figure 2: Warren S. Brown, “A Phylogenetic Model of Mental Causation”……… 74
Figure 3: Image, Knowledge, and Blending Capacity……………………………... 140
Figure 4: Image, Knowledge, and Nature………………………………………….. 153
Figure 5: Image, Knowledge, and Emergent Vocation……………………………..159
Figure 6: Image, Knowledge, and Freedom………………………………………...171
Figure 7: Emerging in the Image of God: A Second Naïveté……………………… 175

1

CHAPTER 1
TOWARD A SECOND NAÏVETÉ: BIOCULTURAL EVOLUTION AS
HERMENEUTICAL LENS
Found in the Primeval History in Genesis, the biblical concepts of the image of God and
the knowledge of good and evil remain integral to Christian anthropology. These concepts
have been the subject of theological reflections for centuries and continue to stimulate
discussion in academic and ecclesial circles. Through a careful integration of theological,
philosophical, and the natural scientific sources, these concepts have the potential to
remain important and appropriate descriptors of the human condition, including the
possibility and necessity of human morality.
This study employs French philosopher Paul Ricoeur’s notion of “second naïveté”
understanding to demonstrate the hermeneutical significance of contemporary biocultural
evolutionary theory for reinterpreting and reappropriating these ancient symbols of
Christian anthropology as terms equipped to encapsulate a morally fruitful and
intellectually honest conceptual framework for constructing, conducting, and evaluating
theological anthropology and ethics today. Forging and polishing this hermeneutical lens
for the purpose of recasting a biblically-based picture of humanity involves alloying these
ancient concepts with others from the interrelated fields of cognitive linguistics,
evolutionary psychology, and emergence. Viewed through this lens, the opening chapters
of Genesis describe human beings as creatures wrought of the creation and embedded
within it to the same extent as all other creatures. Though ordinary in every other aspect,
human creatures are unique in that they have emerged with an ambivalent condition of
freedom through which they bear the vocation to re-present the creative beneficence of
the God who shares power and does not create through violence.
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The following section of this opening chapter explicates the subject and structure
of this study and introduces the topics of each subsequent chapter. The final three
sections define second naïveté as a guiding hermeneutical construct for reappropriating
the biblical concepts under investigation, outline the scholarly precedent for utilizing
biocultural evolution as a hermeneutical tool for gaining a second naïveté understanding
of Christian anthropological concepts, and construct the emergentist hermeneutical
perspective and procedure adopted for doing so.1
Statement of the problem and research goals
Ricoeur’s “aim at a second naïveté” is a critical-hermeneutical endeavor targeting
the ancient and perennial symbols of human self-understanding. This journey of self-rediscovery begins “as an awareness of [a] myth as myth,” such as the biblical myths of
creation and “fall.” For Ricoeur this project of “demythologization is the irreversible gain
of truthfulness, intellectual honesty, objectivity.”2 The goal of the interpreter is to
revivify myth-symbols, not repudiate them. He wonders, therefore, “Does that mean that
we could go back to a primitive naïveté? Not at all,” he responds:
In every way, something has been lost, irremediably lost: immediacy of
belief. But if we can no longer live the great symbolisms of the sacred in
accordance with the original belief in them, we can, we modern [people],
aim at a second naïveté in and through criticism. In short, it is by
interpreting that we can hear again. Thus it is in hermeneutics that the

1

The following papers were presented at the Annual Meeting for the Society of Biblical Literature,
Chicago, Illinois, November 17-20, 2012. Should any of these find their way into publication, they will
provide a sounding board for the hermeneutical procedure developed in this study: Ryan Bonfiglio, “Is
Ricoeur Still Relevant? Reconsidering the Contributions of The Rule of Metaphor to Biblical Studies”;
Read Marlatte, “The Challenge of Pauline Metaphor: Metaphor Theory on the Edge of Explanation and
Understanding”; Todd Oakley, “Mental Space Theory and Hermeneutics”; Eve Sweeter, “Cognitive
Linguistics and the Interpretation of Sacred Texts.”
2
Paul Ricoeur, The Symbolism of Evil, trans. Emerson Buchanan (New York: Harper & Row, 1967), 350;
originally, Philosophie de la volonte: Finitude et culpabilité, II: La symbolique du mal (Paris: AubierMontaigne, 1960), 326; emphasis original.
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symbol’s gift of meaning and the endeavor to understand by deciphering
are knotted together.3
This insight is as true for the theological interpretation of Scripture as it is for the
natural sciences and other disciplines from which theological anthropology must draw
many of its background distinctions. A growing epistemological consensus across the
gamut of contemporary academia indicates that in science, theology, and especially
where the former informs the latter, what human beings know about themselves is a
function of how they know it as historically-situated embodied selves participating in
particular spheres of communal discourse. As an expert in the interdisciplinary
interaction of science and theology, J. Wentzel van Huyssteen argues that in postmodern,
“postfoundationalist” discourse, one is able “to retain the language of epistemology by
fusing it with hermeneutics.”4 What human beings know about being human emerges out
of the confluence of our biological, ecological, and cultural inheritance and interactions.
Through this ongoing creation of meanings and in what theologian Philip Hefner calls the
“symbiotic relationship” between the streams of inherited genetic information and
cultural information, Homo sapiens has emerged in the natural history of our world as a
“defined self-definer,” a “created co-creator,” a bearer of the image of the creator God.5
For Hefner, “at the core of this analogy [of the image of God] today is the character of
Homo sapiens as a free creator of meanings, one who takes action based on those
meanings and is also responsible for those meanings and actions.”6

3

Ricoeur, The Symbolism of Evil, 351; La symbolique du mal, hereafter SM, 326.
J. Wentzel van Huyssteen, Alone in the World?: Human Uniqueness in Science and Theology (Grand
Rapids: William B. Eerdmans, 2006), 22.
5
Philip Hefner, The Human Factor: Evolution, Culture, and Religion (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1993),
27, 118, 119; cf. 45, 47, 120-21, 265, 277.
6
Ibid., 239.
4
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In distinct but commensurable ways, the biblical and natural historical narratives
of human origins depict human beings as creatures whose self-consciousness emerges
with a capacity and necessity for ethical interaction and reflection. Homo sapiens qua
human have a knowledge of good and evil. According to an evolutionary perspective,
“good” and “evil”—wellbeing and ill-being, cooperation and conflict—condition and
catalyze the development of humankind’s ability to construe these values-laden concepts
linguistically. Viewed through this lens, the attainment of what Genesis 3 and theologians
and exegetes throughout the centuries call the “knowledge of good and evil” does not
constitute a falling away from the divine image and likeness. Instead, this development is
more a falling into or stumbling upon the original ambivalence of humanity’s evolved
and evolving nature. In an evolutionary understanding of Christian anthropology, this
fateful discovery is inextricable from the emergence of humankind as bearers of the
imago Dei.
To develop the perennial symbols of Christian anthropology in this way is to offer
a response to Hefner’s call when he professes at the conclusion of his seminal article
exploring “biological perspectives on fall and original sin”:
The rudimentary probes that have formed the substance of this essay have
not touched in any depth the constructive challenge that awaits the
theologian and philosopher in fulfilling the task that [Paul] Ricoeur set
before us—to transport the traditional symbols, where they are important
vessels of information for us, into the realm of contemporary, secondnaivete [sic] experience, and enable them to coalesce with our experience
to provide genuine knowledge of reality, for the sake of our wholesome
living.7
Therefore, from a Ricoeurian-inspired hermeneutical perspective which integrates
scientific and theological disciplines, the goal of this study is to demonstrate how a
7

Philip Hefner, “Biological Perspectives on Fall and Original Sin,” Zygon: Journal of Religion and Science
28 (1993): 99-100; cf. The Human Factor, 142.
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contemporary scientific understanding of human uniqueness and its emergence provides a
fruitful hermeneutical lens for gaining a second naïveté understanding of the image of
God and the knowledge of good and evil that integrates these concepts and provides a
paradigm for framing Christian ethics. By providing reliable knowledge about the world
Christians call “the creation,” natural-scientific understandings are able to inform, though
not fully determine, the course and content of Christian anthropology and ethics rooted in
historical revelation and theological tradition. Biblical scholars and theologians are able
to utilize the data and methods of the natural sciences through secondary and even
primary research, in supporting their (hypo)theses and conclusions. However, theological
data, procedures, and their resulting inferences concerning a reality transcending that of
the natural world are distinct from and not reducible to those of the natural sciences or
historical- and literary-critical biblical scholarship.
Despite these methodological distinctions, many exegetes and theologians who
engage in dialogue with natural scientists tend to agree that the knowledge of good and
evil is part and parcel of the image of God, even if they converge on this point along
slightly different paths. One group reaches this destination through careful textual and
historical analysis; the other through placing the theological tradition in dialogue with
contemporary human self-understanding. Of course, the latter group interacts with the
former, though rarely as extensively as I do in chapters 4 and 5 below.
After exploring, developing, and defending this insight, I submit that the concept
of the knowledge of good and evil might best be understood in terms of what theologian
Edward Schillebeeckx calls the “negative contrast experience,” what moral theologian
Daniel Maguire calls the “foundational moral experience,” and what structural
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anthropologist René Girard calls “mimetic desire.” These perspectives represent three
meta-ethical “camps” that mutually inform and interpret one another, as they each
provide an anthropological concept aimed at locating the biocultural conditions of
possibility for both ethics and religion. What a particularly Christian ethic provides for
each of these camps is a vision of human flourishing or salvation that cannot be fully
accomplished through biological and cultural processes. Culminating in Jesus Christ and
the already-but-not-yet kingdom or reign of God, the economy of salvation to which the
Hebrew Bible and New Testament bear tandem witness exemplifies and foreshadows a
completion of the image of God that fulfills the dynamism of the negative contrast
experience, the foundational moral experience, and mimetic desire, while calling for
loving modes of action reflecting—imaging—an eschatologically oriented faith and hope.
This study proceeds along the following seven steps in delineating and defending
this thesis. As indicated above, the three remaining sections of this introductory chapter
continue to explicate the research topic, goals, and procedure for this study. Chapters 2
and 3 describe biocultural evolution and evolutionary psychology within a non-reductive
emergentist perspective as sources and resources for contemporary theological
anthropology. In chapter 4, I propose an articulation of the doctrine of the imago Dei
within this evolutionary worldview, integrating biblical scholarship on Genesis 1:26-28
and the contributions of several recent and current scientists and theologians. Chapter 5
situates the knowledge of good and evil vis-à-vis biocultural evolution, recent biblical
studies, and theological insights pertaining to the concept of the image of God. I then
construct a proposal in chapter 6 for how this second naïveté understanding of the image
of God and the knowledge of good and evil opens up new frameworks and frontiers for
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fundamental theological ethics. Finally, chapter 7 offers a summative and prospective
conclusion to this study and its likely impact on my future research.
To clarify, when italicized, the terms “image of God” and “knowledge of good
and evil” (among other key terms in English) refer to these concepts as concepts—as in,
“the concept of the image of God” or “the concept of the knowledge of good and evil.” As
in the above paragraph, this use of italics is sometimes made explicit, but not always.
When not italicized, these theological terms refer to the manner in which Homo sapiens
may be understood to bear (and in this sense to be) God’s image and know good and
bad/evil. To avoid another potential source of confusion, the term image of God is never
used to convey a “conception of God” or a “God concept.”
My description of the image of God and the knowledge of good and evil as
created and creative processes emerging within the natural world presents another danger.
One could argue that depicting the image of God and the concept of God as products of
biocultural evolution is to naturalize the divine image and the God imaged. If the natural
world is capable—on its own—of producing God-imaging creatures, what role is left for
God to play in their creation? Why not apply Ockham’s razor and simply eliminate the
extraneous causal explanation, i.e., God? The short answer is to say that this study’s
strong naturalistic claims about the emergence of the image of God must be read as the
“bottom-up” arc of a hermeneutical circle which includes robust, “top-down” theological
claims. The limited scope of my thesis dictates that these theistic tenets cannot be fully
explored in the course of this study, even where they bear mention. An equally extensive
project would be required to explicate my understanding of how God creates through
evolutionary processes, values created realities, wills their wellbeing, and communicates
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with God-imaging creatures through gracious acts of self-revelation. Let it suffice to say
that I presuppose these basic tenets of a theistic, Christian perspective, and that the pages
of this study intimate the manner in which I hold them.
Second naïveté defined
Ricoeur defines second naïveté as “a creative interpretation of meaning, faithful to
the impulsion, to the gift of meaning from the symbol, and faithful also to the
philosopher’s oath to seek understanding.”8 When Ricoeur turns to the myth-symbols of
what he calls “the ‘Adamic’ myth and ‘eschatological’ vision of history,” this pursuit of
the philosopher becomes the “essentially Anselmian” hermeneutical circle of the
theologian—of faith seeking understanding.9 “Such is the circle” Ricoeur envisions:
“hermeneutics proceeds from a prior understanding of the very thing that it tries to
understand by interpreting it.”10 To seek a second naïveté understanding is to
acknowledge that there is no stepping outside, before, above, or behind the perennial
symbols of human self-understanding bequeathed by a religious tradition and its texts.
From within the tradition, these symbols and their own presuppositions are assumed, in
that they are taken a priori to be indispensible, if relatively raw, data.
In the hermeneutical circle of theology and its various sub-disciplines, the critical
function of exegesis gives rise and gives way to the appropriative function of
interpretation.11 This task is accomplished through reframing the original significance of
the myth-symbol (as best can be determined) via a reconceptualization that is both
contiguous and commensurable with ancient meanings, while demanding and allowing “a
8

Ricoeur, The Symbolism of Evil, 348; SM, 324.
Ibid., 357; cf. 308, 352-57; SM, 332; cf. 286, 328-32.
10
Ibid., 352; SM, 327.
11
Ibid., 350; SM, 326.
9
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qualitative transformation of reflexive consciousness.”12 The creation of a second naïveté
understanding must involve the emergence of a new kind of meaning and activity that
would not be available apart from the continued use of the myth-symbol. To live out of
the continual, critical re-appropriation of sacred symbols such as the image of God and
the knowledge of good and evil is to open up novel modes of human being, knowing, and
doing.
For the hermeneutical circle on which biblical symbols necessarily lie to be
constructive and not vicious, these sacred symbols must gain verification or justification.
In order to attain and maintain such truth-value, first, the myth-symbol must be plastic
enough to appropriate new conceptual infrastructure in its reappropriation. Further, the
myth-symbol must make good on what Ricoeur calls the “wager” that the symbol will
allow for increased, irreplaceable, and irreducible “intelligibility,” “power of reflection,”
“coherent discourse,” and “power to raise up, to illuminate, to give order to [a] region of
human experience.”13 Relative to three other “myths that speak of the beginning and end
of evil,”14 Ricoeur argues that elements of all these myths have been appropriated,
repudiated, and/or refined in “the place where the pre-eminence of one of these myths is
proclaimed still today—namely, the Adamic myth.”15 By the end of Ricoeur’s La
symbolique du mal, this assignment of preeminence is more a descriptive assessment than
an evaluative one. His argument at this stage is that an important reason the JudeoChristian traditions have had so much more staying power in Western religious thought
12

Ibid., 356; SM, 331.
Ibid., 355; cf. 357; SM, 330; cf. 332.
14
Ibid., 5; SM, 13.
15
Ibid., 306; cf. 309; SM, 285; cf. 287-88. For a summary of Ricoeur’s Symbolism of Evil and a Christian
theological argument for attributing preeminence to the Adamic myth, see Peter B. Ely, “Revisiting Paul
Ricoeur on the Symbolism of Evil: A Theological Retrieval,” Ultimate Reality and Meaning 24.1 (2001),
40-64.
13
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than their early parallels and competitors is the explanatory power and hope they have
provided regarding the human condition and its future.
A “myth,” according to Ricoeur, is “not a false explanation by means of images
and fables, but a traditional narration which relates to events that happened at the
beginning of time and which has the purpose of providing grounds for the ritual actions
of [people] of today and, in a general manner, establishing all the forms of action and
thought by which [humanity] understands [itself] in [its] world.”16 For Ricoeur Genesis 1
marks the beginning of “the ‘Adamic’ myth and the ‘eschatological’ vision of history”
recorded in the Hebrew Bible and New Testament.17 The myths over against which
Ricoeur sets biblical depictions of the human condition are “the drama of creation and the

16

Ibid., 5; SM, 12-13. To be precise, while the image of God and the knowledge of good and evil are both
taken here to be myth-symbols, the Garden Narrative that begins in Gen. 2:4b does not fall as neatly into
the genre of “myth” as the material that precedes it. Yet, for reasons that will become clearer in chapters 4
and 5, there are good reasons to conclude that the Priestly writer(s) (P) of Genesis 1informs the meaning of
this more ritual-oriented myth with the more sapiential creation narrative of the Yahwist (J) via the process
of redaction. In this case, as both writer(s) and redactor(s), P creates a composite creation account in which
the older narrative follows the myth, which becomes its prologue. Genesis 2-3 becomes an expansion and
elaboration of many elements of the new myth, thereby taking on its own mythic quality. For instance,
Yahweh Elohim’s declaration that humankind as “become like one of Us” in Gen. 3:22 has a bearing on the
significance of Elohim’s plural jussive in Gen. 1:26, “Let Us make [humankind] in our image, according to
our likeness” (NASB).
In a collaborative work with Ricoeur, André LaCocque also argues that Genesis 1 follows the
“trajectory” (trajectoire) of temporally earlier creation tradition, especially Genesis 2-3 (André LaCocque
and Paul Ricoeur, Thinking Biblically: Exegetical and Hermeneutical Studies, translated by David Pellauer
[Chicago; London: The University of Chicago Press, 1998], 9; cf. Paul Ricoeur, “On the Exegesis of
Genesis 1:1-2:4a,” In Figuring the Sacred: Religion, Narrative, and Imagination, translated by David
Pellauer, edited by Mark I. Wallace [Minneapolis, Fortress Press, 1995], 132, 134; originally, “Sur
l’exégèse de Genèse 1,1-2,4a.” In Exégèse et herméneutique, edited by Éditions du Seuil [Paris: Éditions du
Seuil, 1971], 70-71, 73). According to LaCocque, “it is a mistake to oppose the two ‘versions’ of creation
in the first chapters of Genesis. P, to whom we owe the Pentateuch as actually transmitted, prefaced it with
Genesis 1-2:4 in full knowledge of the J version in Genesis 2ff. We have seen above what P had in mind.
The myth of Genesis 1 is meant to relate narrative to ritual, in parallel with the old Mesopotamian Enuma
Elish, for example. By contrast, Genesis 2-3 is simply narrative, a story. Its role is pedagogical and
explanatory, rather than restorative as in myth and ritual. With J’s etiology of creation, we are still formally
close to myth, but generically the distance from myth is considerable” (LaCocque and Ricoeur, Thinking
Biblically, 10-11).
17
Ibid., 232-78; SM, 218-60.
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‘ritual’ vision of the world,” “the wicked god and the ‘tragic’ vision of existence,” and
“the myth of the exiled soul and salvation through knowledge.”18
To summarize, through relating these myths to one another, Ricoeur argues that
the Adamic myth is unique because its eschatological vision of history offers an ultimate
solution to what he calls “the concept of the servile will.” In the polytheistic creation
myth human beings are bound to recapitulate the violent exploits of the creator gods in
the realms of political conquest and religious ritual; in Greek tragedy the evil incurred
and committed by people is fated by the gods and only assuaged through public spectacle
and corporate catharsis, not forgiveness; in the Adamic myth the chaos to which Yahweh
Elohim (Gen 2:4) brings order in “the beginning” of creation continues to threaten to
encroach upon the primordial goodness of the world in the forms of natural hardship and
the knowledge that the creation itself and human action can bring about both tov vara’—
good and bad/evil; in the orphic myth of Platonism and Neo-Platonism, the human body
is a double punishment for the exiled soul, forced to mingle with matter as a consequence
for wrongdoing and bound to commit further evil in that state, resulting in cyclic reincarnation. Only the Adamic myth and the eschatological vision of history forgoes the
primordial mischief of the gods, affirms the goodness of material existence, and short
circuits the penal cycle of life, death, and return.
Again, for all its staying power in Western culture as a purveyor of
anthropological information and an eschatological vision of the future, the Adamic myth
is for Ricoeur, the preeminent, dominant, or central myth of the four he analyzes.
Because the three other myths influence various canonical books of Christian Scripture,
Ricoeur creates a metaphor in which “[t]he cycle of the myths can be compared to a
18
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gravitational space, in which masses attract and repel each other at various distances.”19
By gaining a controlling influence over its conceptual satellites and by shedding light
upon them, the Adamic myth encompasses the center of gravity of this mythic solar
system.
At the same time, and to step with Ricoeur beyond his original metaphor, stars
emit light because their cores undergo nuclear fusion. Likewise the core concepts of the
Adamic myth must fuse with others as this star ages, in order to continue to provide a
hospitable environment for human life, as it evolves. As new and valid modes of human
self-understanding inform how persons understand and live out of the traditional symbols
of the Adamic myth, they enter, through criticism, the realm of second naïveté. Through
interpretation, these ancient symbols continue, as Hefner has alluded, to remain
“important vessels of information” for Christian theology, able “to provide genuine
knowledge of reality for the sake of our wholesome living.”20
Beyond this pragmatic potential, Ricoeur’s insights also imply that the biblical
cosmology and anthropology of the first few chapters of Genesis are themselves results
of a critical interpretation and appropriation of extant religious mythology. While not a
self-proclaimed critique, analysis, and synthesis of theological cosmology and
anthropology inherited from inside and outside an Israelite religious community and its
corporate religious experience, the opening chapters of Genesis comprise just such a
body of sacred literature. Yet what these ancient writers and hearers gained through
updating their mythology was a new primitive naïveté, not a second naïveté.
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Acknowledging these hermeneutical differences, the fourth and fifth chapters of
this study propose that the composition and redaction of this biblical material in the
shadow of Mesopotamian cosmology and ideology sets a precedent for synthesizing
elements of one’s own canon of sacred literature among themselves and with external
sources in order to construct a renewed theological vision of humanity, its origins, and
destiny. Taking this approach reclaims, as Ricoeur explains, “the purpose of providing
grounds for the ritual actions of [people] of today and, in a general manner, establishing
all the forms of action and thought by which [humanity] understands [itself] in [its]
world.”21
Relying upon Gerhard von Rad’s assessment of how established source material
fed into the final composite narration of origins in Genesis 1-3, and acknowledging the
influence ancient near eastern parallels apparently had on these passages in the historicalcultural context of their redaction, Ricoeur concludes that “the very idea of Creation
emerges enriched from this kind of proliferation of originary events.”22 Within this
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process of theological enrichment and refinement, Ricoeur identifies a hermeneutical
“trajectory” (trajectoire) which, among other things, relativizes the role of violence in the
divine acts of creating something from nothing, order from chaos, and liberation from
oppression.23 Acting as prologue to the Hebrew and Christian scriptures, Genesis 1
confers a vocation to humankind to act creatively and responsibly “in the image” of the
creator, indicating the ethical import of the passage’s ideological trajectory.
The question now becomes, can current scientific understanding of human
uniqueness also facilitate the emergence of an enriched and enriching understanding of
the image of God and the knowledge of good and evil today? Both the biblical redactor(s)
of Genesis and the scientist are asking the same kinds of questions, albeit with very
different sets of data, tools, and purposes: “What is the state of things?” “How did they
and we get this way?” “Where might this lead?” “Where can we go from here?” Of
course, the ethicist, the theologian, the interpreter of Scripture is allowed a further
question, for which scientists enable, even demand, new and ever-more intellectually
honest responses today: “Where ought we to go from here?”
Ricoeur is satisfied to wager that the preeminence of the Adamic myth and the
eschatological vision of history will be vindicated by its continued explanatory power
concerning the human condition, provided that its theological anthropology is based upon
a second naïveté understanding of Christianity’s myth-symbols. However, for Hefner a
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second naïveté understanding of these symbols must lend itself to a “genuine knowledge
of reality” and “our wholesome living.”
Theologian Mark I. Wallace sees this ethical aim of biblical interpretation
surfacing in Ricoeur’s later works and as “the true telos of a theological hermeneutic of
the second naiveté [sic], what Ricoeur calls ‘putting the Word to work.’”24 Effecting
tectonic reformations in one’s symbolic worldview can be a bitter-sweet process of
intellectual maturation. As Wallace implies, because the theological realism of a second
naïveté understanding is “a self-corrective and always revisable realism,” living out of
the biblical myth-symbols with integrity means living in constant tension with the
symbolic world of the first naïveté and the facile immediacy of belief it once afforded. 25
Then again, perhaps the biblical writer(s) already knew this: “Then the eyes of both of
them were opened, and they knew that they were naked” (Gen 3:7a). From “the
beginning,” humankind has always faced the challenge to discern, test, and construe how
powerful sources of wisdom and our abilities to interact with them are the ever-active
epicenters of tov vara’—good and bad/evil.
There are other potential hazards associated with a second naïveté interpretation.
First, in ecclesial settings where biblical language is often used without extensive
interpretation, congregants and outsiders alike may mistake an informed teacher’s postcritical (second naïveté) understanding for pre-critical (first naïveté) belief. The danger in
this example is to mistake interpretation for univocation. This interpretive pitfall goes by
names like “literalism” or “fundamentalism.” Second, and because of this first danger,
hearers or readers who are critically-minded may suspect a misleading sleight of hand in
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the post-critical reappropriation of biblical language. Would it not be more prudent for
scholars and preachers to exchange loaded symbols like image of God and knowledge of
good and evil for something more precise and unambiguous like Hefner’s created cocreator? The danger in this case is to view interpretation as mere equivocation and, in
reaction, to exclude a potentially fruitful dialogue with and through the tradition’s ancient
and perennial symbols of self-understanding. Making good on Ricoeur’s wager means
avoiding both of these dangers by stating one’s hermeneutical procedure and tracing the
development of meaning through the garden of the first naïveté, the wilderness of the
critical consciousness, and into the co-created symbolic world of the second, post-critical
naïveté.
Convicting preaching and convincing scholarship share another commonality—
they often prompt new modes of thinking and action. One can hear echoes of Hefner’s
intellectual and ethical “challenge”26 to the theologian in the work of theological ethicist
James Gustafson, as he issues the following hermeneutical and meta-ethical claim in his
monograph exploring the “intersections” of science, theology, and ethics. While
Gustafson argues that the natural sciences and theology share criteria for truthfulness that
“are basically coherent in [their] internal structures,” theological anthropology and ethics
bear an additional burden of truthfulness beyond the coherence and comprehensiveness
provided by empirical consistency, predictability, and theoretical adequacy.27 In
comparing the relative procedures and approaches of theologian Reinhold Niebuhr with
those of anthropologist Melvin Konner, Gustafson concludes that the “bottom-up”
insights of the sciences can point to and inform—but not produce or reduce—the “top-
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down” explanations of ethics and theology—of ought-ness and of an ultimate reality to
which human agency may be accountable.28 Thus, beyond the requirement of explanatory
power, and along with Hefner, Gustafson appeals to a second criterion for the
truthfulness of an anthropologically- and scientifically-based theological ethics that
draws its explanatory power from a rejuvenation of myth-symbols.29 Hefner calls this
second criterion “wholesomeness,” while Gustafson employs the term “moral outcome”
in like manner:
[Niebuhr’s] main resources for truth-bearing ideas and insights are the
Bible and selected figures in Christian theology. Those on which he draws
are used often for their mythic qualities, that is, their capacities to disclose
fundamentally real and presumably universal aspects of human life and
action. Thus, in a sense, they heuristically disclose the realities of
experience. We get to the circularity I indicated earlier, namely that faith
illumines experience and is in turn validated by experience. Thus
“experience” also becomes “data” disclosed by Christian myths and
concepts, and the data validate their use. The Bible makes no hard claims
for special supernatural revelation, nor for what we might call “empirical
studies” of experience. The objective seems to be clear; the persuasiveness
of the account is confirmed by its disclosive power as it issues in a deeper
understanding of the human and guides human action. A further test is the
moral outcome—in political, economic, and other effects—of the actions
that it guides.30
While creating another avenue for intellectual honesty through critical reflection,
this second criterion for truthfulness produces a second potentially vicious hermeneutical
circle. The test of moral outcome begs the questions, “What counts as a positive moral
outcome? And for whom?” “What is ‘our wholesome living’?” “And who is the ‘we’ of
this ‘our’?” The sixth chapter of this study aims to tackle these very questions through a
28
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second naïveté understanding of the image of God and the knowledge of good and evil,
described in terms of negative contrast experience, foundational moral experience, and
mimetic desire. Additionally, the concept of “epistemological privilege” and criteria for
ascribing it will guide responses to questions of who might provide the most adequate
visions of wholesome living and the actions required to promote it equitably.
Present status of the problem
While Hefner proposes “a theory of the created co-creator” aimed at satisfying
both of these truth criteria, and while he explicates what he means by both “explanatory
power” and “wholesomeness,” he does little more than
suggest that the meaning of [certain] packets of [scientific] information
can be understood only in myth. The reason for this state of hermeneutical
affairs is clear: Trans-kin altruism is not simply a scientifically puzzling
phenomenon, nor a regrettably neglected virtue; it is a central symbol and
ritual of what human beings should be doing with their lives, the symbol
and ritual which, above all others, governs the behavior of the created cocreator.31
In other words, the natural sciences reach the limits of their expertise when encountering
the phenomenon that increasing the reproductive fitness of someone who is not a close
genetic relative (i.e., a “genetic competitor”) garners social acceptance and admiration,
while jealously looking out for the welfare of only oneself and one’s kin is often subject
to social disapproval and sanction.32
Natural scientists, within the limits of their disciplines, cannot offer evaluative or
normative claims about human action. Yet for Hefner and Gustafson, both truth criteria
of explanatory power and moral outcome are adapted from those operative in the current
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sciences.33 Hefner patterns his theory of the created co-creator on a model for
establishing scientific theories and paradigms gleaned from the works of Imre Lakatos,
Nancey Murphy, Karl Popper, and Thomas Kuhn, offering primary and auxiliary
hypotheses, data, and evidence to establish the plausibility of his theological theory and
its commensurability with current science.34 Interdisciplinary scholar and Templeton
Prize winner Ian G. Barbour summarizes the four criteria for evaluating scientific
theories: (1) an agreement with the data which enables predictive success with novel
data; (2) internal and external coherence strengthened by conceptual interconnection with
other accepted theories; (3) comprehensiveness of scope or generality; and (4) fertility in
providing a framework for ongoing research and practical application.35 Together, the
first three of these distill into the criterion of explanatory power, the fourth is adapted to
that of moral outcome, which Hefner terms “fruitfulness” or the ability to promote
“wholesomeness.” The fertility or fruitfulness of created co-creator theory is not that of
pure science leading to technological advancement, but of human self-understanding
leading to cultural developments proffering and promoting humanizing visions of
wholesomeness for all creation.
Since such ethical visions are not self-evident, as “a basis for beginning to reflect
upon values,” Hefner states what he calls a “teleonomic axiom,” holding that “[t]he
structure of a thing, the processes by which it functions, the requirements for its
functioning, and its relations with and impact upon its ecosystem form the most
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reasonable basis for hypothesizing what the purpose and meaning of the thing are.”36
Here is the gateway through which Hefner begins to “lay the groundwork for a pragmatic
criterion of truth” for his theory in terms of present and future wholesomeness.37
If “wholesomeness” is defined as that which is “empirically discernible as in
some manner beneficial” to nature,38 and if Hefner is correct that working toward
wholesomeness is intrinsically human and humanizing, there is arguably a “need for a
second naiveté [sic] among contemporary men and women that can appropriate myth and
ritual as the first naiveté [sic] did millennia ago.”39 This second naïveté would provide
the cultural explanations, motivations, and justifications necessary for engendering
ethical behavior, especially when such behavior defies that predicted by natural scientific
accounts of human nature and the explanatory power these explanations provide. Further,
if Hefner is right in surmising “that altruism beyond kin is transmitted culturally, not
genetically, and that religious traditions are the chief carriers of this value,”40 then, he
asks, are new intellectually and ethically credible myths required to accomplish the
cultural functions that religious myth and ritual once did, “[o]r are the old myths to be
appropriated through critical analysis and reinterpretation, as Ricoeur and others
propose?”41
According to the second truth criterion of moral outcome, a mythic human selfunderstanding is falsified if it is unable to recognize, construe, and promote the
wholesomeness of human persons and their natural and cultural environments in the
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present and future.42 In competing for viability, myths or second naïveté understandings
of them must be both intellectually and ethically satisfying to the greatest possible
degree. A lack in intellectual viability implies a lack in ethical viability and vice versa. In
theological terms, this requirement is the mutual entailment of orthodoxy and orthopraxy,
involving a hermeneutical circle on which neither aspect is self-evident, and both require
constant testing and self-critical assessment within a community of religious adherents—
i.e., faith seeking understanding. I share Hefner’s thesis that the Christian myth and some
of its most integral symbols are able to produce a theological anthropology and ethics
able to satisfy both truth criteria with integrity, plausibility, and commensurability among
secular and other religious perspectives alike.
However, Hefner’s created co-creator theory is not, strictly speaking, a second
naïveté interpretation of the image of God. While Hefner incorporates an understanding
of the image of God into his created co-creator theory, he does so as a kind of variation
on a broader anthropological theme.43 He mentions that his understanding of the human
person as created co-creator is an “interpretation of the image of God,” but he does not
rely on biblical scholarship to the same extent or in the same way as this study.44
Hefner’s relative lack of engagement with exegetical sources may be due in part to the
limited aims of his research and in part to the interpretive difficulties presented by Gen.
1:28 and the anthropocentric spirit in which it has traditionally been read.45 This verse
describes humankind’s God-imaging purpose in terms of “filling,” “subduing,” and
“ruling over” the earth, which now faces a state of ecological crisis due mainly to human
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proliferation, pollution, and consumption. Ironically, by taking little time to reframe these
biblical commands, Hefner neglects to clarify how his created co-creator theory avoids
their seemingly anthropocentric and paternalistic thrust. I engage both of these issues in
chapters 4 through 6, arguing that these commands do not support human activity leading
to ecological degradation and that the God-imaging co-creation to which Hefner refers is
best understood as humankind’s non-coercive co-operation with the nonhuman world and
one another for the benefit of all people, all other species, and the planet on which we
have co-evolved.
While Hefner holds that his understanding of the image of God must incorporate the
notion that moral knowledge and responsibility, in all their ambivalence, are intrinsic to
and co-emergent with this image, my analysis goes further, integrating of the mythsymbols of the image of God and the knowledge of good and evil within a second-naïveté
interpretation based as much in biblical scholarship as scientific understandings of human
uniqueness.46 Additionally, though Hefner hypothesizes that a “concept of
‘wholesomeness’ is both unavoidable and useful as criterion governing the behavior of
human beings within their natural ambiance, as they consider what their contribution to
nature should be,” he goes little past the point of acknowledging that the concept of
wholesomeness is an “ambiguous criterion,” “open to scrutiny,” which “must be forged
through consensus.”47 Beyond this word of caution, but keeping it ever in mind, I construct
an interpretation of the image of God and the knowledge of good and evil that portrays
these concepts as conditions of possibility for constructing and evaluating such a consensus
within Christian ethical discourse and among religious and secular ethical visions.
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At the exegetical level, and for historical-critical, literary, philosophical, and
sometimes scientific reasons, many biblical scholars and theologians relate the concepts
of the image of God and the knowledge of good and evil by construing the latter as a
quintessential aspect of the former. These scholars include J. F. A. Sawyer, Andreas
Schüle, Phyllis A. Bird, Douglas John Hall, J. Wentzel van Huyssteen, Philip Hefner and,
to a certain extent, William N. Wilder. For some Christian scholars, the knowledge of
good and evil completes the image of God and/or presents a condition of possibility for
its continuing completion in history, in anticipation of its eschatological completion in
the person of Jesus Christ and the everlasting existence promised by and through him.
Because an evolutionary view of humanity supports the inference that the knowledge of
good and evil is a conditio sine qua non for bearing the imago Dei with freedom and
responsibility, a biocultural understanding of the human condition and our dis-ease with
it presents a significant development in the frameworks and frontiers for constructive
work in Christian ethics. While much of the scholarship cited in this study acknowledges
this trajectory, it does not venture far beyond this point, leaving a waypoint for future
explorers.
Many scholars have dealt masterfully with some aspects of this problem, but none
yet have ventured to fulfill Hefner’s call in his terms or along the trajectory proposed
here. For instance, Hefner, biblical scholar John Baker,48 and theologians Edward
Farley,49 Jerry D. Korsmeyer,50 and F. LeRon Shults,51 all suggests ways in which the
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doctrines of fall and original sin ought to be reformulated in light of both exegetical and
scientifically-informed notions of the knowledge of good and evil. Yet none of these
scholars develops an understanding of the knowledge of good and evil as a fundamental
starting point for theological ethics.
Van Huyssteen interfaces theological exegesis pertaining to the image of God
with contemporary paleoanthroplogical portraits of human uniqueness. However, he only
hints at how the image of God relates to the knowledge of good and evil in historicalcritical exegesis and theological anthropology and does not relate these considerations to
fundamental Christian ethics.52
Contemporary biblical scholars Sawyer and Schüle have argued convincingly that
the knowledge of good and evil mentioned in Genesis 3:5, 22 is part and parcel of the
image and likeness of God first mentioned in 1:26-28, but they have not brought their
exegetical findings into the realm of contemporary theological understanding or
interfaced their insights with scientific scholarship.53
None of these scholars mentioned constructs systematic theological portraits of
the image of God and the knowledge of good and evil in terms of second naiveté
understanding. Hefner, Van Huyssteen, and Hall produce articles, chapters, or books that
fulfill the basic function of developing a second naïveté understanding, but none adopt
the term as a guiding hermeneutical principle or fully share or develop the hermeneutical
procedure proposed here. Further, these thinkers give relatively little, if any, attention to
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the knowledge of good and evil, which precludes a systematic integration of this concepts
with that of the image of God. Responding to Hefner’s challenge in the manner indicated
adds both new structure and content to constructive theological scholarship addressing
the interrelated, pressing, and perennial questions of human uniqueness and how such
considerations inform ethics, how the descriptive affects the prescriptive, how our “is”
informs our “ought.”
Hermeneutics of emergent meaning
This attempt to traverse the thorny path from “is” to “ought” via a second naïveté
understanding the image of God and the knowledge of good and evil takes hermeneutical
direction from the field of cognitive linguistics, particularly from the concept of “doublescope conceptual integration” or “blending” found in the works of Gilles Fauconnier and
Mark Turner. The integration of natural scientific, biblical-critical, and theological
concepts blended to produce a second naïveté interpretation of the image of God and the
knowledge of good and evil can be modeled as a broad-spectrum example of doublescope conceptual integration, in which the conceptual domains of non-reductive
evolutionary science and biblically-based theological understanding frame one another
“to provide genuine knowledge of reality, for the sake of our wholesome living.”54
Notably, Hefner also calls this intra- and interdisciplinary connectivity
“conceptual integration” or “vertical integration,” borrowing these terms from
evolutionary psychologists Leda Cosmides and John Tooby.55 Hefner’s reliance on the
work of these scientists is significant for three reasons. First, standing at the forefront of
evolutionary psychological research, Cosmides and Tooby’s work plays a significant role
54
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in the following chapter. Second, the notion of “conceptual integration” is a key term in
the hermeneutical procedure adopted here and the uniquely human abilities that make it
possible, as theorized by Fauconnier, Turner, and other cognitive linguists.56 Third,
according to these scientists, the cognitive-linguistic capacity for conceptual integration
contributes to the creation of new meanings, allowing for new modes of free and
responsible human action—the same host of capacities and activities I argue to be central
to any current understanding of the image of God.
By weaving careful and intricate interdisciplinary connections of this type, this
study represents an “integration” of theological and natural scientific thought tantamount
to what Barbour calls a “theology of nature.”57 Barbour explains a theology of nature
“starts from a religious tradition based on religious experience and historical revelation.
But it holds that some traditional doctrines need to be reformulated in the light of current
science,” where theological and scientific concerns overlap.58 A theology of nature
dovetails the disciplines of science and theology, while maintaining a relationship of
nonreciprocal dependence. Science is able to inform—though not circumscribe—the
course and content of theological scholarship, while divine agency is not a causal
factor—a “God of the gaps”—in any scientific explanation of natural phenomena. This
interdisciplinary procedure involves consulting non-reductive sources of scientific
knowledge as resources for theological and ethical discourse. Yet, the theological
concepts that emerge from the synthesis of sacred and secular sources are not reducible to
their scientific meanings. The flipside of gaining a second naïveté interpretation of
56
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biblical symbols is gaining a theological understanding of scientific data. Here again,
interpretation must distinguish itself from both univocation and equivocation. The image
of God is no mere cipher for the epigenetic outcomes of biocultural evolution. The
knowledge of good and evil is not just another term for the conscientious awareness that
many circumstances and behaviors contravene the flourishing or wholesomeness of
oneself, other persons, other species, and their environments.59
At the same time, the nonreciprocal dependence of theology and ethics upon
science in their integration does not preclude the possibility of reciprocal influence. Like
mentality emerging from the metabolic activity of the human brain-body, and through this
causally efficacious dynamic, values-laden cultural meanings emerge from the “bottomup” to supervene upon thought and action from the “top-down.” Through blending, novel
concepts emerge to constrain behavior. Ethical and sometimes even religious concerns
guide the course and conduct of pure and applied scientists and their academic
communities who depend on these supervening cultural considerations to give their work
purpose, meaning, direction, and accountability. For Cosmides and Tooby, herein lies the
reason that conceptual integration among disciplines is “vertical integration.” Information
is often only relevant or usable in one direction between disciplines or specialties. Biology
depends on chemistry, which depends upon quantum physics, which depends upon
mathematics. Similarly, when integrated with scientific understandings of human
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uniqueness, new ethical and theological meanings emerge from the bottom-up, changing
the landscape and horizons of thought and action for people of faith.
More technically speaking, conceptual integration or blending projects and
merges meanings from two or more packets of conceptual information Fauconnier and
Turner call “mental spaces,” in order to frame and fill a new mental space called a
“blend.”60 This cognitive activity is creative, in that blended mental spaces often display
emergent structure—conceptual relations, and thus meanings, which are not available in
any of the input mental spaces, and are not predictable from them.61 The creation of new
meanings is a dynamic mental process of composing, completing, and elaborating blends.
According to Fauconnier and Turner, “composition” is the result of projecting conceptual
meanings from input mental spaces, “completion” is the act of structuring and
constraining conceptual relations through “independently recruited frames and scenarios”
extrinsic to the input spaces, and “elaboration” is the result of “running [the blend]
imaginatively according to the principles that have been established for the blend.”62 At
the cognitive level, the emergent structure of conceptual blends is the neurologicallybased dynamic domain of all semantic meanings, including the generative grammar
which relates them. Meaning is a dynamic mental process which words serve to prompt,
not a property of words, symbols, sentences, or objects themselves.
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Fauconnier and Turner have identified four types of blending capacity which
yield the conceptual integration networks that transform the material universe into our
symbolic universe: “simplex,”63 “mirror,”64 “single-scope,”65 and “double-scope.”
Because complex single-scope and double-scope blends often project meanings
from very different kinds of behavioral domains, the act of conceptual integration often
involves various levels of compatibility and clash among projected meanings.
Remarkably, however, our brain-minds accomplish a smooth running of these blends by
deleting or even modifying ill-fitting elements, usually without any conscious effort.66
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According to Fauconnier and Turner, simplex networks are those for “which human cultural and
biological history has provided and effective frame that applies to certain kinds of elements as values, and
that frame is in one input space and some of those kinds of elements are in the other input space” (The Way
We Think, 120). The statement, “Jason is the father of Quinton” represents a simplex network of family
relations which frames the two male values, “Quinton” and “Jason,” according to the projected roles of
father and son. The projection of framing elements and values is direct and reflects the kind of truthconditionality often expressed in the supposedly prototypical semantic form of first-order Fregean logic
(ibid.). However, simplex conceptual integration networks are not always so simple in their meaning.
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spaces. The simplex networks represented in the statements, “Joseph was the father of Jesus,” “The Pope is
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illustrate this type of blending, Fauconnier and Turner recount a riddle in which a “Buddhist Monk begins
at dawn one day walking up a mountain, reaches the top at sunset, meditates at the top for several days until
one dawn when he begins to walk back to the foot of the mountain, which he reaches as sunset” (39). They
go on, “Make no assumptions about his starting or stopping or about his pace during the trips. Riddle: Is
there a place on the path that the monk occupies at the same hour of the day on the two separate journeys?”
(ibid.). Fauconnier and Turner suggest discovering the solution by imagining the Monk taking both
journeys on the same day (122-26). With both journeys framed by this albeit impossible scenario, the
solution emerges in the blend. One does not know where it would happen, but one knows that at some point
along the path, the Monk would have to run into himself, as it were.
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Fauconnier and Turner define single-scope blending as integrating “two input spaces with different
organizing frames, one of which is projected to organize the blend” (The Way We Think, 126). Many
metaphors utilize single-scope blends to prompt inferences across domains of meaning that are more and/or
less well-known. As Fauconnier and Turner suggest, “The scenario of two men boxing gives us a vibrant,
compact frame to use in compressing our understanding of two CEOs in business competition. We say that
one CEO landed a blow but the other recovered, one of them tripped and the other took advantage, one of
them knocked the other out cold” (ibid.). One input space is that of economic competition; the other is of a
boxing match. The identities involved are projected from the CEO space, but the relations of role and
causation are framed only by the boxing space. Without delving into the perhaps unfamiliar terminology of
corporate transactions, the blend achieves the intended meaning via a more concrete conceptual domain.
66
Fauconnier and Turner, The Way We Think, 125.

30

For example, the metaphor, “We’re getting over a hurdle” represents a single-scope blend
in which two people’s relational difficulties and their efforts to surmount them are framed
by a track and field domain. In making sense of this deceptively simple metaphor, one
generally negates the aspect of competition from the framing material and disregards that
fact that racers do not clear hurdles in pairs. Without realizing it, we compress the
identities of the partners into a single hurdler intent on reaching a goal quickly, though
not necessarily before others do.
Conceptual clashes occur even more frequently in double-scope blending, which
involves two or more “inputs with different (and often clashing) organizing frames as
well as an organizing frame for the blend that includes parts of each of those frames and
has emergent structure of its own.”67 An example of double-scope conceptual integration
operates in the metaphor, “This surgeon is a butcher.” As Fauconnier and Turner note, to
make the inference that this is a pejorative statement, one must be able to blend
automatically the neuro-cognitive structures involved in the conceptual frames of both
surgery and meat-carving. The metaphor “underscores the clumsiness of the surgeon and
its undesirable effects.”68 However, neither clumsiness nor undesirable effects are found
the conceptual frames of either meat-carving or surgery. Both butchers and surgeons can
be quite skillful, organized, and sanitary, producing desirable results through their efforts.
Both professions involve the cutting of body tissue in precise ways, implementing sharp
steel instruments, and wearing similar clothing when doing so. Yet when the blended
space of the metaphor is framed by the setting, characters, and purposes of surgery along
with the tools, methods, and purposes of butchery, clumsiness and its detrimental
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(perhaps even fatal) consequences emerge in this double-scope blend.69 This integration
of concepts creates meaning that is distinct from and not reducible to any meaning
contained in or predictable from the originating conceptual frames.
At the same time, emergent meanings like these are dependent upon pre-blended
meanings and do not negate or re-signify these concepts within their original cognitive
domains. By analogy, theologians are able to reframe scientific and theological concepts
by means of one another, though not in a manner which projects theological meanings
into scientific discourse (or natural scientific meanings into biblical narrative). A
theology of nature perspective which introduces second naïveté understandings of
theological formulae reframes doctrinal concepts scientifically and scientific concepts
theologically. Another way of describing the relationship of nonreciprocal dependence in
this kind of large-scale double-scope blending is that natural scientific understandings
gain theological significance within theological discourse, not scientific discourse.
Double-scope blending is a powerful hermeneutical tool in the present case for at
least three reasons: (1) its explanatory power for analyzing the creation of new meanings
at the cognitive-linguistic level;70 (2) its ability to facilitate this analysis across vastly
different conceptual domains such as the natural sciences, biblical studies, and Christian
theology, anthropology, and ethics; and (3) its ability to locate an empirically testable
locus of human uniqueness with potentially monumental implications for biblically-based
Christian anthropology and ethics. If double-scope conceptual integration is vital to the
69
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human ability to create new meanings, and if there is any viability to Hefner’s insight that
human beings image God as free and responsible creators of meanings, this way of
accounting for Homo sapiens’ meaning-making capacities may also be a very fruitful
way of understanding the origins and development of the image of God and the
knowledge of good and evil as our shared human condition and the myth-symbols aimed
at helping us to understand it.
Furthermore, a hermeneutical procedure for constructing second naïveté
understanding of myth-symbols that is grounded in conceptual integration theory is wellsuited for both the synchronic and diachronic aspects of such an endeavor. Hermeneutical
analysis in terms of (double-scope) conceptual integration can locate and evaluate ways
of bringing together sources from multiple contemporary disciplines and the findings of
historical-critical scholarship in order to construct a second naïveté understanding of the
image of God and the knowledge of good and evil as an anthropological framework with
the ability to reframe ethical discourse, as well.
The following illustration is adapted from Fauconnier and Turner’s “basic
diagram” for visualizing the cognitive process of conceptual integration.71 I have added
explanatory notes in parentheses to label the elements of Fauconnier and Turner’s
diagram on the left. On the right I have filled out conceptual integration diagram to show
in simple terms how Hefner’s created co-creator theory may be interpreted as a blended,
second naïveté understanding of Homo sapiens’ bioculturally-constituted uniqueness.
Chapter 4 below contains more detailed diagrams illustrating some of the salient
conceptual elements that go into explaining what it might mean to emerge in the image of
God with a knowledge of good and evil.
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Figure 1: (Double-Scope) Conceptual Integration "Basic Diagram"

In a sense, the hermeneutical procedure illustrated in figure 1 has been around as
long as language itself and is just as transparent—and opaque—as linguistic ability.
Though double-scope conceptual integration is the most complex form of blending
Fauconnier and Turner have identified, they propose that without this mental capacity,
our species would never have developed language, not even a “simple” language utilizing
only less complex forms of blending capacity. By extension, they hypothesize that the
related cultural singularities of “art, music, science, fashions of dress, dance,
mathematics,” ethics, politics, economics, religion, etc. would never have emerged,
because these all “precipitate as products of Double-Scope conceptual integration.”72
With these behaviors emerge everything considered to be unique about human-being.
Because the concepts of the image of God and the knowledge of good and evil are, in
part, statements about human uniqueness, a relatively detailed cognitive linguistic
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account of the origin, evolution, and operation of linguistic ability over the next several
pages is warranted for several reasons.
First, an evolutionary account of the emergence of blending capacity situates
human uniqueness within the developmental continuum shared by all life on earth,
implying that the image of God and the knowledge of good and evil are of a piece with
the rest of the creation. Second, as an explanation of how language and its meanings
emerge and evolve, conceptual integration theory constitutes a general hermeneutic
applicable across disciplines, including the natural sciences, biblical studies, theology,
and ethics. Third, the biblical concepts of the image of God and the knowledge of good
and evil and any interpretation of them are the results of conceptual integration. And
fourth, as I argue in various way throughout each of the following chapters, the human
ability and necessity to create and live together responsibly within a symbolic world of
meanings resides at the heart of what it means and has always meant for Homo sapiens to
bear the image of God with a knowledge of good and evil.
Evolutionarily speaking, the emergence of these self-defining and self-directing
capabilities that would come to be associated with bearing the image of God developed
rather suddenly and recently. According to Fauconnier and Turner, double-scope
blending capacity accounts for why language is “an all-or-nothing” behavior, why it is
not present in any other species, why if it is present at all it is present in abundance:
If the species has not reached the stage of Double-Scope blending, it will
not develop language at all, since the least aspects of grammar require it.
But if it has reached the stage of Double-Scope blending, it can very
rapidly develop a full language in cultural time because it has all the
necessary prerequisites for a full set of grammatical integrations.73
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The rapid development of linguistic ability in toddlers may illustrate this very
phenomenon in the evolution or our species on a microcosmic scale. In their hypothesis
for the origin of language, Fauconnier and Turner argue that double-scope conceptual
integration is uniquely and constitutively human in that the emergence of this cognitive
ability is intrinsic to the advent of behaviorally modern Homo sapiens.74 If this cognitive
ability is not afforded by the neurological infrastructure of the brain, the capacity for
other forms of conceptual integration will not simply produce truncated systems of
symbolization such as language. Why not? In Fauconnier and Turner’s understanding:
There is every reason to think that some species are able to operate
efficiently in separate domains of, say, tool use, mating, and eating
without being able to perform these abstractions and integrations. If that is
so, then grammar would be of no use to them, because they cannot
perform the conceptual integrations that grammar serves to prompt. But
couldn’t they just have a simpler grammar? The only way they could have
a simpler grammar and yet have descriptions in language for what happens
would be by having separate forms and words for everything that happens
in all the different domains. But the world is infinitely too rich for that to
be of any use. Trying to carry around ‘language’ of that size would be
crippling.75
The ability to apply a relatively small vocabulary to a potentially limitless number of
situations has a great deal to do with what is so astoundingly unique about human beings,
especially because nearly all of us do it so effortlessly. This effortlessness can be
illustrated in rereading the final sentence of the above quotation. Its eleven words prompt
an efficient blending of many concepts from very different behavioral domains—
language and carrying and object. Framing this blend requires projecting an imagined
attempt to carry around a large, heavy object, which results in the “crippling” of the
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would-be carrier—an inability to either bear the object or move with it. Yet the object at
issue is not a physical object at all, but “language.”
Another salient feature of this blend is that the framing cluster of concepts
belongs to the domain of a physical activity. Conceptual thought and language are
functions of the embodied human brain. Cognitive linguist George Lakoff even defines
conceptual blends as “neural bindings across distinct structures.”76 The most basic
concepts, as the raw materials for forming conceptual blends, refer to commonplace
sensory-motor phenomena that span all cultures. For Lakoff, certain blends belong to a
class he calls “primary metaphors,” which are able to appertain to a number of more
abstract and complex situations and expressions. One such primary metaphor is that
“Difficulties are Impediments to Motion” toward a “destination,” which is the purpose or
goal of the motion.77 For Fauconnier and Turner, without double-scope blending, it
would impossible to compose and comprehend the statement, “Trying to carry around
‘language’ of that size would be crippling.” Containing an example of single-scope
conceptual integration, this concise and clever turn of phrase makes a powerful case in
point for the hypothesis that myriad concepts supposed to have literal or univocal
significance in verbal representation are actually metaphors stemming from more basic
sensory-motor experiences.
Lakoff and colleague Mark Johnson argue persuasively that from the most basic
and intimate of human interactions to the most intellectual of discourses, many
irreducible speech forms do not have domain-specific meanings, or their contextual
meanings are unavailable apart from a projection of meaning from more basic domains of
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experience and behavior. Much of human thought and language is made possible by
broad-spectrum metaphors like “more is up,” “love is a journey,” and “affection is
warmth.”78 While many of these “metaphors we live by” could be described as singlescope blends, Fauconnier and Turner argue convincingly that the capacity for doublescope conceptual integration is a kind of top-down requirement for developing language
and its regulatory grammar.
In double-scope blends, multiple input spaces play a role in framing the blend,
giving shape and structure to new conceptual relations within the blended mental space.
While not all blends are as complex as those involving double-scope conceptual
integration, the criteria for assessing the truth value of any blend are the same. The
meaning generated by its concepts and their relations must be found to be semantically
proper, logically valid, and in accord with what is understood to be the case.79 The new
conceptual relations seeming to make sense of the reality construed by the conceptual
integration are preserved in the blend. Those that do not are discarded or ignored. For
Fauconnier and Turner, these conceptual relations constitute the grammar of the blend.80
The reasons for depicting grammar in this way are many. For one, the definition
of grammar as the in vivo cognitive relations among meanings in brain-based conceptual
integration networks is testable by the four criteria of theoretical adequacy—explanatory
and predictive power, internal and external coherence, comprehensiveness, and fertility
or fruitfulness. That is, one can test (1) whether this construal of grammar fits and
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extends the data characterizing linguistic performance as an embodied cognitive function;
(2) whether it coherently describes (within and among scientific disciplines) ways in
which meanings arise and gain their structure, flexibility, and strength in the synaptic
interconnections of the brain’s neurons and neuronal regions, as in Lakoff’s neural theory
of metaphor;81 (3) whether conceptual integration theory and its typology of networks are
able to apply this cognitive-linguistic definition of grammar to the simplest grammatical
constructions as well as the most complex instances of analogy, metaphor, and
metonymy, including those in science, art, and religion; and (4) whether conceptual
integration theory is ripe for application in hermeneutics, interdisciplinary dialogue, and
ethical and theological discourse.
The hermeneutics of constructing a second naïveté understanding of the image of
God and the knowledge of good and evil developed here are designed to test these
possibilities heuristically, by engaging in large-scale double-scope conceptual integration
across disciplinary and historical-cultural distances and exploring the novel
anthropological, ethical, and theological meanings and inferences that emerge from these
efforts. To speak of human uniqueness in terms of bearing the image of God with a
knowledge of good and evil as a natural result of biocultural evolution is to frame the
findings of evolutionary sciences and related disciplines by the theological concepts of
createdness, purpose, and wholesomeness. To speak of the myth-symbols of Genesis 1-3
as a fruitful interpretation of the results of biocultural evolution is to frame the concepts
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of the image of God and the knowledge of good and evil by concepts such as genetics,
indeterminacy, emergence, natural selection, and adaptation.
In Fauconnier and Turner’s conceptual integration theory, the projected and
emergent meanings brought about by blending these conceptual frames do not result in
mere equivocation or the erasure of original meanings. In this exercise of
interdisciplinary conceptual integration toward a second naïveté understanding of biblical
myth-symbols, scientific meanings remain, while gaining novel, organically related, and
irreducible emergent meanings in theological anthropology and ethics. Likewise, ancient
near eastern meanings remain, while gaining novel, organically related, and irreducible
emergent meanings in contemporary Christian anthropology and ethics. As emergent,
these new meanings are able to exert a whole-part or top-down influence, not in the sense
of interdisciplinary conflation or anachronism, but to the extent that they present new
conceptual frames for the perennial Christian symbols of human self-understanding and
the beliefs and actions—the faith, hope, and love—that follow suit. The novel meanings
that emerge from these newly-integrated conceptual frames open up new conceptual
horizons for several areas of systematic theology—not only Christian anthropology and
ethics, but also interrelated theological loci to which this study can only allude, such as
doctrines of creation and divine action, Christology, “fall” and original sin, soteriology,
and eschatology.
Whether in the creation of new meanings or the advent of new and more complex
living structures and capacities, creation through “emergence” is integral to
understanding what it means to have emerged in the image of God with a knowledge of
good and evil. This statement resonates harmoniously with Hefner’s suggestion that
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“what is at the core of this analogy [of the image of God] today is the character of Homo
sapiens as a free creator of meanings, one who takes action based on those meanings and
is also responsible for those meanings and actions.”82 Amplifying this harmony means
applying the concept of emergence to theological anthropology and ethics in both its
ontological and epistemological-hermeneutical forms. Relating these two types of
emergence through a biocultural model of human development means highlighting the
additional point that these emergent realities are coadaptive. That is, the evolutionary
emergence of the human brain-mind itself emerges into a conditioned but open-ended
world of uniquely human meanings, invigorated by the willful creation of linguistic
concepts and other forms of symbolic understanding, including scientific and religious
understandings.83 Imaging God is ontological and/because it is performative, involving
the creation of new meanings that allow and call for genuinely novel, unpredictable, and
irreducible forms of knowledge and agency. As a species of defined self-definers, human
creatures are blessed and cursed with the task of deciding what our role in the world is
and what its future will hold. For better or worse, constructing a second-naïveté
understanding of the image of God and the knowledge of good and evil as mutually
entailed symbols which frame what it means to exist and act as a free and responsible
person is an exercise of created co-creation—of God-imaging agency and its dynamic,
open-ended, and participatory nature. Homo sapiens have emerged with the unique
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ability to construe, and thereby constitute reality for themselves, in conditioned yet free
and responsible ways.
This interconnection of human ontology, epistemology, and agency comes into
clearer focus through juxtaposing the works of Fauconnier and Turner and emergentist
Philip Clayton. For the former, conceptual blends gain emergent structure “in three
(interrelated) ways:”
Composition: taken together, the projections from the Inputs make new
relations available which didn’t exist in the separate inputs.
Completion: knowledge of background frames and cognitive and cultural
models allows the composite structure projected in to the Blend from the
Inputs to be viewed as part of a larger self-contained structure in the
Blend. The pattern in the Blend triggered by the inherited structures is
‘completed’ into the larger, emergent structure.
Elaboration: the structure in the Blend can then be elaborated. This is
“running the Blend.” It consists in cognitive work performed within the
Blend, according to its own emergent logic.84
This definition of emergent neuro-cognitive structures is parallel to Clayton’s outline of
the features that define emergent physical and biological structures and the properties
they display:
1) Ontological physicalism: All that exists in the space-time world are the
basic particles recognized by physics and their aggregates.
2) Property emergence: When aggregates of material particles attain an
appropriate level of organizational complexity, genuinely novel
properties emerge in these complex systems.
3) The irreducibility of the emergence: Emergent properties are
irreducible to, and unpredictable from, the lower-level phenomena
from which they emerge.
4) Downward causation: Higher-level entities causally affect their lowerlevel constituents.85
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According to this fourfold definition, emergent phenomena bear a supervenient
causal influence upon the constituent parts, processes, and properties which constitute
them. In complex systems, supervenient emergent dynamics like life and consciousness
are the causally efficacious properties of the whole which are distinct from the simple
sum of the properties of the parts. Irreducible realities require irreducible modes of
explanation. Biological explanations transcend those of physics. Cultural explanations
transcend those of biology. Theological explanations transcend those of purely empirical
inquiry. These ascents in scale require new kinds of meanings to emerge.
In this vein Fauconnier and Turner’s theory for the origin of language connects
these two types of emergence, as does neuroscientist Terrence Deacon’s recent work
showcased in chapter 3 below. For these scientists, the creation of new meanings is an
emergent phenomenon, a functional “singularity” made possible by the stepwise
evolution of the human brain.86 New kinds of meanings can emerge because a new kind
of being has emerged—human-being.
Behaviorally modern human-being is a result of biocultural evolution. Homo
sapiens are constituted, remarks Hefner, by two confluent streams of information: “The
one streams is inherited genetic information, the other is cultural information. Both of
these streams come together in the central nervous system. Since they have coevolved and
coadapted together, they are one reality, not two.”87 In more general terms, traditional
arguments over the relative influence of “nature” vs. “nurture” cast a false dichotomy. The
emergence of behaviorally modern humanity has afforded a kind of free and responsible
Oxford University Press, 2006), 2; cf. Philip Clayton, Mind and Emergence: From Quantum to
Consciousness (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 4.
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“nature” entailing unprecedented capacities for “nurture,” including the abilities to predict
the consequences of human actions, form value judgments, and choose among various
courses of action.88 Where the embodied and socially embedded human brain-mind is
concerned, “More nature allows more nurture,” quip Cosmides and Tooby.89
Evolutionary psychology (EP) is a natural-scientific research framework for
analyzing the bioculturally evolved brain and its functioning. Much of what scientific and
theological anthropology hold to be uniquely human relates directly to these aspects of
human-being. For this reason, the following two chapters explicate how a biocultural
model of human-being, colored by EP and framed by an emergentist perspective, is
instrumental in developing a second naïveté understanding of the image of God and the
knowledge of good and evil as a conceptual framework for guiding anthropological and
ethical discourse and the actions they beget.
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CHAPTER 2
BIOCULTURAL EVOLUTION AND EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY:
INTEGRATING CONCEPTS
When evolutionary psychologists John Tooby and Leda Cosmides explain what they
mean by their statement, “More nature allows more nurture,” they develop an argument
for why and how to integrate the biological, cognitive, and social sciences. Addressing
the “nature-nurture” discussion, they stress that the cognitive abilities generally
associated with “nurture” are coadapted products or by-products of humanity’s
underlying biological “nature” and its development. Evolutionary Psychology (EP)
presents a powerful set of tools for relating biology and behavior in non-reductionistic
ways, exposing the false dichotomy which many insert between nature and nurture,
between biology and culture. Chance, necessity, and freedom, it turns out, are not
mutually exclusive. Cosmides and Tooby are able to distinguish between biological and
behavioral explanations without divorcing them. In their case, EP is a research
framework espousing a nonreductive biocultural model of human evolution. I set out in
this chapter to paint a biocultural portrait of human uniqueness able to emerge into a
second naïveté understanding of the image of God and the knowledge of good and evil.
To accomplish this goal, the first three sections of this chapter define the concept
of biocultural evolution, highlight the significance of symbolization in a biocultural
model of human uniqueness, and present a biocultural definition of “full” humanity.
Explored subsequently are the notions of domain specificity in cognition and culture and
the “symbolic threshold” as an indicator for the advent of the image of God. The final
section delves into specific aspects of EP as a steadily advancing biocultural research
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platform able to inform a second naïveté interpretation of the image of God and the
knowledge of good and evil.
Biocultural evolution defined
Defined most succinctly by theologian Philip Hefner:
Biocultural evolution refers to (1) the emergence, within the physical
realm, of biological processes of evolution that themselves generate the
phenomenon of culture; and (2) to the distinctive, non-Darwinian,
dynamic processes by which culture proceeds, while at the same time
existing in a relationship of symbiosis with the physical-biological
processes in which it emerged and in which it continues to operate.90
Many cultural processes have Darwinian aims, in that they pertain, directly or indirectly,
to assuring the survival of oneself and one’s offspring, thereby securing the passage of
genetic material to subsequent generations. In addition, cultural information, like genetic
information, is subject to principles of selection which test its ability to foster skills and
behaviors suited to present ecological and social contexts. Socially and ecologically
appropriate behaviors are more likely to propagate pedagogically across generations.
At the same time, Hefner’s definition of culture implies the ways in which
cultural processes are non-Darwinian. For him, “Culture is defined as learned and taught
patterns of behavior, together with the symbol systems that contextualize and interpret
the behavior.”91 These behaviors and symbolic systems of contextualization are non-
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Darwinian because even though human biology and culture are co-adaptive, co-emergent,
and co-conditioning, they are not co-determined. As an integral aspect of the human
phenotype in its phylogenetic (species-wide) and ontogenetic (individual) development,
culture is an expression of the human genotype. Every human being’s genetic inheritance
confers all the biological information needed to produce a culturally embedded person,
but not the cultural information that makes personhood possible. For reasons that become
clearer as this chapter progresses, culture and the uniquely human characteristics that
make culture possible and necessary are emergent phenomena, involving the
conscientious creation, implementation, and evaluation of emergent meanings. I contend
that our species has been equipped and called to bear the image of God with a knowledge
of good and evil through this unique form of creativity, emerging and evolving through
biocultural processes.
Genetic and cultural information are two different kinds of information, each with
distinct and irreducible dynamics governing their creation, replication, and evolution. The
existence, scope, and malleability of cultural information are ontologically dependent on
genetic information, but not vice versa, because phenotype arises from genotype.
However, cultural information is able to exert a supervening influence on genetic

2) Geographic differentiation in behavior, i.e., differences between separated populations, is an
important and distinctive common ground for cultural behavior, and has been well documented in
chimpanzees, orangutans, and humans.
3) The potential for change across generations is a final hallmark of primate cultural behavior. In
modern humans, cultural variations are cumulative: the inventions of many generations are
stockpiled, creating vast repositories of social information. In nonhuman primates there is less
evidence for such accumulation (Alone in the World?: Human Uniqueness in Science and
Theology [Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans, 2006], 222).
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information, especially trans-generationally, by means of sexual (mate) selection that is
influenced by cultural considerations.92
Cultural information such as ethical values and religious beliefs also allows
individuals and groups to interpret experiences critically and respond conscientiously.
Culturally-informed actions may override biologically primed behavioral responses.
Impulsive behaviors and knee-jerk reactions which may have evolved to serve an adaptive
function in past environments may encounter social sanction where they conflict with
values-laden understandings and the norms they generate. Proceeding according to their
own set of rules for selection and expression, the content and course of culture are
unpredictable, even in principle, from genetic information and its dynamics.
Interdisciplinary theologian J. Wentzel van Huyssteen expresses certainty that “the
emergence of culture has been propelled by organic forces, but, however crucial, the
biological approach will not be sufficient to explain the complex and peculiar paths of
cultural evolution.”93 As an outworking of emergent phenomena, “Cultural evolution
exhibits its own characteristics and systems conditions,” notes van Huyssteen.94 It involves
irreducible dynamic processes, requiring distinct forms of explanation and evaluation.
According to Hefner’s definition, the emergence and development of culture
require human forms of symbolization, including language. Cognitive linguists Gilles
Fauconnier and Mark Turner present strong evidence that linguistic ability requires the
emergence of double-scope conceptual integration and the capacity it affords to create
novel meanings, making possible new forms of understanding and agency. These abilities
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to construe the world and its significance symbolically, to evaluate and amend such
construals, and to act accordingly entail what Hefner calls “freedom”—“the condition of
existence in which humans unavoidably face the necessity of both making choices that
govern their behavior and of constructing the stories that contextualize and hence justify
those choices.”95
Defined this way, freedom includes responsibility vis-à-vis the requirement that
cultural meanings find fitness within their ecological and social settings. Generally,
people hold one another accountable to those meanings which they and their communities
understand to provide the greatest explanatory power and best moral outcomes for the
individual and the group. What is more, and as implied in the above chapter, these two
criteria for truthfulness—explanatory power and moral outcome—are mutually
informative and mutually reinforcing. Wholesome living means thriving in light of
(and/or in spite of) what really is (understood to be the case). Thus genuine knowledge of
reality would seem to be a key component to promoting wholesomeness.96 The question
at hand is whether (or at least how) concepts such as “creator” and “creation” might
remain intellectually and morally helpful references, whether, as Hefner suggests, it is
fruitful to transport the myth-symbols of the image of God and the knowledge of good
and evil “into the realm of contemporary, second-naivete [sic] experience, and enable
them to coalesce with our experience to provide genuine knowledge of reality, for the
sake of our wholesome living.”97 What comes to light in the process of engaging these
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questions is a proposal that when viewed from the “bottom-up,” the image of God and the
knowledge of good and evil are biocultural products of the natural world, which are fully
embedded within it, and which confer the response-ability to discern, construe, and enact
God’s purposes for the world as the creation. This study aims to illumine an
understanding of what it means to emerge in the image of God, to traverse a path from
evolution to ethics through a second-naïveté understanding of Christian anthropology.
While biocultural evolutionary models of human origins cannot generate a
theological anthropology or fully participate in Christian ethical discourse, they can
inform the latter by providing natural scientific explanations for how Homo sapiens
became self-conscious and self-critical creators, receptors, and transmitters of symbolic
meanings. Religious and theological meanings are among the cultural meanings that have
emerged, developed, and come to bear a supervening influence on human selfunderstandings and the actions they motivate and justify. Hefner reflects this biocultural
state of affairs in characterizing the image of God as both myth-symbol and the ontoepistemological conditions necessary to conceptualize and/or actualize this human
condition. Once again, for Hefner, “at the core of this analogy [of the image of God]
today is the character of Homo sapiens as a free creator of meanings, one who takes
action based on those meanings and is also responsible for those meanings and actions.”98
Hefner’s theory of the created co-creator is not a scientific theory. His is a theological
theory dependent upon, but not reducible to, well-founded and ecumenically accessible
scientific conceptions of Homo sapiens as an active participant in the creation through
biocultural processes. According to this religious perspective, human beings and their
cultures have emerged in and through the natural world to bear a creative influence upon
98
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it in ways that reflect an ability to discern, construe, and enact what are understood to be
the creator’s intentions for the human and nonhuman world.
According to Hefner, “The appearance of culture is directly correlated to the
central nervous system, and the dramatic increase in the significance of culture in the
human species is correlated with the equally dramatic development of the human
brain.”99 In this vein EP, is an integration of scientific data and disciplines that presents a
paradigm for framing biocultural evolutionary theory. EP opens new avenues for
systematic cultural analysis, by describing culture as a result of the physically embodied,
socially embedded human mind, whose cognitive mechanisms for navigating its
ecological and social environments are the adaptational outworkings of the human brain,
an organ designed by natural selection “to extract information from the environment and
use that information to generate behavior and regulate physiology.”100 For this reason,
when framed by an emergentist perspective, EP can be a powerful hermeneutical tool for
constructing a second naïveté interpretation of the image of God and the knowledge of
good and evil. As myth-symbols, these theological concepts are (co-created) products of
human cognition and culture, examined here for their potential to provide genuine
knowledge of what constitutes human-being and how this self-understanding may serve
as a starting point for conducting ethical discourse effecting positive moral outcomes.
The ethical results of human self-understanding are coveted and contested
territory, because positive moral outcomes are not self-evident or self-producing in
biocultural evolution. Yet, the stakes involved in the ongoing development of cultural
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meanings could not be higher. Hefner notes with an air of warning that the confluent
streams of genetic and cultural information that constitute what he calls the “two-natured
character of the human”
often appear to be quite different from each other and that they proceed
with different sets of dynamics and principles. We also understand that
they have been selected to mix sufficiently well to differentiate humanity
from other forms of life and that, even though they flow in different
channels, these channels merge in the human brain. The relation between
them is at times a tense one at best. The cultural reality can easily put the
biological to death, just as the latter can apparently withhold its
cooperation with the former.101
Yet without this tense relationship between nature and nurture, human-being would not
be human. Hefner continues:
It is the cultural agency that makes life interesting; culture lifts human
existence to its heights, and it also plunges us into the depths.
Nevertheless, for humans the genetic agent has both mandated the
necessity and provided the possibility for the cultural reality, just as it
holds the final cards in the game of life, and if those cards are played in a
fatal manner, culture is obliterated. The cultural and the genetic have
coadapted to each other and to their common environments so as to
coevolve, in a relationship that may be termed symbiotic.102
In provisional but plausible ways, EP provides a systemic natural scientific
understanding of how the metaphorical symbionts of genes and culture, of nature and
nurture, come to cooperate and conflict in the ways Hefner indicates, even if, as he
admits, “[w]e are far from understanding adequately how these two dimensions of human
life and its evolution are related.”103 EP can help explain, for example, how “[w]hat we
call freedom is rooted in the genetically controlled adaptive plasticity of the human
phenotype.”104 Within an emergentist perspective, EP can help to indicate the biological
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roots of cultural values, including those infused with religious and theological
significance. According to EP, the cognitive mechanisms involved in religious and
theological knowledge are naturally selected, genetically controlled, brain-based mental
adaptations or by-products thereof.105 Whatever the image of God and the knowledge of
good and evil are conceived to be, this conception is a cultural product of these
systemically integrated neuro-cognitive mechanisms. In various and sometimes disparate
ways across the spectrum of Judeo-Christian traditions, all strands of exegetical and
theological scholarship interpret these cognitive mechanisms to be involved in bearing
the image and likeness of God with a knowledge of good and evil. A biocultural
theological anthropology informed by EP and framed by an emergentist perspective
facilitates the second naïveté understanding that, along with its systemically integrated,
coevolved, and coadapted bodily counterparts and constituents, the emergent human
mind and many of its cultural products are the loci of the image of God and the
knowledge of good and evil.
Biocultural evolution and symbolization
The socially embedded human mind is a somatically-based conduit and creator of
what Hefner terms “extrasomatic information,”106 what neuropsychologist Warren S.
Brown calls “external scaffolding,”107 or what evolutionary psychologists Pascal Boyer
and H. Clark Barrett call an “external database.”108 That this extrasomatic information is
constitutive of human-being in general and human beings in particular is perhaps more
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well known and less controversial than the claim that this symbolically-borne cultural
information takes part in the divine image. Culture enables dynamic modes of being
human capable of reflecting, representing, even extending the creator’s purposes for the
creation beyond the results of biological evolution. The “distinctive, non-Darwinian,
dynamic processes by which culture proceeds” have emerged to bear a non-Darwinian
teleonomy (apparent purposefulness or end-directedness), through the trans-biological
functions of ethics and religion among other behavioral domains.109 Theologically and
eschatologically speaking, this non-Darwinian teleonomy might properly be called a
trans-Darwinian teleology, a “goal” of the natural world intended, initiated, and
facilitated by its creator to emerge through natural processes.
As symbionts the biocultural streams information that constitute human existence
have coevolved to subserve the survival of their host species and its individual members.
The extreme degree and singular kinds of social contact that characterizes human life
have come about in evolutionary time in order to solve the many evolutionary problems
encountered recurrently in past environments—e.g., securing food and water, caring for
young, protecting against predators and competitors, etc.
At the same time, large-group dynamics create their own adaptive difficulties.
Even if culture proceeds by non-Darwinian dynamic principles, it is, in part, demanded
by them, because culture and the cognitive processes undergirding it have emerged and
evolved to negotiate between biological and social demands. At bottom, as Hefner
argues, cultural staples such as ethics, myth, and religion are necessitated in no small way
by the fact that “[h]umans must live cooperatively in large communities of persons who
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are not kin relatives—that is, who are genetic competitors.”110 In order to make the
ecological and social environments conducive to human survival and wellbeing,
psychosomatic mechanisms have evolved to facilitate the adaptive use of extrasomatic
information that occurs naturally in these environments. These cognitive functions also
enable us to create, utilize, and revise an open ended web of symbols and technological
artifacts which become the external database or external scaffolding of culture. This
external scaffolding helps us to navigate life’s demands with unparalleled efficiency.
According to Brown, human beings rely so heavily “on external supports for
augmenting mental processing” that “external scaffolding plays a critical role in the
emergence of efficacious mental processes,” which in turn create and manipulate novel
forms of external scaffolding.111 Quoting cognitive scientist and philosopher Andy Clark,
Brown suggests, “‘We use intelligence to structure our environment so that we can
succeed with less intelligence. Our brains make the world smart so that we can be dumb
in peace!’”112 Because external scaffolding has catalyzed the formation of our brains and
their mental functioning, and because this mental functioning is responsible for the
human forms of external scaffolding comprising culture, Brown proposes with Clark that
“‘[i]t is the human brain plus these chunks of external scaffolding that finally constitutes
the smart, rational inference engine we call mind.’”113 Accordingly, Brown argues
persuasively that “mind is a description of the brain and body operating as one in solving
real problems in the field of action.”114
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The human “mind” is not a possession of the individual in isolation. Neither is the
mind a mere unidirectional expression of him or her ab intra ad extra. Homo sapiens are
biocultural organisms, constituted as persons in vivo through the confluence of both
streams of information—biological and cultural. Because these streams are coadapted
and mutually inextricable, the human phenotype as a bearer of the image of God cannot
have sprung from only one of these streams.
As myth-symbols the image of God and the knowledge of good and evil are able
to play an irreducible role in structuring the cultural-linguistic scaffolding of the mind,
the self, the person. The unique and characteristically human abilities and activities to
which these symbols refer emerge with the ability to appreciate and live by the kinds of
meanings they encode. As philosopher Charles Taylor explains:
A fully competent human agent not only has some understanding (which
may be also more or less misunderstanding) of [her- or] himself, but is
partly constituted by this understanding. […T]o be a full human agent, to
be a person or self in the ordinary meaning, is to exist in a space defined
by distinctions of worth. A self is a being for whom certain questions of
categoric value have arisen, and received at least partial answer.115
As for the source of these distinctions and values, no one comes by them ex nihilo or
even solo ex se. No person is a recipient or repository of clear and distinct ideas, as if
some kind of pure notion could arise unfettered by the forms of life, to use Wittgenstein’s
term, out of which all concepts emerge.116 Ironically, Descartes’ “ego” is only able to
utter its skeptical and solipsistic “cogito ergo sum” because that which it doubts—the
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cultural-linguistic world supposedly outside the self—has provided it with the symbolic
world in which to make such claims.117 For Taylor:
The community is not simply an aggregation of individuals; nor is there
simply a causal interaction between the two. The community is also
constitutive of the individual, in the sense that the self-interpretations
which define him are drawn from the interchange which the community
carries on. A human being alone is an impossibility, not just de facto, but
as it were de jure. Outside of the continuing conversation of a community,
which provides the language by which we draw our background
distinctions, human agency […] would be not just impossible, but
inconceivable. […] On our own, as Aristotle says, we would be either
beasts or Gods.118
Through this line of reasoning, Taylor acts as both philosopher of language and
philosopher of science, concluding that reductionist models of human behavior set forth
in some strands of natural scientific thought betray the irreducible kinds of agency
required to create such self-definitions.119 Epistemologically and (thus) hermeneutically,
reductionism and its cousin positivism have very little to contribute to discussions about
human nature, according to Taylor, because a species of defined self-definers has no
external perspective from which to gain this kind of objectivity: “A being who exists only
in [communally-borne] self-interpretation cannot be understood absolutely.”120 In
addition, the background distinctions and cultural impetuses behind any human selfunderstanding are values-laden, or they would not be worth the effort it takes to
formulate them. Reductive natural scientific explanations of human biology and behavior
can be appropriate and complete, according to the methodological exigencies of their
respective disciplines. However, these explanations cannot claim comprehensiveness
117
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where they cannot account for the supervening cultural values according to which they
approach their objects of study.121
Moving with and beyond Taylor’s integration of language, meaning, and human
nature, this study argues that emergence and emergent meaning in biocultural evolution
are constitutive of human being and agency, and as such, co-constitutive of the image of
God and the knowledge of good and evil. Our “full” humanity is a function of our
biology and its cultural expression.
Biocultural evolution and “full” humanity
So constitutive of humankind are its symbols-laden cultures that many scholars
cite paleoanthropological evidence for the rapid buildup of this external scaffolding to
date the evolutionary advent of “full” humanity. The term fully human encodes one of
those person-defining “distinctions of worth” already slipped into Taylor’s definition of
what it means “to be a full human agent, to be a person or self in the ordinary
meaning.”122 Where the image of God is coterminous with this distinction, the concept of
full humanity gains theological amplification. And where the knowledge of good and evil
finds its way into the semantic range of this conceptual cluster, there is a word of warning
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that these distinctions of worth might arise to foster positive and/or negative moral
outcomes. For these reasons van Huyssteen cautions “that whatever we define as our true
‘humanness,’ or even our human uniqueness, ultimately reveals a deeply ambivalent
moral choice, for we are not just biological creatures, but as cultural creatures we have
the ability to determine whom we are going to include, or not, as part of ‘us.’”123
Paleoanthropologist Ian Tattersall and archeologist Steven Mithen date the advent
of behaviorally modern human beings (Homo sapiens sapiens124) to about 50,000 years
ago, in contrast to the arrival of anatomically modern human species (Homo sapiens)
200,000 to 100,000 years ago in Africa. Relying on these findings, van Huyssteen,
Fauconnier, and Turner present their own takes on how our species took this biocultural
evolutionary step and why it was so significant.125 For Fauconnier and Turner the
suggestion of this relatively late date for the birth of full humanity stems largely from the
choice to define behavioral modernness in terms of the capacity for double-scope
conceptual integration and the paleoanthropological evidence for its inception. That is,
the designation of behavioral modernness rests on the rare but reliable evidence for a
symbol- and language-based external scaffolding of cultural information, revealing the
socially-embedded creation, transmission, and evolution of values-laden distinctions—
personal, social, moral, and even proto-religious concepts. Van Huyssteen presents the
same argument in a more detailed form, citing reasons for calling the behaviorally
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modern Homo sapiens of the Upper Paleolithic era (ca. 45,000 to 10,000 years ago)
“fully human.” As direct descendents of these Cro-Magnon people, this means “us.”126
During this time, “we” left evidence of several sudden and interrelated cultural
innovations, including the abilities to diversify, complexify, and standardize stone tool
making; to carve detailed objects made of bone, antler, and ivory; to manufacture tools by
means of others (i.e., compound tool use); to develop technologies much more quickly
and with regional diversity; to ornament ourselves, our dwellings, and our dead; to
compose pieces of representational and ritual-based art; to specialize and systematize
animal exploitation; to increase the size and density of the total and local human
populations; and to form organized settlements with well-defined habitable structures.127
This period of rapid behavioral advancement coincides with what
paleoanthropologists call the “Upper Paleolithic Revolution or the ‘Creative Explosion’”
evidenced in the artifacts and images dated to this time, such as those immortalized in the
cave “art” discovered in the Iberian Peninsula and adjacent regions. 128 What these people
left behind indicates the presence of a unique form of consciousness emerging from a
host of integrated neuro-cognitive and motor operations and their external scaffolding.
This species-defining period in biocultural evolution may indeed signal a kind of
creative explosion—the “big bang” of Homo sapiens’ symbolic universe (or multiverse).
Nestled within the unbounded and ever-expanding symbolic universe of the socially and
ecologically embedded human mind lies the lesser infinity of language, comprising many
of the most concrete and therefore manipulable objects within this world. This mindover-symbolic-matter dynamic translates into a qualitatively distinct—though always
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conditioned—creative capacity for construing, crafting, and thereby constituting the self
and its environment. Van Huyssteen’s poignant characterization of this biocultural
evolutionary development bears repeating:
In a sense we are not simply more intelligent than other species, we are
also differently intelligent: intelligent in a manner that allows us not only
to view ourselves and thus be self-aware, but also to manipulate the
environment around us in a qualitatively unique way. In both of these
forms of self-reflection our linguistic abilities are crucially important, and
almost all the literature in [the] field [of paleoanthropology] acknowledges
the central role that language plays in human intelligence. As far as we
humans go, language is intimately tied up with our complex symbolical
capacities, and is in fact the medium through which we explain those
capacities to ourselves. […] Naturally, all this ties in with that most
mysterious of organs, the human brain, an organ with its own evolutionary
history, which is directly linked with the dramatic evidence for art, music,
and symbol very early on in the history of our species. It is precisely this
symbolism that lies at the very heart of what it means to be human. In fact,
if there is one single thing that distinguishes humans form all other lifeforms, living or extinct, it is the capacity for symbolic thought, the ability
to generate complex mental symbols and to manipulate them into new
combinations. Tattersall correctly argues that this is the very foundation of
imagination and creativity, of the unique ability of humans to create a
world in the mind and then re-create it in the real world outside
themselves.129
Following Mithen, van Huyssteen calls this novel and humanizing form of
symbolic intelligence “cognitive fluidity,” signifying humankind’s open-ended ability to
combine various behavioral and cognitive domains conceptually through symbolization,
yielding qualitatively distinct meanings and myriad cultural artifacts of a potentially
limitless variety.130 Mithen hypothesizes that the advent of language predates and feeds
into the cognitive fluidity that resulted in the Creative Explosion. Also indebted to
Mithen, but disagreeing with this facet of his theory, Fauconnier and Turner’s argue more
coherently that both language and the Creative Explosion of the Upper Paleolithic “came
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about once the continuous improvement of blending capacity reached the critical level of
Double-Scope blending.”131 This aspect of Fauconnier and Turner’s hypothesis for the
origin of language makes sense of the lack of evidence for rudimentary or grammatically
simple languages in early humans, isolated tribal groups, or other animal species. While
the capacity for double-scope conceptual integration is a result of a gradual, step-wise
succession of cognitive developments that were each adaptive in themselves, language
emerges explosively as a functional singularity made possible by this critical mass of
neuro-cognitive complexity.132 Cognitively fluid minds are, to revise Mithen’s
hypothesis, the result of the capacity for double-scope conceptual integration.
From the standpoint of evolutionary biology and EP, Fauconnier and Turner’s
theory for the origin of language arguably provides the greatest explanatory power, while
supporting an emergentist biocultural evolutionary perspective. In broad strokes, by
proposing their theory for “the origin of language as a product of the evolution of modern
cognition,” Fauconnier and Turner take on the roles of both evolutionary psychologists
and emergentists. They preface their theory by indicating that the human “brain is [an]
organ” created through natural selection, while “language is a function subserved by it,
with the help of various other organs. Language is the surface manifestation of a capacity.
It is a singularity of function, and so nothing prevents it from having arisen from a
basically continuous and adaptive process of evolution.”133 In the terminology of EP,
treated more fully below, perhaps language is not an adaptation, but is a by-product of the
neuro-cognitive adaptations for double-scope conceptual integration across behavioral
domains. Fauconnier and Turner’s theory is that brain-based double-scope conceptual
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integration is adaptive in a Darwinian sense, allowing language and culture to emerge
from this systemically integrated (emergent) capacity and its constituent properties and
parts. This line of argument places human symbolization and interrelated functional
singularities characterizing “full” humanity within a fully biocultural schema. This
hypothesis also addresses lingering questions left by other theorists, such as Mithen and
neuroscientist Terrence W. Deacon.
Engaging Mithen, Fauconnier and Turner have extended his thesis by providing
terminological precision and a better causal logic for his concept of cognitive fluidity in
terms of conceptual integration theory. Turning to Deacon, they argue that his theory of
the co-evolution of language and the brain provides fuel for a false dichotomy that
sometimes arises when interpreting paleoanthropological data.134 This false dichotomy is
a seeming impasse between “gradualist” and “punctuated equilibrium” models of
evolution, surfacing in the face of peculiar or puzzling data. This false dichotomy arises
because of two analytical fallacies, which Fauconnier and Turner call “Cause-Effect
Isomorphism” and “Function-Organ Isomorphism.”135 The first of these holds that if one
encounters a sudden, dramatic effect, one should expect to find a correlatively dramatic
or punctuated causal event. The second of these fallacies holds that where a capacity is
found to be the function of an organ or organs, the continuous and gradual development
of the function(s) and supporting organ(s) proceed at similar rates.
If one characterizes language and cognate forms of human symbolization as an
anomalous singularity, cause-effect isomorphism is the interpretive temptation. A
seeming leap in brain function might imply a similarly sudden leap in brain size or
134
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complexity, indicating an extreme instance of punctuated equilibrium. However, such a
leap may not be biologically possible, given the genetic jumps necessary to support such
a dramatic evolutionary event. Evolutionary biologists generally agree that gradualist
models of genetic change account better for the vast majority of the data. And, according
to Fauconnier and Turner, “[e]ven ‘punctuated equilibrium’ theories propose only
relatively minor jumps—not jumps that produce an eye or language out of nothing.”136
The theological implication of gradualism is that human abilities associated with the
imago Dei may emerge suddenly but not incongruously through evolutionary processes.
However, if the human brain and its complexity developed by a gradual process
of accretion and regional arrangement and interconnection, one might expect brain
functions like language to develop gradually and leave evidence of primordial and
transitional forms. In Deacon’s co-evolution theory of language and the brain, language
would have first taken the form of a crude system of symbolic gestures invented to ensure
survival and create and maintain social cohesion. With Deacon, Fauconnier and Turner
point out that this early kind of symbol system would not have been recognizable as
language, except as its germinal form. This means of communication would have been
“fragile, difficult to learn, inefficient, slow, inflexible, and tied to ritual representation of
social contracts like marriage.”137 From here, linguistic forms supposedly became more
efficient as ecological and social selection pressures “favored genetic variations that
rendered brains more adept at language. Language began as a cognitive adaptation and
genetic assimilation then eased some of the burden.”138 For Fauconnier and Turner,
however, the insurmountable difficulty left by Deacon’s earlier theory is that it demands
136
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a gradual accumulation of both vocabulary and grammar. This type of development
would demand the “crippling” kind of language mentioned in chapter 1, because a simple
grammar can only support a language bearing “separate forms and words for everything
that happens in all the different domains.”139 Conceptual integration theory explains how
a biological step can facilitate a functional leap.
The theological take-away here is that the emergence of the image of God is
nothing unique in terms of genetic and physiological development, even though the
advent of “full” humanity represents a relatively sudden qualitative shift in terms of
functional capability. By extension, (1) the imago Dei and the knowledge of good and
evil are borne through the same kinds of processes constituting the bio-cognitive
activities of other animal species to which we are genetically related; and (2) there is
nothing to rule out the possibility that other species could evolve to bear the image of
God in a manner that is supposedly unique to Homo sapiens.
Animal research with primates and birds has shown that humans are not the only
ones able to invent, teach, and learn meaningful signals useful in multiple behavioral
domains. For example, many animals have distinct and identifiable vocal and visual
signals for mating, warning, and finding food. However, these “vocabularies” remain
restricted because, among other things, they remain relatively domain-specific. Yet,
according to Boyer and Barrett, the domain specificity of mental adaptations and the
meanings they support are not the issue. The issue is the ability to integrate meanings
across domains with what Fauconnier and Turner call “equipotentiality”—the ability to
employ a finite number of combinable language forms in literally any situation.140 Boyer
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and Barrett note that the “lexicon of a natural language” contains between 15,000 and
100,000 items. However, they insist that “this external database is available only to a
mind with complex phonological and syntactic predispositions.”141 In other words, for
language to develop at all, it would seem that all its cognitive conditions of possibility
and anatomical infrastructure must be in place at the outset. And, according to
Fauconnier and Turner’s hypothesis for the origin of language, if a species “has reached
the stage of Double-Scope blending, it can very rapidly develop a full language in
cultural time because it has all the necessary prerequisites for a full set of grammatical
integrations.”142
Deacon’s co-evolution theory, with its implied function-organ isomorphism, is
unable to surmount the theoretical difficulty of explaining how everything human
language is and does could evolve in a gradual, step-wise manner. A further problem of
the gradualist theory is the lack of empirical evidence for rudimentary or transitional
languages among paleoanthropological data, indigenous peoples today, or any other
species.143 Interestingly, Deacon’s later work on emergence, showcased in the following
chapter, provides some of the most precise tools for explaining how “full” humanity and
its symbolic capabilities might have co-emerged suddenly as functional singularities
produced by the gradual, step-wise evolution of blending capacity in humanity’s
biocultural history.144 In a biocultural conception of theological anthropology, these
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functional singularities and their operation in cognition and culture together constitute the
epicenter of the image of God.
Biocultural evolution, domain specificity, and conceptual integration
One of the hallmarks of EP is the concept of domain specificity. The domainspecific brain-mind is not a blank slate, but a computational system capable of storing
and running multiple programs, each designed by natural selection for a specific
application or adaptive function. Evolution by natural selection produces specialized
cognitive competencies, based in specific neural structures which have evolved in
response to recurrent evolutionary problems, such as food acquisition, territory

punctuated equilibrium model, in which “the emergence of human uniqueness was achieved in one
quantum leap” (187-88; cf. Tattersall, Becoming Human, 68, 225-33). And this leap is energized by none
other than the emergence of Mithen’s cognitively fluid mind.
One avenue for updating and qualifying Mithen’s cognitive fluidity hypothesis via Fauconnier and
Turner’s conceptual integration theory is through making van Huyssteen’s understanding of Mithen’s
metaphor characterizing “the mind as a cathedral” more consistent with his emergentist interpretation of it.
According to this metaphor, the biocultural evolution of the human mind entered an initial phase of
construction focused on a foundational “nave” around and above which more specialized cognitive
domains or “chapels” of “language, social intelligence, technical intelligence, and natural history
intelligence” are constructed in a second building phase (Alone in the World, 195-96). Finally, phase three
sees the opening of these spaces to one another with doors and windows, facilitating unobstructed (i.e.,
cognitively fluid) movement among them (196).
However, this three-stage building metaphor needs a different set of blueprints if the cathedral of
the mind is to get off the ground, as it were. The problem arises in phase two, where “language” for Mithen
is one “chapel” among others gradually taking shape from the bottom up. How could language be its own
cognitive domain if its use is integral to the construction of uniquely human forms of behaviors like social
and technical intelligence, which many other species display in their own ways? A cathedral may have to
be built from the bottom-up, but its significance as a cathedral is constituted from the top-down. A
cathedral is distinguishable by its majestic height, interior expansiveness, unique floor plan, and exquisite
decoration, all reflecting and facilitating specifically cultural functions transcending the Darwinian goal of
reproductive fitness—the survival of oneself, one’s offspring, and so forth. Revising and extending the
cathedral metaphor, it would appear that language is not itself a cognitive domain, but a precipitous result
of the double-scope conceptual integration that buttresses the human mind with this external scaffolding. If
the mind is a cathedral, double-scope blending and the symbolic intelligence it prompts construct the flying
buttresses making possible the expansive, grandiose, and intricately interconnected mental spaces within,
through which we move with such fluidity. With its stained glass windows, vaulted ceilings, and ornate
walls, a cathedral is more complexly open—and closed—to the world outside than perhaps any other
structure. It lets in light through a painstakingly wrought translucent array of information-laden images and
symbols, while guarding its implements and artifacts against decay. It is a place of memory, speech, selftranscendence, moral instruction, accountability, symbol, and ritual. It is a place where creatures encounter
one another and their creator. The cathedral of the “fully” human mind is the mental space where the
physical world actualizes its spirituality, its self-understanding, its understanding of other selves.
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maintenance, predator avoidance, mate selection, child rearing, etc. However, even these
cognitive domains are relatively general. An example of a more domain-specific
cognitive adaptation would be the capability of a frog to distinguish visually between the
motion of a leafy branch blowing in the wind, a tasty insect on one of its leaves, and the
hungry heron behind the bush. Natural selection makes sure that frogs will only evolve to
find and fill an ecological niche if they develop this efficient cognitive mechanism, where
opportunities and dangers like these remain common.
To give a more human-like example, certain primate species have developed
different vocalizations for conveying various meanings. Some signals are specific enough
to indicate that a certain kind of predator is approaching. To a vervet monkey, a “leopard”
signal means scurry up and look down; an “eagle” signal means the opposite.145 These
vocalizations manifest a host of domain-specific cognitive adaptations capable of
generating more than one kind of output. The presence of these adaptations indicates their
evolutionary relevance to vervet monkeys and points to the genotypic and phenotypic
foundations upon which they had to build over many generations. EP predicts that the
brain’s “hardware” and “software” are not installed all at once, and that these components
will come to interact in some surprising ways as they compile and coadapt. According to
Tooby and Cosmides, “natural selection will ensure that the brain is composed of many
different programs, many (or all) of which will be specialized for solving their own
corresponding adaptive problems. That is, the evolutionary process will not produce a
predominantly general-purpose, equipotential, domain-general architecture.”146 However,
domain specificity does not necessarily compartmentalize cognition.
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Homo sapiens and other species are capable of various kinds of complex and
abstract thought, not because their cognitive architectures are domain-general, but
because they are domain-integral. That is, certain kinds of brains are capable of complex
conceptual integrations across specific behavioral domains. The equipotentiality language
affords in not a matter of Homo sapiens being conceptually open to the world in general
and parsing out little bits of it. Rather, the human mind is open to specific and
evolutionarily relevant aspects of the world and is able to combine or blend them into
qualitatively unique symbolic forms, which in turn open up distinctly human behavioral
domains like art, science, ethics, and religion. As van Huyssteen suggests, “instead of
asking what kind of mind is required to know the world, we should rather ask what kind
of world the world must have been to produce the sort of mind we have.”147
The primate warning signal illustration provides an example of simplex blending
capacity (value-role projection) and its adaptive value for promoting survival. Two bits of
information are involved—first, that a predator has been detected, and second, what kind
of predator it is. The first piece of information indicates a need for alertness and perhaps
evasion; the second helps to focus those efforts. This process traverses the cognitive
domains of predator detection, vocalization, and danger avoidance in a socially
meaningful way. Fauconnier and Turner note that paleoanthropological evidence and
studies of other animal species suggest that blending capacity is evolutionarily
advantageous and adaptive in and of itself and that ever-more complex forms of blending
capacity can accrue in a continuous, gradual manner.148 According to their hypothesis,
that which distinguishes humanity cognitively from other species—linguistic ability,
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morality, religiosity, etc.—co-emerges with the capacity for double-scope conceptual
integration across domain-specific, neurologically-based centers of semantic information.
Another implication of this theory is that the evolutionary steps along the path to
language were taken “not for the function of language itself but for the cognitive abilities
that finally led to the precipitation of language as a product.”149 From the standpoint of
EP, language and culture are not adaptations, but the by-products of adaptations. In
Fauconnier and Turner’s hypothesis for the origin of language, “Language arose as a
singularity. It was a new behavior that emerged naturally once the capacity of blending
had developed to the critical level of Double-Scope blending.”150 The data suggest to
Fauconnier and Turner that language and other “human singularities: art, music, science,
fashions of dress, dance, mathematics […] precipitate as products of Double-Scope
conceptual integration.”151
Similarly, for evolutionary biologist Francisco Ayala, cultural behaviors like
language and ethics display a kind of pleiotropy. Pleiotropy occurs when a single gene is
expressed in multiple phenotypic traits. Consequently, the epigenetic consequences of
genotypic change can be many and diverse. In cognitive linguistic terms, language and
the host of other cultural capabilities of which it is inextricable was not the foreseeable
target of blending capacity and its development. Rather, in Ayala’s estimation:
Literature, art, science, and technology are among the behavioral features
that may have come about not because they were adaptively favored in
human evolution but because they are expressions of the high intellectual
abilities present in modern humans: what may have been favored by
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natural selection (its “target”) was an increase in intellectual ability rather
than each one of those particular activities.152
With this principle in mind, Fauconnier and Turner conclude that when provided
with the tools to rid itself of an implicit function-organ isomorphism, Deacon’s
theoretical framework for the co-evolution of language and the brain is basically right.
They note simply that “his theory is missing an explanation of the mental operations
underlying [the] relational ability” behind the biocultural emergence of behaviorally
modern Homo sapiens through a novel but not evolutionarily unprecedented
development.153 For Fauconnier and Turner, “conceptual blending is a good candidate for
a continually evolving mental ability that could produce the singularity of language. This
opens up new possibilities that Deacon could not have considered” when he developed
his theory in The Symbolic Species (1997).154 More recently, however, Deacon has
incorporated blending theory into his understanding of the emergence of uniquely human
cultural behaviors and the meanings they convey.155 Conceptual integration theory may
therefore hold the key to what Deacon calls “the symbolic threshold.” This functional
threshold is arguably indicative of the image of God, in part, because the image of God
and the knowledge of good and evil are themselves myth-symbols indicating heuristically
the realities to which they refer.
Following philosopher Charles Sanders Pierce, Deacon differentiates three
hierarchical categories of referential associations: iconicity, indication, and
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symbolization. Each association is a type of mental interpretation. An icon is a sign
interpreted to resemble an object; an index is interpreted to indicate or point to a physical
and/or temporal connection, contiguity, or correlation between sign and object; a symbol
references an object or concept, not by any perceived resemblance or spatio-temporal
contiguity, but in relation to other symbols, indices, and icons.156 For example, a
rattlesnake is iconic of its surroundings to the extent it blends in with them; its vibrating
rattle is indicative of the snake’s proximity and the danger it poses; and its image is
symbolic of the “don’t tread on me” spirit of the American Revolution.
Contributing much of the architectural support for humanity’s external
scaffolding, symbolic relationships among words and concepts allow inferential and
imaginative creativity. This kind of cognitive competence supports unique
understandings of those things which reach our senses and, perhaps more importantly,
those things which do not or cannot, like “angels, unicorns, and quarks,” not to mention
God, image of God, and knowledge of good and evil.157 All symbolic associations and
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their grammatical regulations are made possible, according to Fauconnier and Turner’s
hypothesis, by the evolutionary emergence of double-scope blending.
Seeming to anticipate this theoretical development, Deacon argues that symbolic
interpretation
is one kind of competence that grows out of and depends upon a very
different kind of competence. What constitutes competence in this sense is
the ability to produce an interpretive response that provides the necessary
infrastructure of more basic iconic and/or indexical interpretations. To
explain the basis of symbolic communication, then we must describe what
constitutes a symbolical interpretant, but to do this we need first to explain
the predication of iconic and indexical interpretants and then to explain
how these are each recoded in turn to produce the higher-order forms. […]
What one knows in one way gets recoded in another way. It gets represented. We know the same associations, but we know them also in a
different way. You might say we know them both from the bottom up,
indexically, and from the top down, symbolically.158
This “bottom-up,” “top-down” language is common in emergence scholarship, including
Deacon’s later work in this field. In terms that gain more clarity in the following chapter,
symbolic ability dynamically supervenes on indexical and iconic awareness. These
competencies develop and accumulate from the bottom-up, from part to whole. In turn,
these mental abilities are causally efficacious from the top-down, from whole to part. As
Hefner has alluded, this uniquely human form of psycho-somatic causality and others with
which it is systemically integrated embody those “distinctive, non-Darwinian, dynamic
processes by which culture proceeds” as an outworking of humanity’s biological nature.159
This emergentist schema of the accumulation of competencies and the
precipitation of singularities coincides with Fauconnier and Turner’s conceptual
integration theory for the origin of language. The gradual evolution of double-scope
conceptual integration might have yielded an explosive propensity for symbolic
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association when blending capacity reached this critical mass of complexity. If there is
but one species who has evolved this cognitive capacity, such an anomaly would explain
why other species may show rudimentary symbolic ability, but none develop language,
and why humans are, in van Huyssteen’s terms, “alone in the world,” with the ability to
define ourselves as be(ar)ing the image of God with a knowledge of good and evil.
Biocultural evolution, the “symbolic threshold,” and the image of God
The most biologically similar species to Homo sapiens seems to be on the cusp of
the symbolic threshold. Under controlled experimental conditions, chimpanzees have
demonstrated the ability to interpret non-iconic lexigrams symbolically, according to
simple adjective-noun-verb rules of association. When the chimps entered the appropriate
lexigrams in a particular sequence, they obtained a reward associated with that specific
sequence. Over thousands of trials, indexical associations formed, some of which were
also symbolic. Experimenters changed the relative positions of lexigrams, their colors,
and shapes, ruling out these variables as indexical cues. Next, when the experimenters
added more lexigrams, the chimps were able to incorporate the new “vocabulary” items
by the same semantic logic known to govern the others, sometimes in a single try.160 As
Deacon explains, “They had discovered that the relationship that a lexigrams has to an
object is a function of the relationship it has to other lexigrams, not just a function of the
correlated appearance of both lexigrams and object. This is the essence of a symbolic
relationship.”161 In Fauconnier and Turner’s terms, this behavior is a relatively complex
display of blending capacity or conceptual integration.
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This accomplishment is truly remarkable. However, there is a qualitative
cognitive break between these highly contrived, rudimentary instances of symbolic
behavior among chimps and human symbolization and language. According to Brown,
the symbolic threshold reached by our species and its children at a young age presents
“one exception” to the general correlation between the gradual development of nervous
system complexity and the presence and sophistication of mental properties.162

Figure 2: Warren S. Brown, “A Phylogenetic Model of Mental Causation”163

In the image provided above, Brown illustrates the emergence of human mentality
as a cone. The width of the cone represents nervous system complexity among species.
The density of shading within the cone represents the presence or absence of cognitive
function. At its point of origination, the cone lacks any shading, and the width of the cone
and its shading increase constantly and gradually from this point. The cone bells slightly
at a line designating the symbolic threshold, and its shading quickly grows darker.
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Brown’s illustration represents another way of reconciling Deacon’s gradualist
co-evolution theory with the rapid precipitation of uniquely human singularities as
functions of the cognitive adaptations underlying them. This simple figure also implies
the need and ability to integrate evolutionary biology and developmental psychology
among other disciplines, which is one of EP’s purposes. Incidentally, and in a manner
similar to Fauconnier and Turner’s theory for the evolutionary origins of language,
Brown’s insights avoid the fallacies of cause-effect isomorphism and function-organ
isomorphism. In his emergentist model, the advent of behaviorally modern Homo sapiens
required no unprecedented genetic/physiological leaps or a simple/stepwise accretion of
cognitive functionality. One small step for biology; one giant leap for behavior.
At the level of Christian anthropology, this biocultural evolutionary perspective
means that whatever the image of God and the knowledge of good and evil are taken to
be, they have emerged from the natural world and are fully embedded within it. As
concepts and as the constitutive elements of the human condition to which these terms
refer, the image of God and the knowledge of good and evil may in turn point beyond the
world of nature. However, to suggest that certain aspects of human life intimate the
supernatural is not to say that these existential-behavioral structures and capabilities have
an immediate supernatural origin or cause. Likewise, Hefner concludes “that since
humans emerged within the processes of nature’s evolutionary history, nature itself
participates in the image of God.”164 Hefner is correct that “[t]his is a novel
interpretation” of this myth-symbol, one which supports the second naïveté interpretation
proposed here.165 Van Huyssteen shares Hefner’s inference, suggesting:
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Theologians are now challenged to rethink what human uniqueness might
mean for the human person, a being that has emerged biologically as a
center of embodied self-awareness, identity, and moral responsibility. This
notion of personhood, when reconceived in terms of embodied
imagination, symbolic propensities, and cognitive fluidity, will now
enable theology to revision its own notion of the imago Dei as emerging
from nature itself, an idea that does not imply superiority or greater value
over other animals or earlier hominids, but might express, from a
theological point of view, a specific task and purpose to set forth the
presence of God in this world.166
Interpreting the image of God as a reality which has emerged through natural
processes, van Huyssteen argues that belief in the supernatural is natural. That is, a
propensity for mythic and religious belief finds its origins and purposes in the biocultural
evolution of humankind.167 Again citing Hefner, he proposes that the images left in caves
by our Paleolithic ancestors almost certainly reveal that “ancient myths and rituals must
have organized the kind of information that was necessary for survival through elaborate
cultural systems.”168 Van Huyssteen infers that in the course of confronting the
ecological, social, and existential crises of human life and death, “[n]ot just the use of
myth, but also the contents and messages of particular myths must have greatly
influenced the behavior of the our ancestors, as they still do for us today.”169
While biocultural utility is no guarantor of a myth’s truth value, the cultural
necessity to contextualize and justify behavior means that the human central nervous
system has evolved what Hefner and sociobiologist E. O. Wilson call “mythopoetic
requirements.”170 For Hefner, these mythopoetic requirements are an entailment of the
human condition of freedom, “of both making choices that govern […] behavior and of
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constructing the stories that contextualize and hence justify those choices.”171 While this
is not to say that Homo sapiens are somehow hardwired for religious or theological
beliefs, one can justifiably borrow a principle from theologian Paul Tillich to support the
claim that trans-humanistic or trans-naturalistic conceptions of being or reality are able to
provide efficient and perhaps insuperable visions of humankind’s ultimate concern.
Yet the endurance of theological beliefs is no more a guarantor of their truth value
than their biocultural utility. Therefore, well short of performing impossible apologetic
(proof-oriented) and ecumenical (unity-oriented) tasks on behalf of “Christianity” or
“Christian beliefs,” this study makes the relatively modest proposal that a second naïveté
reinterpretation and reappropriation of some Judeo-Christian myth-symbols is able to
provide increased explanatory power and positive moral outcomes from a particular faith
perspective informed by current science. While the human central nervous system may
display something like mythopoetic requirements, the narratives by which human beings
frame their actions need not be explicitly religious or theological. Nonetheless, by
enabling and requiring qualitatively distinct and irreducible characterizations of reality as
guides for human behavior, a myth-based theological anthropology is able to support
what Paul Ricoeur calls “a qualitative transformation of reflexive consciousness”—an
otherwise unavailable orientation or end-directedness of human-being.172
If, as Ricoeur argues, myth really “has the purpose of providing grounds for the
ritual actions of [people] today and, in a general manner, establishing all the forms of
action and thought by which [humanity] understands [itself] in [its] world,”173 then, “in
this broadest sense of the word,” as van Huyssteen explains, “religion co-emerged with
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humanity itself.”174 Myth, ritual, and the actions they require and enable are constitutive
of human-being because they provide the “distinctions of worth” without which the
genetic and cultural symbionts comprising Homo sapiens might perish. According to
Hefner’s definition, culture provides the information required to accomplish “the three
tasks of interpreting the world in which humans live, guiding human behavior, and
interfacing with the physical-biogenetic-cultural systems that constitute the environment
in which we live.”175 In serving its cultural functions, religion and myth provide an
understanding of reality itself and as a whole—of “what really is” or “how things really
are.” Religious visions of what really is may always remain underdetermined by our
experience of/in the world, but they may also provide plausible and fruitful conceptions
of human significance and purpose vis-à-vis the rest of the world and a reality beyond
it.176 The background concepts belonging to the symbolic universe of what really is—
including theological concepts—provide and infuse those distinctions of value which
intimate, motivate, interrogate, and justify actions that lead to our wholesome living or
lack thereof. Presenting a comprehensive vision of the way things really are, myth and
religion are able to propose the is designed to inform the ought.
Hefner calls this dynamic process of religious and ethical discourse and action the
“myth-ritual-praxis complex.”177 This complex is a way of relating the indicative to the
imperative, of moving from how things really are to what ought to be done in response.
In light of Ricoeur’s phenomenological and hermeneutical insights, paleoanthropological
interpretations of Paleolithic cave images, along with biblical scholarship concerning the
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communal function (Sitz im Leben) and historical-cultural context (Sitz im Welt) of the
creation account(s) in Genesis, Hefner infers that ritual translates “myth into symbolic
action, which in turn is to be expressed in the praxis of ordinary life. The ritual serves as
a means of approaching the central realities of the world and also as a resource and norm
for daily behavior.”178
This hermeneutical circle coincides with Ricoeur’s “essentially Anselmian
schema” of theology—of lived faith seeking understanding.179 Conceiving theological
discourse in terms of a myth-ritual-praxis complex makes of theology and ethics what
liberationist scholars since Gustavo Gutiérrez have called them for more than half a
century—critical reflection on historical praxis. The circularity of this complex is a
function of its self-critical component, irrupting when the conceptual premises and/or
practical outcomes of myth-ritual-praxis are no longer intellectually and/or morally
satisfying. In other words, if Christian anthropology is to retain the myth-symbols of
image of God and the knowledge of good and evil as indispensable data of selfunderstanding and behavioral motivation/justification, Hefner cautions that
we may recognize the wisdom of the myths, but we cannot believe them
naively. We are critical; we can entertain the myths only as proposals, as
hypotheses. We can believe only through what Ricoeur terms the second
naiveté [sic], which requires critical philosophical analysis and
interpretation.180
Hefner’s own hermeneutical endeavor of “revitalizing” or “revivifying” a given mythritual-praxis complex follows a three-stage process, which he describes generally as
“retrieval, testing, and restatement.”181 He claims that this kind of effort has become the
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task of theologians today—“presenting the resources from their own work of
reinterpreting the tradition, offering them up as potential contributions for the
overwhelming task of cultural revitalization that faces us.”182 Hefner takes up this task in
proposing his theory of the created co-creator.
For the purposes of this study, retrieval of the tradition involves historical- and
literary-critical analysis of the Judeo-Christian myth of origins and the kinds of symbolic
actions it likely supported. Testing means developing a faithful interpretation of this
tradition with the potential to satisfy the criteria of explanatory power and moral outcome
in today’s intellectual and cultural climate. Restatement synthesizes the results of
retrieval and testing by constructing a second naïveté understanding of the image of God
and the knowledge of good and evil that is both intellectually and morally fruitful, while
also presenting some of the first fruits of this effort.
Another way to describe this second naïveté reinterpretation and reappropriation
of these myth-symbols is through Fauconnier and Turner’s concepts describing the
“construction,” “completion,” and “elaboration” of conceptual blends. The natural
scientific and theological findings explored and integrated in these opening chapters
contribute a hermeneutic of emergent meaning tying together the neuro-cognitive
emergence of new meanings with the biocultural emergence of “full” humanity. In a
theology of nature perspective, this association adds precision and credibility to the claim
that the image of God and the knowledge of good and evil are evolved and evolving
avenues of biocultural evolution.
In a 21st century symbolic universe, the conceptual constellations of evolutionary
psychology and emergence help to reframe and inform the concepts belonging to these
182
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biblical myth-symbols of Christian anthropology. Together, they help to explain how
mind and culture emerge dynamically from their physiological and biological
constituents; how these systems of information are able to exert the dynamic “top-down”
or “whole-part” causal influence which amounts to human freedom and responsibility;
how symbolic meanings are able to transcend the givens of their empirical contexts; how
retrieval, testing, and restatement of these kinds of meanings are possible; and how these
uniquely human capacities and activities can be as humanizing as they can be
dehumanizing.
In theological parlance, emerging in the image of God through biocultural
evolution means that as free and responsible creators of meanings, human persons are
able to discern, construe, and enact the purposes of God, for the continued goodness of
creation. Because it emerges through natural processes, this free and responsible cocreativity is neither absolute nor autonomous, but conditioned by an original and
ambivalent knowledge of fulfillment and frustration, cooperation and conflict, good and
bad/evil. This contemporary self-interpretation is potentially fruitful for ongoing
theological and ethical discourse, commensurable with historical- and literary-critical
biblical scholarship, and made possible by a biocultural model of humanity’s origins and
ongoing evolution. The interrelated fields of cognitive linguistics, EP, and emergence
supply the hermeneutical tools and materials for constructing this self-reinterpretation.
Evolutionary psychology, the image of God, and the knowledge of good and evil
On its own, EP does not have the resources to conceive of humanity in terms of
the image of God or Hefner’s created co-creator. Yet EP is well equipped to depict Homo
sapiens as the culturally-constituted creature. Viewed from the bottom-up, the term

82

creature is not a theological designation but is a descriptor of an animal constituted by
(and contributing to) a self-transcending dynamic, namely culture. EP aims to understand
how this state of affairs comes about as a result of natural processes and as a function of
the physically embodied and socially embedded human central nervous system. At the
natural scientific level, EP is a window to human spirituality—the biocultural dynamics
through which Homo sapiens bear the image of God with a knowledge of good and evil.
EP’s potential to inform a renewed understanding of Christianity’s
anthropological myth-symbols lies in what it is and what it is not. Evolutionary
anthropologist John Tooby and psychologist Leda Cosmides have been at the forefront of
the metatheoretical subdiscipline of EP since they helped establish it in the latter half of
the 1980s. There is perhaps no surer primary source for gaining an accurate description of
EP, its conceptual foundations, methodological procedures, and research outcomes and
prospects than these scientists. This listing of credentials is necessary because EP is often
mistaken for one or more of those disciplines from which it expressly differentiates
itself—sociobiology, behavioral ecology, or evolutionary ecology.183 While findings
from these earlier attempts at integrating biological and behavioral sciences have
provided vast amounts of data for EP, especially in its formational years, EP has
developed a new theoretical framework by which to interpret these data. Understandably,
this new conceptual framework and its corresponding shifts in focus and method have led
to hypotheses and conclusions which sociobiology and its cognate disciplines could not
attain, anticipate, or even allow. EP overturns many of the assumptions and conclusions
of sociobiology, especially the reductionistic, deterministic tenets which made it the
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object of so much scientific, philosophical, political, and religious controversy. Thus,
according to Tooby and Cosmides:
Evolutionary psychology is the long-forestalled scientific attempt to
assemble out of the disjointed, fragmentary, and mutually contradictory
human disciplines a single, logically integrated research framework for the
psychological, social, and behavioral sciences—a framework that not only
incorporates the evolutionary sciences on a full and equal basis, but that
systematically works out all of the revisions in existing belief and research
practice that such a synthesis requires.184
The ultimate goal of EP is nothing short of “the mapping of our universal human
nature,” i.e., “the construction of a set of empirically validated, high-resolution models of
the evolved mechanisms that collectively constitute universal human nature,” which
finally ought to “include the neural, developmental, and genetic bases of these
mechanisms, and encompass the designs of other species as well.”185 Such an
achievement, while far off, is not out of the question and would constitute a
comprehensive biocognitive conception of Homo sapiens and its ongoing evolution.
Reaching this goal would also establish a comprehensive conceptual basis from which to
conduct biocultural analysis able to inform theological anthropology and ethics.
EP’s value for a contemporary discussion on what it might mean to bear the
imago Dei is encapsulated in Tooby and Cosmides’s comment that “[m]ore nature allows
more nurture.”186 Our biological and psycho-somatic makeup—nature—emerges into our
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self-defining, self-directing cognitive and cultural activity—nurture. Human creatures
bear (and determine what it is to bear) the image of God with a knowledge of good and
evil within the dynamic confluence of the co-constraining biocultural dynamics here
abbreviated as “nature” and “nurture.”
I hold that the findings of many evolutionary psychologists are able to operate
within an emergentist philosophical framework because they are able to differentiate
between biological and cultural dynamics in ways that do not reduce the latter to the
former. Evolutionary psychologists are able to provide conceptual content to the intuition
that Homo sapiens and their actions amount to something more and other than the
epiphenomenal sum of the information contained in their DNA and the seeming
social selection pressures in ancestral environments (EEA). Because this process is slow, the brain’s current
evolved programs are designed to respond to the adaptive problems of our hunter-gatherer ancestors of the
Upper Paleolithic era and earlier (17). In order for a given aspect of an organism’s phenotype to qualify as
an adaptation, it must show that
(1) it has many design features that are improbably well suited to solving an ancestral
adaptive problem, (2) these phenotypic properties are unlikely to have arisen by chance
alone, and (3) they are not better explained as the by-products of mechanisms designed to
solve some alternative adaptive problem or some more inclusive class of adaptive
problem (28).
For example, that blood carries oxygen to body cells is an adaptation; the redness of blood due to the color
of oxygenated hemoglobin is a by-product of this adaptation. A “noise” feature that is uncoordinated with
any selection pressures is the location of color flecks in the iris (ibid.). Fourth, because of the evolutionary
time between the evolution of adaptive function and new problems posed to the brain in later contexts,
there is no guarantee that the behaviors it has been primed to produce will continue to be adaptive. This
principle is especially true of social behavior. At the same time, this principle cuts two ways. The host of
integrated mental programs responsible for the creation of rapidly evolving social contexts also afford the
abilities to respond in new ways to these changes, though not by deleting the evolved programs that must in
some ways be overridden to produce these new behaviors (17). Fifth, natural selection has produced many
specialized mental functions, each responding to a small number of recurring adaptive problems. The
specificity of selection pressures is not conducive to the evolution of a domain-general cognitive
architecture applicable to more specialized problems, but a domain-specific architecture supporting
complex interactions and integrations among specialized programs. These dynamic integrations produce
behaviors in domains abstracted from and unanticipated by the brain’s individual cognitive mechanisms
(17-18; cf. 41-63). Sixth, because the evolved functioning of the brain has created and continues to shape
human culture, “descriptions of the computational architecture of our evolved mechanisms allows [sic] a
systematic understanding of cultural and social phenomena” (18). EP predicts these descriptions to include
“cross-culturally universal frames of meaning that allow us to understand the actions and intentions of
others” (ibid.). In this sense, EP constructs species-specific and species-wide tools for analyzing and
commensurating diverse human cultures at the level of natural scientific research, in a manner suited to
postmodern discourse. These kinds of tools are vital to the one planning to venture beyond what is
descriptively human to what might be normatively humanizing, daring to blaze new trails on the endless
journey from our is to our ought.
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imperative to pass it on. The significance of human evaluations of self, other persons, and
their environments, along with the capacity to construct such values with freedom and
responsibility, cannot be circumscribed by any understanding, however valid, of the
biological ends they serve (e.g., survival and reproductive fitness). “Organisms are
adaptation executors, not fitness pursuers,” emphasize Tooby and Cosmides.187
Through natural selection, on average, adaptive cognitive mechanisms will
include an evolutionary (i.e., reproductive) advantage, because those genotypic and
phenotypic variations that do not regularly result in greater environmental fitness will be
eliminated over generations. However, evolutionarily beneficial adaptations may serve
other, wholly unrelated, even counterintuitive functions in the actual life of an organism.
Additionally, values-laden social preferences for new modes of behavior are able to exert
their own selection pressures. On the one hand, Darwinian dynamics often demand
increased cognitive command over evolutionarily relevant environmental information.
On the other hand, in order to meet these Darwinian demands effectively, psychological
programs must be able to generate consistent and predictable responses to a great number
of situations. Given such predictability, how does EP leave room for a theological
conception of Homo sapiens as conscientious creatures who bear the divine image in
their freedom and responsibility? Does EP lead to the conclusion that biology determines
behavior? Tooby and Cosmides argue that humankind’s neuro-cognitive
programs and the databases they create can be called on in different
combinations to elicit a dazzling variety of behavioral responses. These
responses are themselves information, subsequently ingested by the same
evolved programs, in endless cycles that produce complex eddies,
currents, and even singularities in cultural life. To get a genuine purchase
on human behavior and society, researchers need to know the architecture
of these evolved programs. Knowing the selection pressures will not be
187
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enough. Our behavior is not a direct response to selection pressures or to a
“need” to increase our reproduction.188
In view of Tooby and Cosmides’s argument as a whole, the implication of the
italicized phrase in this excerpt is that any number of the human brain’s integrated
cognitive mechanisms “can be called on” at will, to a greater or lesser degree, because the
recurrent dynamics of the brain’s “endless cycles” of cognition are not reducible to the
sum of the underlying “functionally specialized learning systems, domain-specialized
rules of inference, default preferences that are adjusted by experience, complex decision
rules, concepts that organize our experiences and databases of knowledge, and vast
databases of acquired information stored in specialized memory systems.”189
Ironic as it may appear, EP allows and informs a theological discussion of human
nature and nurture built upon the seemingly reductionistic principle that the genetic
heritage of every organism is determined for it. No one can pick and choose the genes
that express themselves in the development of the brains responsible for regulating all
behavior and physiology. At the same time, Hefner finds ample reason to argue that
“[w]ithin this deterministic evolutionary process, freedom has emerged,” and that “[w]hat
we call freedom is rooted in the genetically controlled adaptive plasticity of the human
phenotype.”190 This plasticity does not negate the predictive and explanatory power of EP
any more than it represents a subterfuge for a reductionistic research platform.
EP provides predictive (not circumscriptive) explanations (not justifications) for
human behavior, because the discipline’s vast amounts of empirical data show that all
human thoughts, meanings, values, and actions are conditioned (not determined) by the
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interaction of naturally selected, domain-specific, and cognitively biased psychological
mechanisms following the circuit logic of the malleable (not amorphous) human brainmind.191 Evolution by natural selection primes our primate brains to interact with the
world in species-specific ways. The mind is not a blank slate, contra Locke. It operates
according to something like Descartes’ innate ideas or Kant’s a priori categories of
reasoning. Yet the brain’s genetically controlled array of cognitive programs is not a
mental donum supernadditum. Cognitive adaptations do not present evidence for a
creator God—not in any immediate sense. Rather, they intimate the specific selection
pressures present in what scientists call a species’ environment of evolutionary
adaptedness (EEA). In this sense, EP is a fully natural scientific critique of pure reason,
because whatever “reason” is held to be, it is not the domain-general musing of the
unfettered human intellect, but a bioculturally embedded psychosomatic function of
human personhood.
Out of this functioning emerge humankind’s symbolic worlds and the symbols,
concepts, values, norms, technologies, theologies, anthropologies, ethics, etc. they
produce. Therefore, van Huyssteen infers that epistemological-hermeneutical discourse in
theology must face the “question [of] whether the nature of this process of complex
cognitive evolution, revealed as interactive and epigenetic […] tells us anything about the
realist claims of some religions.”192
EP and the biocultural model of human development it supports cannot venture so
far as to confirm or falsify “the realist claims of some religions,” such as the Judeo191
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Christian understanding that we bear the image of God with a knowledge of good and
evil. However, EP and cognitive linguistics can offer natural scientific explanations of
how these kinds of claims arise and operate on a neuro-cognitive level to generate
culture. In this way the natural sciences synthesized in EP equip other disciplines with
tools for understanding how human beings construct cognitively and culturally “what
really is” and how this symbolic world guides perception, cognition, and action in vivo.
I mention in chapters 5 and 6 below some evolutionary psychologists’ findings
about distinctly human forms of competitive and cooperative behaviors and their
relationship to the emergence of cultural singularities like ethics, mythology, religion,
and theology. These scientists are discovering how complex and abstract forms of
semantic knowledge emerge from our biocultural inheritance to generate the everevolving ambit of human behavior, including humanity’s conditioned but conscientious
influence over it.
Conclusion
The sections of this chapter have described the emergence of the image of God as
a biocultural development marking the advent of “full” humanity in terms of its unique
functional capabilities. The natural scientific disciplines of cognitive linguistics and
evolutionary psychology help to locate the symbolic threshold launching behaviorally
modern Homo sapiens’ biocultural evolution. As myth-symbols and the human condition
to which they point, the image of God and the knowledge of good and evil emerge in no
small part through our species’ singular capacity to integrate bits of semantic information
across diverse behavioral domains. Because “more nature allows more nurture,” our
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biocultural nature generates a condition of freedom through which we are responsible to
discern, decide, and define what really is and ought to be.
As discussed in chapter 1, cognitive linguist George Lakoff’s neural theory of
language and metaphor presents a fruitful framework for describing how the symbolic
associations which encode what really is or how things really are are culturally
constituted bits of semantic information, emerging from the bottom-up and giving shape
to every human apperception and action, from the most limbic of emotions to the most
lyric of poems to the most logical of discourses.193 This conception of the emergence of
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meanings implies that even theological understandings of what really is begin in domainspecialized neuro-cognitive mechanisms and physical structures for knowing, which
ought therefore to be taken into consideration when formulating and articulating the
meanings of religious symbols today.
According to Fauconnier and Turner, double-scope blending or conceptual
integration is what makes singularly human forms of semantic knowledge possible.
Through these somatically-based biocultural processes, Homo sapiens construe any and
every understanding of what really is—that conception of reality for which we are
responsible and to which we are accountable. In our symbolization is constituted the
semantic knowledge that makes us who we are as those who play a conscientious role in
determining what really is and ought to be for us. Within these non-Darwinian dynamic
processes beats the heart of what it means to emerge as a culturally constituted creature, a
created co-creator, a bearer of the image of God. The following chapter presents a
detailed analysis of how these novel realities emerge.
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CHAPTER 3
EMERGENCE: CREATING CAUSES, CREATURES, MEANINGS, MINDS
At the heart of the endeavor to discover what it might mean to emerge in the image of
God through biocultural evolution lies the concept of emergence. Among the many crossdisciplinary concepts giving shape to scientific understanding and research today,
emergence has both a relatively long history and a newly enthusiastic following,
especially among those engaging in discourse between scientific and religious
disciplines. Emergentism has quickly become an attractive and well-established option
for scholars dissatisfied with reductionistic perspectives in science and/or dualist
perspectives in religion. Among other things, emergence seeks to expose and escape the
false dichotomy between reducing mentality to physics and attributing cognitive function
to the activity of an immaterial substance called “soul” or “spirit.” In this chapter I seek
to show how emergence dismantles this false dichotomy and provides a great deal of
constructive material for Christian anthropology and ethics. Arguably, emergentism is a
fruitful framework for gaining a renewed understanding of the myth-symbols of the
image of God and the knowledge of good and evil, for constructing an intellectually
honest and thoroughly Christian conception of what really is in order to better discern
and decide what ought to be.
The following sections of this chapter represent the next steps in constructing an
understanding of what it is to emerge in the image of God with a knowledge of good and
evil. The first section raises the notion that emergence is mainly about how to account for
different kinds of causes in the cosmos. The second section introduces neuroscientist
Terrence W. Deacon’s three-tiered taxonomy for understanding every kind of emergent
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causal power. The third section sets about the task of comparing, contrasting, and
constructing Deacon’s emergentist schema. This section includes three subsections,
which explore the false dichotomy of “weak” vs. “strong” emergence, the false equation
of reductive and nonreductive physicalism, and the confusion over Deacon and
emergentist Philip Clayton’s “orders” vs. “levels” of emergence. The fourth section
builds upon the crux of Deacon’s argument that emerging into something other—like a
God-imaging person—does not entail the introduction of something more in the cosmos,
like a new type of force, substance, or law of physics. Included in this fourth section are
three subsections delving into Deacon’s three cumulative and hierarchic orders of
emergence—homeodynamics, morphodynamics, and teleodynamics. The final section
addresses anthropologically, ethically, and theologically relevant forms of non-Darwinian
teleodynamics and concludes with two subsections on how the emergent dynamics of
sentience and consciousness inform what it means to emerge in the image of God with a
knowledge of good and evil.
Counting the (emergent) cause
The emergence of person-defining symbolic meanings is a result of the
underlying emergence of life and mind. Theologian John F. Haught has observed that the
concept “of emergence now holds an increasingly prominent place” in framing “the many
scientific ideas that seem to support the naturalist worldview.”194 What Haught means by
naturalism is the suspension or rejection of the appeal to any reality distinct from the
natural world as necessary for understanding the existence of the cosmos or any
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phenomenon within it.195 Haught’s overarching question in his critical embrace of
naturalism is whether this perspective “is enough” to provide responses to ultimate
questions of purpose and meaning in the cosmos or whether such questions are even
meaningful so as to have any purpose.
In terms of Aristotle’s classic taxonomy of causality, Haught argues that the
natural sciences, especially in their more reductionistic strands, confine themselves
methodologically to what could be construed as questions of material, formal, and
efficient causality—the atoms that make up everything and everyone (material), their
intrinsic causal properties in isolation and interaction (formal), and the ways in which
they interact to make things happen (efficient).
Haught contends that scientific scholarship ought to restrict itself in most cases to
these levels or “layers” of explanation and always avoid appealing to divine activity.
These relatively objective kinds of explanation are valid and valuable in themselves, and
their impact on other disciples should not be ignored. The explanatory power and
fruitfulness of a naturalist perspective has helped to reframe theological inquiry regarding
the nature of all divine activity ad extra—creation, providence, revelation, redemption,
etc. Differentiating and reintegrating distinct but commensurable levels or kinds of
explanation among scientific and religious forms of discourse reshapes what it means to
be a part of “the creation,” what it might mean “to create,” and therefore what it can
mean to speak of “a creator.” Where natural scientific explanations satisfy the criteria for
truthfulness, they can challenge and inform the entire framework of the believer’s
conception of reality, from gluons to God.
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Yet for Haught, despite this potential for dialogue, the sciences still seem to
display a methodological lacuna for questions of ultimacy, purpose, and meaning in the
realm of what Aristotle termed final causality—the end or goal for the sake of which
something exists and/or (inter)acts. Haught argues convincingly that this teleological
layer of explanation is largely inaccessible and irrelevant to many natural scientists
because of their underlying (and often unexplored) ontological presuppositions.
Some ontologically reductionistic presuppositions entail the implicit or explicit
claim that intentionality and the meanings and values often accompanying it are seeming
surds in the natural world or convenient, if illusory, explanatory glosses for causal
interactions that are fully explicable in epiphenomenal terms. All modes of causation, in
other words, are reducible to the interactions of variously sized bits of matter-energy via
the four known fundamental forces.196 There is nothing going on at the level of biology or
psychology for which physics cannot theoretically provide a comprehensive explanation.
Haught calls this perspective “scientific” or “evolutionary naturalism.”197 Perhaps more
descriptively, Deacon calls this perspective “eliminative reductionism” or “eliminative
materialism.”198 Another oft-used, though less precise, synonym for this eliminative
paradigm is “reductive physicalism.” All of these terms have been generated in order to
contrast with nonreductive—yet still fundamentally naturalist, materialist, physicalist—
emergentist perspectives.
According to eliminative materialism, appeals to divine agency are doubly
redundant because appeals to the human agency through which such notions arise are
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also redundant. The supposedly misguided appeal to personal causal “agents” lies behind
evolutionary biologist Richard Dawkins’s so called “God delusion.”199 Sociobiologist E.
O. Wilson also holds that the projection of intention within and beyond the natural world
is meaningful and valuable only in terms of its sociobiological utility in securing a
reproductive advantage.200 For Wilson religious faith and ritual are genetically primed
and “adaptive in a Darwinian sense” as means of enhancing individual and group
survival, ecological control, and social conformity.201
As a counterexample to this kind of thinking, Haught highlights how
reductionistic scientists betray their own phenomenological common sense. They are able
to give more or less complete accounts of phenomena at some levels of explanation, but
in ways which cut them off from other kinds of explanation implied in all forms of
human activity, including the pursuit of knowledge through natural scientific methods.
These scholarly pursuits imply the causal relevance of irreducible “things” like meanings,
interests, intentions, values, and persons.
As a test case, Haught draws an analogy using Aristotle’s four forms of causality,
supposing that if someone sees a pot of water boiling on a stove and asks why it is
boiling, one could respond in a number of equally valid ways. One could accurately say
that the water is boiling because the relative velocities of the H2O molecules in the pot
have increased enough to reach a temperature of 100 degrees centigrade, causing them to
make their transition from a liquid to a gaseous state (material and formal cause). One
could explain that the water is boiling because the burner beneath the pot is alight
(efficient cause). However, the answer which one might expect in most circumstances is
199
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also the answer which reductive forms of natural scientific scholarship cannot
countenance without reducing and therefore eliminating what is meant by it—“because I
want tea” (final cause).202
From an eliminative perspective the subject “I” and verb “want” in this sentence
refer to a causal power that is epiphenomenal of the physics underlying it. Notions of
subjects and their intentions are an adaptive, but superfluous, epistemic shorthand or
placeholder for more eliminative explanations. The appearance of agency can be
understood without remainder as the entailed effects of ultimately unguided material
interactions. Only bottom-up or part-whole interactions are really real or causally
efficacious; top-down or whole-part explanations are illusory, heuristic, and
epiphenomenal. Consequently, so are intention, freedom, meaning, and value.
If this kind of reductionism were valid or complete, its effects on ethics and
religion, among other pursuits, would be devastating. These potential effects are among
the reasons that “emergence now holds an increasingly prominent place” in scientific
scholarship and discourse between natural scientific and theological disciplines.203 While
scholars like evolutionary psychologists Leda Cosmides and John Tooby are implicitly
non-reductionistic, emergence is explicitly anti-reductionistic in its ability to frame the
findings of evolutionary psychology (EP) and other scientific disciplines. Emergentism
does not result in theology or theological anthropology and ethics. However, proponents
of emergence are able to locate and analyze both quantitative and qualitative distinctions
within the natural world. These distinctions give rise to credible, systematic, empiricallybased ways of describing human uniqueness that open up scientific modes of explanation
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to conceptual integration with theological ones.204 With their goal of substantiating final
(causality) analyses, many emergentists hold that eliminative materialism misses
something, because the something it misses is not a materially or energetically present
“thing” at all, but the dynamical, diachronic self-organization of that which is materially
and energetically present and quantifiable.
According to Deacon, the emergence of life and mentality are among the kinds of
(id)entity constituting dynamics which are not only absent in terms of an empirically
observable and quantifiable material-energetic cause or sum of causes, but which, in
being end-directed and consequence-organized, emerge and employ energy for the sake
of a reality—a goal, a telos—which is no less absent in terms of its incompleteness,
intangibility, or spatio-temporal distance.
In these terms, there is perhaps little wonder so many in the natural sciences have
been missing the forest for the trees, so to speak. Though cliché, this turn of phrase might
help illuminate key concepts in the emergence conversation. Ecologically speaking, a
forest is not just a dense localized grouping of arboreal life; it is an ecosystem, which is
only present as a function of the interactive dynamics of its geological, climatic,
microbial, plant, and animal constituents. These dynamic processes and others like them
are something other than the simple addition of constituent parts and their interactions,
though they are not exactly something more than this—a superaddition of new physical
laws, forces, or “spirits.” What is missing is a way to account for the generation,
preservation, and propagation of energetic physical interactions which involve a degree
and kind of causal power “located” in an indissoluble interaction of constituent parts, not
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in the parts themselves.205 Mereological analysis206 does not overlook any of the materialenergetic components present in emergent dynamics, but it does “throw away information
about the basis of higher-order causal powers.”207 “There is nothing left out,” Deacon
argues, “because there are no components to what is absent. […] We can summarize the
source of irreducibility in such cases in a simple slogan: Absence has no components, and
so it cannot be reduced or eliminated.”208 Speaking perhaps less enigmatically, Deacon
grants that
[t]here can be little doubt that reductionistic science is fundamentally
sound. It has provided unparalleled predictive power for explaining
physical-chemical processes across unimaginable ranges of scale and
diversity of phenomena. It would be pointless to even imagine that it is
somehow misguided.209
At the same time, he points out that where it concerns living organisms, this kind of
science
also precisely brackets from analysis what is most relevant: the “organic
wholeness.” The life of an organism is not resident in its parts. It is
embodied in the global organization of living processes. Moreover, the socalled parts that analysis produces—the individual molecules, organelles,
cells, tissues, types, and organs—are not parts in the sense that machine
parts are.210
Without delving into Deacon’s extensive argument over what qualities
differentiate machine parts and the (co)evolved body parts of organisms,211 one might
accomplish the same effect by denoting the concept of fusion he gleans from American
philosopher Paul Humphreys. Fusion means that inclusion within an emergent whole can
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affect the constitutional properties of a given part. The coadaptation of organs or
organisms is one such effect. Summarizing the concept of fusion, Deacon explains that
“[b]y virtue of their systemic involvement with each other, [dynamically integrated body
‘parts’] are not longer entirely distinguishable. As a result, reductionist decomposition
cannot be competed because what were once independently identifiable parts no longer
exist.”212
(Id)entity-defining dynamics emerge as the self-orchestration and mutual direction
of the pieces in the ensemble. The performance of the ensemble is not merely the sum of
each part being played simultaneously. Likewise, life, evolution, information,
significance, sentience, consciousness, and personhood all happen because of—and for the
sake of—something which for all reductionistic intents and purposes is not there. An
ability to account for emergent causes might be instrumental in “locating” human
spirituality, the image of God, and the ethical and theological horizons toward which they
point.
Three orders of emergent causality
Like Haught, Deacon is interested in reformulating and reappropriating the
Aristotelian notion of final causality for the natural sciences today, which he attempts to
achieve through the concept of teleodynamics. Where some scholars seem to understand
emergence very generally as an escalating result of self-organizing principles in the
natural world, and where others are able to cite nearly thirty distinct levels or types of
emergence, Deacon locates three cumulative and hierarchically supervenient213 orders of
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scale for analyzing all instances of emergent dynamics. Deacon now refers to these orders
as homeodynamics, morphodynamics, and teleodynamics.
This nomenclature reflects that of Deacon’s most recent monograph on
emergence, Incomplete Nature: How the Mind Emerged from Matter (2012). He has,
however, employed various parallel terminologies to denote the same three orders of
emergence. Discussions of these three emergent orders and their potential impact on
Christian anthropology and ethics occupy the remainder of this chapter:
(1) First-order =
(2) Second-order =
(3) Third-order =

non-recurrent
simple-recurrent
hyper-recurrent

supervenient
self-organizing
evolutionary

thermodynamic (homeo-)214
morphodynamic
teleodynamic

Deacon’s three-tiered schema of emergent phenomena is arguably more
terminologically precise, comprehensive, and internally and externally coherent than any
other framework for emergence scholarship. His decade-long work on the topic of
emergence has proven influential and fruitful for a number of scholars in the
philosophical and theological disciplines who are working to bring current science into
dialogue with their respective fields. Thinkers like Christian Philosopher Nancey
Murphy, psychologist Warren S. Brown, Philip Clayton, J. W. van Huyssteen, John
Haught, and Philip Hefner are just a few who consider the concept of emergence to
present a viable alternative to the seeming dichotomy between reductive physicalism and
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substance dualism in anthropology, especially as it reaches into the realms of ethics and
theology. These scholars are not looking for any available dialogue partner who “plays
nice” with theology. Rather, they, like Deacon, find eliminative explanations of natural
phenomena to be incomplete and inaccurate.
Still, the greater attraction to emergence among theologians might well be the
implication that if free and responsible intentionality is able to emerge through natural
processes, the emergent dynamics resulting in human personhood might intimate the
existence and character of a personal, intelligent, dynamic, creative reality transcending
the cosmos as a whole. In short, the search for the ultimate conditions of possibility
behind such perennial questions as “Why does anything exist?” “Why this reality and not
another?” and “Why am I able to ask these questions?” may still point plausibly in the
direction of religious faith, theological reflection, and the kinds of meanings and values
they enable and require. Emergence has become a promising path down which
interdisciplinary scholars are pursuing these kinds of questions today.
Along this path, emergence also promises to be a fruitful hermeneutical tool by
which Ricoeur’s “wager” that a second naïveté retrieval of religious myth-symbols might
yet pay off in terms of Hefner’s twofold task of “provid[ing] genuine knowledge of
reality, for the sake of our wholesome living.”215 Theological meanings may be able to
retain an integral and plausible space in the symbolic universe of what really is, bearing
implications for human visions of what ought to be.216
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Comparing, contrasting, and constructing Deacon’s emergentist schema
One of the star players on the stage of emergence scholarship and its theological
application is Philip Clayton, whose concise listing of the general tenets of emergence are
rehearsed at the end of chapter 1 above: (1) ontological physicalism, (2) property
emergence, (3) the irreducibility of emergence, and (4) downward causation.217 As an
emergentist Clayton contributes careful philosophical and historical scholarship, firsthand
contributions to dialogue between the natural sciences and theology, and accessible
explanations of emergence. However, he no more represents a standardized conception of
emergentism than Deacon.
Though Deacon is less concerned with theological application than Clayton, one
could argue that these scholars’ respective characterizations of emergence are ultimately
compatible, plausible, and profitable for theological discourse.218 At the same time,
neither thinker is currently working to commensurate or coordinate their efforts. Both
place a premium on terminological precision, but they pursue clarity in ways that are
prima facie incompatible.219 Because they have not done much talking with one another,
they seem to do an unfortunate amount of talking past one another.
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Three potential areas of contention between Clayton and Deacon are (1) the
relative significance each assigns to the distinction between “weak” and “strong”
emergence, (2) the manner in which each understands the term “physicalism,” and (3)
whether Deacon’s three orders of emergent phenomena are precise enough to make the
same qualitative distinctions as Clayton’s multiple “levels” of emergence, especially
among third-order emergent dynamics.
The following three subsections help to construct and defend Deacon’s
emergentist schema by tackling these issues. This analysis makes it possible to describe
precisely (1) how the image of God and the knowledge of good and evil belong to the
dynamic psychosomatic life of the human person ever in the process of becoming, (2)
how these theologically oriented realities emerge as natural, physically-based dynamics,
and (3) how these uniquely human emergent realities are qualitatively distinct from other
types of naturally-occurring phenomena.
The false dichotomy of “weak” vs. “strong” emergence
Clayton contrasts weak and strong conceptions of emergence as follows:
Strong emergentists maintain that evolution in the cosmos produces new,
ontologically distinct levels, which are characterized by their own distinct
laws or regularities and causal forces. By contrast, weak emergentists
insist that, as new patterns emerge, the fundamental causal processes
remain those of physics. As emergentists, these thinkers believe that it
may be essential to scientific success to explain causal processes using
emergent categories such as protein synthesis, hunger, kin selection, or the
desire to be loved. But, although such emergent structures may essentially
constrain the behaviour [sic] of lower-level structures, they should not be
viewed as active causal influences in their own right.220
He labels this understanding of weak emergence “epistemological emergence,” in that the
emergent wholes it identifies embody “the same fundamental causal processes” at every
220
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level of organization, though in ways that might currently escape our notice or grasp.
Strong, or “ontological emergence,” by contrast, refers to causal properties that are not
reducible to any belonging to the constituent parts of an emergent whole or any sum of
the interactions among them.221 While Clayton admits that weak emergentism does
constitute a break with canonical strains of reductive physicalism, he appeals to
contemporary American philosopher Jaegwon Kim in order to propose that weak
emergentism stands or falls on its ability to distinguish between reductive and
nonreductive physicalism. However, because of the way Clayton and Kim define
physicalism, they find the reductive-nonreductive classification to be a distinction
without a difference, or at least an untenable distinction. They hold that nonreductive
physicalism ultimately collapses into either reductive physicalism or some form of
ontological dualism.222 Thus, Clayton argues, weak emergence is left “saddled with the
same old dichotomy between physicalism and dualism, despite its best efforts to the
contrary.”223 If Clayton is correct about physicalism, then perhaps Deacon, as a
physicalist, cannot help the theologian give a robust account of the emergence of the
image of God.
According to Clayton, weak emergentism accepts “the causal closure of the world
and a lawlike, even necessary entailment relationship between supervenient and
subvenient levels,” which he calls a “token-token relationship.”224 Causal closure,
especially as Deacon employs the principle, refers mainly to the first law of
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thermodynamics, which states that matter and energy cannot be created or destroyed. 225
The second law of thermodynamics—the law of entropy—states, however, that matter
and energy can be converted into other forms (including one another). When left to
themselves, energetic interactions tend to diffuse as much as possible into their
surroundings, becoming more randomized, or in Deacon’s terminology, less
constrained.226 Deacon holds that the laws of thermodynamics entail “a causal closure
principle, which is to say that the basic causal laws of the universe also form a closed
system—all changes come from within.”227 Causal closure, couched solely in
thermodynamic terms, implies the “bottom-up” determination of emergent phenomena at
every level or order. Deacon, however, claims that there are two kinds of dynamics within
the causally closed cosmos, which are not reducible to the thermodynamic activity
through which they emerge, namely morphodynamics and teleodynamics. By this route,
explored more fully below, Deacon celebrates the causal closure principle and
successfully avoids reducing all forms of causation to their quantum level constituents.
In the process, Deacon, like Clayton, sings the praises of multiple realizability.
For Deacon multiple realizability means that complex emergent phenomena defy
reductive token-token analyses because they “can all be embodied in highly diverse kinds
of physical-chemical processes and substrates.”228 The same adaptive function might be
realized in very different ways by different species or individuals.229 Two identical brain
events may be associated with very different mental events; just as two identical mental
events may be associated with very different brain events. Avoiding the
225
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epiphenomenalism of token-token entailment presents another way in which Deacon may
not fit the bill of the weak emergentism Clayton expects to find in physicalism.
Deacon argues that metabolism does not equal mentality. He holds that while
there may be an identifiable micro-physical-chemical correlate to every mental
phenomenon, lower-level explanations do not preclude robust accounts of mental
causation according to which mind states (emergent mental dynamics) and brain states
(subvenient neuro-chemical-physical dynamics) are co-constraining, yet qualitatively
distinct. Mental phenomena are causally dependent upon brain physiology from the
“bottom-up,” and emergent mental dynamics are able to affect/effect these brain states
from the “top-down.” Deacon’s dynamical emergentist schema is able to justify the
phenomenological intuition characteristic of so much of human experience—that the
mind knows what the brain is telling it; and the brain-body does what the mind tells it to
do. Emergentism both confirms and qualifies the old adage, “mind over matter.”
Despite these potential inroads to consensus, Clayton remains skeptical of what he
is willing to admit “is perhaps the most sophisticated scientific theory of emergence
currently available,” because he still finds Deacon’s version to be “weak” in the sense
denoted above.230 What is more, for Clayton, “weak emergence is the position to beat.”231
Deacon, however, denies both claims—that he is a weak emergentist in Clayton’s
terms, and that the contest comes down to one between weak and strong emergence.
Deacon acknowledges that his own scholarship “might be described as a sort of ‘weak
emergence’ or ‘soft reductionism.’” Yet he immediately qualifies this confession by
arguing that a “more careful analysis of emergence forces an abandonment of both
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caricatures of explanation as simplistic abstractions.”232 Making only an indirect
reference to Clayton, Deacon notes in his latest monograph that
theorists are often distinguished as either being “weak” or “strong”
emergentists, referring to their stance on the question of causal
discontinuity and whether emergence is compatible or incompatible with
reductionism. Strong emergentism argues that emergent transitions
involve a fundamental discontinuity of physical laws; weak emergentism
argues that although there may be a superficially radical reorganization,
the properties of higher and lower levels form a continuum, with no new
laws of causality emerging. However, this distinction does not capture
many more subtle differences, and the perspective developed in this book
is not easily categorized in these terms.233
Though the way out of this seeming dichotomy is complex, Christian philosopher
Nancey Murphy has developed several terminological distinctions which she finds to
operate within Deacon’s work. First, Murphy defines five interrelated types of
reductionism: (1) methodological reductionism, (2) epistemological reductionism, (3)
logical or definitional reductionism, (4) causal reductionism, and (5) (two types of)
ontological reductionism.234 When denoting and relating these terms, she takes issue with
the concept of causal reductionism: “The view that the behavior of the parts of a system
(ultimately, the parts studied by subatomic physics) is determinative of the behavior of all
higher-level entities; all causation is ‘bottom-up.’”235 Supplementing her findings with
Deacon’s, Murphy distinguishes between “causal forces” and “causal powers.”236 She
prefers the latter term, which follows neatly the etymology of the Greek dunamis, most
readily recognized in the noun and adjective forms of the English dynamic. Even more
232
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interesting is that Deacon has begun to make ample and consistent use of the term “causal
power” in the way Murphy describes it.237
With this distinction between forces and powers, Murphy and Deacon conclude
that emergent phenomena of any type do not involve the creation of new physical “laws,”
even though they may introduce irreducible causal “dynamics.” Likewise, emergent
phenomena do not create new physical “forces,” even though they may constitute the
creation of a dynamically supervenient “causal power,” system, or entity, such as an
organism. Life and causally efficacious mental function do not add to or subtract from the
four fundamental cosmic forces. Yet life and mentality are not located in the metabolic
activity of the body, but in the causal dynamics orchestrating metabolism from part to
whole and whole to part. The “parts” are materially-energetically present; their “fusion”
is not.
Consequently, the causal closure principle cannot chase the image of God or even
God out of the physical universe. Even if “all changes come from within,” as Deacon
asserts, “causal powers” and their dynamically supervening influence are not “in” the
cosmos in the same manner as “causal forces.” Deacon is not forced to choose between
ontological physicalism and causal dualism, as Clayton and Kim presume. Thus, while
every aspect of human personhood is wholly immanent to the cosmos, bearing the image
of God can neither be reduced to physics nor relegated to the inaccessible realm of the
supernatural. Theological descriptors like the image of God remain defensible because
the causal closure principle cannot exclude a priori a dynamically supervening causal
power acting from within—but not circumscribed by—created reality as a whole. With

237

See Deacon, Incomplete Nature, 141. Because Deacon does not cite Murphy’s development of this
distinction, I prefer to think of this terminological convergence as coincidental.

109

emergence there is room for God, even “in” a closed universe. While in-depth discussion
of divine action in a causally closed universe is beyond the scope of this study, this topic
is very likely to play a role in my future research and bears further mention in chapter 7.
The false equation of reductive and nonreductive physicalism
Because the image of God must at some level be a physically-borne reality, a
second area of potential disagreement between Clayton and Deacon worth analyzing is
the manner in which each understands the term “physicalism.” As mentioned above, this
second issue relates to the first, in that Clayton draws a correspondence between weak
emergentism and physicalism. Citing Kim, Clayton attempts to discredit the supposed
“nonreductive physicalism” of Deacon and his supporters, voicing his “serious doubts
whether any version of physicalism other than reductivist physicalism is in the end
coherent.”238 However, Deacon “evades Kim’s critique” by exposing a problematic
assumption underlying Kim’s understanding of ontological (strong) emergence versus
epistemological (weak) emergence—the false dichotomy Deacon seeks to overcome.239
The difficulty in Kim’s position for Deacon lies in the assumption that one can
separate the synchronic and diachronic aspects of emergent phenomena.240 For Deacon,
“at least for higher-order forms of emergence, the part/whole distinction and the
synchrony/diachrony distinction are intertwined.”241 The diachronic dynamics of causal
powers “contains” the information reductive analysis irretrievably throws away.
Emergence is a process, not just a product, and the process is not reducible, because it has
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no components.242 At the same time, these dynamic processes bear ontological
implications for the materially-energetically present “components” involved in emergent
phenomena. Referring again to Humphrey’s concept of fusion, Deacon argues that Kim’s
conflation of all forms of physicalism rests on the atomistic assumption that “parts” are
fully understandable in isolation from the wholes in which they are dynamically
embedded.243
Deacon’s self-termed “softened reductionism” does not preclude a robust
conception of whole-part supervenience, because he maintains that “a synchronic
understanding of this relationship is an insufficient basis for the concept of emergence.”244
This is not to say that mereological analysis is useless or unnecessary, only that it cannot
avail itself of all information relevant for “locating” personal subjects or the image of God
they bear in vivo. Analogously, differentiation in calculus is useful for finding
instantaneous slopes of nonlinear equations, making available moment-to-moment
information such as the velocity or acceleration of an object, but only by reducing time
and distance (i.e., space-time) to nothing—to zero.245 This kind of synchronic analysis is
important, but the methodological reductionism of finding the instantaneous slope of a
zero-dimensional point on a curve yields a quantity that is only identifiable and significant
because it is in flux—a “part” of dynamic, diachronic function.
As a proponent of Deacon’s emergentist perspective, Murphy argues convincingly
that the first type of ontological reductionism she defines is a key ingredient of
nonreductive physicalism, because it does not entail causal reductionism. The form of
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ontological reductionism conducive to emergentism “is the view that as one goes up the
hierarchy of levels, no new kinds of metaphysical ‘ingredients’ need to be added to
produce higher-level entities from lower.” According to Murphy, for higher-order forms
of complexity to emerge, “No ‘vital force’ or ‘entelechy’ must be added to get living
beings from non-living materials; no immaterial mind or soul needed to get
consciousness; no Zeitgeist to form individuals into a society.”246 Murphy then defines a
second kind of ontological reductionism in terms of the “much stronger thesis […] that
only the entities at the lowest level are really real; higher-level entities—molecules, cells,
organisms, are only composites made of atoms.”247 She calls this position “atomist
reductionism,” and elsewhere, “reductive materialism.”248
In nonreductive physicalism, Murphy argues, “It is possible to hold a physicalist
ontology without subscribing to atomist reductionism.”249 With the emergence of novel
and irreducible causal powers, one is able to “say that higher-level entities are real—as
real as the entities that compose them—and at the same time reject all sorts of vitalism
and dualism.”250 By rejecting atomist reductionism, Murphy also rejects what she calls
causal reductionism. Deacon accomplishes the same by differentiating morphodynamics
and teleodynamics from their underlying thermodynamics.
The theological significance of this principle is that from atom to “Adam,”
emerging in the image of God is a natural process which is not reducible to physics. At
the same time, the dynamical emergence of human uniqueness bears a traceable kinship
246
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to all other life and the matter-energy out of which it emerges. In this light a
contemporary interpretation of the image of God is a statement about humankind’s
functional uniqueness among other species, not its metaphysical uniqueness above other
species. A dynamical physicalist ontology allows for robust qualitative distinctions
among species that do not mistakenly place Homo sapiens outside or above the rest of the
natural world as the creation.
Interestingly, Murphy’s position seems identical to the way in which Clayton
defines the first general feature of emergence—“ontological physicalism: All that exists
in the space-time world are the basic particles recognized by physics and their
aggregates.”251 However, Clayton adds that for all its anti-dualistic accuracy, this basic
tenet is not precise—it “is poorly formulated.” Rather than ontological physicalism he
prefers the term ontological monism, according to which, “Reality is ultimately
composed of one basic kind of stuff. Yet the concepts of physics are not sufficient to
explain all the forms that this stuff takes—all the ways it comes to be structured,
individuated, and causally efficacious.”252 Up to this point in the definition, Clayton
proposes nothing at odds with the nonreductive physicalism advocated by Deacon and
Murphy. He continues however, explaining:
The one ‘stuff’ apparently takes forms for which the explanations of
physics, and thus the ontology of physics (or ‘physicalism’ for short) are
not adequate. We should not assume that the entities postulated by physics
complete the inventory of what exists. Hence emergentists should be
monists but not physicalists.253
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This distinction may provide a helpful working definition for Clayton’s treatment of
emergence, but it also includes a misleading conception of physicalism. For Clayton “the
ontology of physics” is necessarily that which Murphy defines as “atomistic
reductionism,” in contrast with “ontological reductionism.” The atomism Murphy and
Deacon readily avoid is the same atomism Clayton and Kim presume to be endemic of
physicalism and “weak” emergentism.
Clayton holds that “causality should be our primary guide to ontology.”254 Deacon
does not disagree. Like Clayton, he finds “serious inadequacies in our conceptions of
matter, order, life, work, information, representation, and even consciousness and
conception of value.” Deacon’s way of remedying this situation “requires reframing the
way we think about the physical world in thoroughly dynamical, that is to say, process,
terms, and recasting our notions of causality in terms of something like the geometry of
this dynamics, instead of thinking in terms of material objects in motion affected by
contact and fields of force.”255 In the case of many higher-order emergent phenomena,
“their causal power is not located in any ultimate stuff but in this dynamical organization
itself.”256
This concept is already a theological doctrine. In orthodox Christianity the one
God is a dynamic Trinity of “persons.” To borrow a term from patristic theology, this
emergentist conception of ontology-causality implies that the image of God and the
knowledge of good and evil are borne out in the ongoing perichoresis—the mutual
interpenetration—of everything that goes into forming a culturally-constituted creature,
from the (dust of the) ground up. Given a trinitarian theology of the creator God, one
254
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could contend that this creaturely perichoresis emerges in response to and in the image of
the eternal, self-constituting emergent dynamic “in” which all created reality lives and
moves and has its being. Perhaps creation though evolution produces this dynamical kind
of analogy of the divine life—an analogia entis, an imago trinitatis. Chapter seven below
notes the potential impact of this concept on my future research.
“Orders” vs. “levels” of emergence
Finally, and to begin a more systematic treatment of Deacon’s three-tiered
taxonomy of emergent phenomena and its implications for Christian anthropology and
ethics, Clayton expresses doubts as to whether Deacon’s three “orders” of emergence are
precise enough to include and distinguish all the phenomena Clayton identifies as the
many different “levels” of emergence. Once again, with a little translation, this apparent
terminological problem becomes a nonissue. Clayton even admits that there may be a
way through the apparent difficulty.257 Expressing his ongoing reservations, however,
Clayton recounts that Deacon
describes thermo- [now “homeo-“], morpho-, and teleodynamics as three
“orders” of emergence. Deacon and I agree that thermodynamics and the
dynamics of form are necessary but not sufficient for explaining biological
and psychological phenomena. Two main differences seem to divide us:
exactly when teleodynamics first occurs and whether there are additional
distinct orders of emergence in the natural world.258
As a response (albeit indirect) to these two interrelated issues, Deacon has since
coined a term to characterize all teleodynamic phenomena—ententional. Deacon coins
the term “ententional” to convey the “lack a single term in the English language (and
others that [he knows] of) that captures [the] more generic sense of existing with-respect257
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to, for-the-sake-of, or in-order-to-generate something that is absent that also includes
function at one extreme and value at the other.”259 Entention combines (or blends) the
prefix en- (meaning “in” or “within”) with the adjectival form of intend to denote a state
of being intrinsically and dynamically “inclined toward” something extrinsic or absent. 260
Maximally, teleodynamic structures and functions emerge through the indissoluble
interaction of multiple teleodynamic processes. Minimally, teleodynamic structures and
processes emerge through the “co-creation, complementary constraint, and reciprocal
synergy of two or more strongly coupled morphodynamic processes,” which are
propagated through their underlying homeodynamics.261
For Clayton teleodynamics implies teleology, which implies life. The emergence
of life from nonliving processes makes a very attractive candidate for locating the phase
transition from form to function. Yet for Deacon, teleodynamics can and must occur prelife. The term ententional solves this first-occurrence problem and provides a common
thread to all teleodynamic phenomena. The concept of ententionality differentiates
teleodynamics from morphodynamics and homeodynamics, with great precision. By
contrast, Clayton’s “family resemblances” between perhaps “more than two dozen
levels” of emergent phenomena do not establish the same kinds of qualitative distinctions
among emergent phenomena as Deacon’s three orders.262 Deacon’s orders are able to
accommodate any of Clayton’s levels as occurring within them. These orders do not
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ignore the qualitative distinctions of Clayton’s levels. They add another layer of
distinction to them.263
The significance of each of these interrelated terms—homeo-, morpho-, and
teleodynamics—becomes clearer below. The present reason for highlighting the
cumulative and hierarchic relationships among Deacon’s orders of emergence is to
emphasize that teleodynamics describes from the bottom-up the emergence of the human
body-brain-mind and its functioning from matter. From the top-down, this functioning is
describable in terms of the image of God and the knowledge of good and evil.
The emergence of the imago Dei ex absentia via homeo-, morpho-, and teleodynamics
In the Christian doctrine of creation, God creates ex nihilo—out of nothing.
Integrating Christian and Deconian concepts, the imago Dei emerges ex absentia. The
divine image is not located in any physical or immaterial substance but “in” what Deacon
calls a “constitutive absence” dynamically fusing the matter-energy of the cosmos into a
human person in vivo.264 From this perspective, whatever is uniquely and
characteristically human, and thus whatever belongs to the image of God, is can be
described—on a natural-scientific level—in terms of Deacon’s teleodynamics and the
ententionality these dynamics entail.
On a theological level, when divinity and divine intentionality are understood to
be the ultimate concern and only necessary constituent of what really is, then entention in
creation—existing with-respect-to, for-the-sake-of—takes on new, emergent meaning.
Blending an emergentist understanding of end-directedness (i.e., teleodynamics) and the
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theistic concept of creatio ex nihilo supports the inference that the cosmos as a whole and
all creatures emerging within it exist with-respect-to the creator God who is distinct (and
thus absent) from the physical universe, but in whom all creatures live, move, and have
their being. Where ententional dynamics reach the complexity of conscientious
intentionality through biocultural evolution, human beings are able to exist and act freely
and responsibly with-respect-to and for-the-sake-of theologically motivated goals, values,
and norms.
Using Deacon’s terminology, emerging in the image of God is a teleodynamic
development involving the interrelated and variously complex teleodynamic processes of
consciousness (including religious awareness), selfhood, sentience, significance, value,
evolution, and life. As an ententional development, the emergence of the image of God
can be described as the natural process by which the creation evolves all the conditions of
possibility to point beyond itself in faith, hope, and love.
This naturalness of the image of God relates to van Huyssteen’s point concerning
the naturalness of religion mentioned in the previous chapter. However, to point to this
relationship is not to say that the embodiment of the image of God is contingent upon
religious belief. Still, as van Huyssteen puts it, “in this broadest sense of the word,
religion co-emerged with humanity itself.”265 According to van Huyssteen, Deacon also
subscribes to this “emergence and naturalness of religious imagination” thesis, in the
strong sense of being
open toward the specific emergence not just of a propensity for religious
belief, but of spirituality, [which seems] to leave room for the possibility
that the symbolic human mind, because of its vast neural complexity,
might be an emergence of newly integrated capacities for perception,
265
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knowledge, and awareness that go beyond the biological nature of the
brain.266
“In fact,” van Huyssteen suggests, “for a scientist like Terrence Deacon the capacity for
spiritual experience can be understood as an emergent consequence of the symbolic
transfiguration of human cognition and emotions.”267
Many EP scholars are also pursuing nonreductive scientific research about human
uniqueness open to emergentist analysis. Turning to fields related to Deacon’s
neuroscientific research, van Huyssteen notes that although EP cannot itself evaluate the
rationality or irrationality of specific religious beliefs, it is among the many scientific
disciplines making arguments “that support the emergence of the cognitive, fluid,
symbolic human mind; of imagination and religious awareness; and of the crucial role of
language in the process.”268 Van Huyssteen finds Deacon, paleoanthropologist Ian
Tattersall, archeologist Stephen Mithen, and many evolutionary psychologists to be
among the scientists who “see the cognitively fluid human mind as blending and
recombining templates of understanding used for other purposes and domains of
cognition” in order to beget cultural singularities like ethics and religion.269
On this point, the interrelated constructs of a number of scholars converge and
combine, indicating the range of fields fruitful for constructing a second naïveté
interpretation of the image of God and the knowledge of good and evil. According to this
integration of sources, the evolutionary emergence of our symbolic species270 and its
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singular capacities for conceptual blending across diverse cognitive domains271 has
marked the emergence of a created co-creator of person-constituting cultural meanings
and values.272
These person-constituting distinctions belong to a symbolic universe—an external
scaffolding physically absent from the material universe, but instrumental to cultural,
cognitive, and thus cosmic change. Anticipating the role this type of constitutive absence
plays in Deacon’s description of teleodynamic-ententional phenomena like spirituality,
van Huyssteen argues that
the heights of all human imagination, the depths of depravity, moral
awareness, and a sense of God also must depend on this human capacity
for symbolic coding of the “nonvisible.” This “coding of the nonvisible”
through abstract, symbolic thought enabled also our early human ancestors
to argue and hold beliefs in abstract terms. In fact, the concept of God
itself follows from the ability to abstract and conceive of “person.”273
If Deacon’s dynamical conception of emergent causal powers is adequate, then
“persons,” whether human or divine, are “not there” in the sense of being materiallyenergetically present as the interactional sum of internal and external constituent parts.
Rather, as mentioned above, the perichoresis of the “parts” is itself the person. In
Christian parlance, this understanding of emergent dynamics might provide powerful
tools for constructing the logic of how the tri-personal God must also be conceived as one
“Person,” “personal,” or as theologian and biochemist Arthur Peacocke words it, “at least
personal, or supra-personal.”274
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This theological development, which cannot be explored here, is especially
relevant for developing the theological and anthropological insights of scholars at the
crossroads of theology and the natural sciences such as Karl Rahner, Ted Peters, Denis
Edwards, John Polkinghorne, Arthur Peacocke, and Robert John Russell, to name a few.275
While van Huyssteen is surely correct that a compound abstraction of the concept
of person is what makes theistic awareness possible, Rahner, for example, follows
generations of theologians when arguing that while the analogy of personhood must
proceed epistemologically from human to divine, the analogy of personhood (the
analogia entis) can only proceed ontologically from divine to human, from infinite to
finite, from necessary to contingent, from (Ground of) Being to beings, from eternal to
temporal, from creative (ex nihilo) to created (ex absentia), from intrinsic-immaterial
person-constituting emergent dynamics to extrinsic-material person-constituting
emergent dynamics.276 In this development of Rahner’s theology, God, as concept and as
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“person,” is the constitutive absence or “mystery” which gives existence and significance
to all of created reality, dynamically supervening on the material cosmos from within,
albeit across the so-called infinite qualitative distinction between creator and creation.
Homo sapiens are able to conceive of this physically absent, yet causally relevant
condition for existence as a motivator of moral action and other behaviors and hopes
oriented to/by a reality and a futurity transcending those of the material cosmos.
From this type of vantage point, Christianity and other theistic faiths have come to
construe a potentially valid concept pertaining to a qualitatively insuperable reality able
to relate to the world—i.e., God. This religious awareness has become inextricably
woven into the teleodynamic processes that constitute and individuate persons vis-à-vis
one another and their environments. In other words, through human agency, whatever
“God” is understood to be exerts a personal causal influence in the world. While the
verdict of whether theological awareness has an actual referent is ultimately a matter of
faith, from a Christian perspective, the emergent dynamics which make possible this selftranscendence might be identified as those biocultural processes through which we bear
the image of God with a knowledge of good and evil.
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To elucidate this theological point, however, requires a deeper understanding of
the most humble beginnings of biocultural development. Homeodynamics, according to
Deacon, is where it all begins. The following subsections provide detailed summaries of
Deacon’s three orders of emergent phenomena, highlighting how the cosmos has cocreated the image of God with each ascent in scale. Borrowing a phrase from Peacocke,
to explore the theological implications of homeodynamics, morphodynamics, and
teleodynamics is to explore how the creator “makes things make themselves.”277 For
Haught, Clayton, Deacon, and others wishing to reformulate and reappropriate Aristotle’s
taxonomy of causality for contemporary ontology, to explore the dynamic supervenience
of teleodynamics upon morphodynamics upon homeodynamics is to explore the ways in
which final and formal causes emerge and direct the matter-energy (material and efficient
causes) of the cosmos toward specific ends, including ethical and religious goals.
Homeodynamics and efficient causality
In one sense, homeodynamics refers to a class of emergent phenomena, but in
another sense, argues Deacon, it “is the engine of emergence” of every kind.278 In a word,
homeodynamics are the source of all efficient causality in the cosmos—the
thermodynamic interactions by which higher-order morpho- and teleodynamics emerge
(from the “bottom-up”) and effect change (from the “top-down”).
Because Deacon’s three orders of emergent dynamics are cumulative and
hierarchic, teleodynamics are also morphodynamic are also homeodynamic, but not
necessarily the other way around. This taxonomy might seem reductionistic, since the
concept of homeodynamics is no more or less than a reaffirmation and restatement of the
277
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two laws of thermodynamics—(1) that matter-energy cannot be created or destroyed and
(2) that it tends toward an equilibrium state which is organized as diffusely and
randomly—entropically—as possible. Yet how could entropy fuel emergence? What does
thermodynamics have to tell theologians about the image of God? How might
homeodynamics take part in the divine image and likeness?
At first glance, thermodynamics would seem to make the spontaneous emergence
of high-order complex system dynamics about as likely as falling up. But as a “law,”
entropy is not as iron-clad as, say, gravity. It is more a rule of thumb with built-in
loopholes. The law of entropy is a statistical likelihood characteristic of matter in
interaction, not a property of matter itself, like gravity. Thus, any intrinsic or extrinsic
property which alters the nearly certain probability that physical interactions will reach a
maximally randomized equilibrium state over time, can lead to otherwise unexpected
organizational regularities among substrate particles. The particles do not “fall up” so
much as they “fall in line,” by way of an attraction caused by some factor entailing new
interactive probabilities. Deacon parses this notion of attraction with three other
interrelated terms. The first is ubiquitous to the concept of emergence; the latter two are
original to Deacon: constraint, orthograde, and contragrade. As “the expression of an
asymmetric statistical tendency,” an attractor correlates to one or more constraints.279
Deacon defines constraint and these other terms as follows:
Constraint: The state of being restricted or confined within prescribed
bounds. Constraints are what is not there but could have been. The concept
of constraint is, in effect, a complementary concept to order, habit, and
organization because something that is ordered or organized is restricted in
its range and/or dimensions of variation, and consequently tends to exhibit
redundant features or regularities. A dynamical system is constrained to
the extent that it is restricted in degrees of freedom to change and exhibits
279

Ibid., 547.

124

attractor tendencies. Constraints can originate intrinsic or extrinsic to the
system that is thereby constrained.280
Orthograde: Changes in the state of a system that are consistent with the
spontaneous, “natural” tendency to change without external
interference.281
Contragrade: Changes in the state of a system that must be extrinsically
forced because they run counter to orthograde (aka spontaneous)
tendencies.282
Some common examples of what Deacon would call homeodynamic emergent
organization are the orthograde (entropic) properties of most liquids, such as laminar
flow, surface tension, and viscosity.283 Liquid molecules display these properties when
they are brought together in sufficient quantity within a certain range of temperature and
pressure. These properties are emergent because they do not belong to the liquid
molecules in isolation and they dynamically supervene upon—constrain—the motion of
the constituent molecules. Yet, at this first order of emergence, Deacon notes, “Statistical
dynamics and quantum theory have provided a remarkably complete theory of how”
these properties arise. “Thus in one sense they are considered to be fully reducible to
relational molecular properties.”284 In a minimal sense, these properties are “formally
caused” by environmental factors—they are inherent relational properties of individual
molecules interacting thermodynamically under certain boundary conditions.285
However, this homeodynamic interaction of liquid molecules is far from the farfrom-equilibrium (i.e., contragrade) dynamics constraining a liquid serving the function
of, say, blood, sweat, or tears; and there is no indication at this point of how to get to the
280
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latter from the former. Homeodynamics of this first-order involve the bare minimum of
constraint. In terms of thermodynamics, then, Deacon proposes, “We can thus describe
the increase in entropy as a decrease in constraints, and the second law can be restated as
follows. In any given interaction, the global level of constraint can only decrease.”286
At the same time, as the engine of emergence, homeodynamics are no less
integral to the emergence of the image of God and the knowledge of good and evil than
the teleodynamic biocultural processes they fuel.
Morphodynamics and formal causality
How, then, does a spontaneous transition from simple homeodynamics to
morphodynamics take place? How do causally efficacious (id)entities or (w)holes begin
to “take shape,” as it were?287 How does formal causality become an internal principle of
constraint? How is it that every snow crystal is alike in certain macro aspects of
configuration but unique in other macro aspects of form? In thermo-/homeodynamic
terms, morphodynamics occurs when “contragrade dynamics at one level produce
orthograde dynamics at the higher level.”288 Simply put, unlikely things can only happen
at the lower organizational level if they play a constitutive role in the most likely things
happening at the higher level. Technically speaking, “A contragrade change must
therefore derive from two or more orthograde processes, each in some way undoing the
other’s effects. […E]ach must constrain the other.”289 That is, the lower level process is
only contragrade in appearance, because the overriding orthograde tendencies of the
higher level “force” (i.e., constrain) the lower level dynamics to take on new, previously
286
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improbable orthograde tendencies. Morphodynamics make interactions less likely to
become more random.
At the same time, in a morphodynamic transition, there is no decrease in energy
dissipation. In fact, there is a net increase in entropy accompanying the net increase in
dynamical order or complexity.290 Materially-energetically, everything taking place at the
higher level is accounted for at the lowest level, except for the new (morpho)dynamics
themselves. Mutual constraint means that these new dynamics are as bottom-up/partwhole dependent as they are top-down/whole-part influential. The contragrade tendencies
of lower-level interactions induced by constraint at the higher level require the constant
homeo-/thermodynamic “work” of particles bumping into each other in chaotic ways. 291
In short, absolute zero is the end of emergence.
Revisiting and reinterpreting Aristotle’s taxonomy of causation, Deacon
characterizes thermodynamics as the only source of efficient causality.292 In a manner of
speaking, E = mc2 is the only concept one must master to understand literally everything
that happens in the universe. This lowest quantum-physical-chemical level is where all
causal forces come from. Yet these are not the only real or efficacious causal powers. All
efficient causation resides with the four fundamental forces. However, not all causally
efficacious systems and their dynamics are reducible to one another. The
morphodynamics constraining and harnessing these forces exerts a formal-causal
influence, and in teleodynamics, a final-causal influence. In Murphy’s terms, this state of
affairs is why ontological reductionism does not entail causal reductionism or atomist
physicalism. In this sense, and contrary to the Clayton-Kim critique, nonreductive
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physicalism is indeed tenable. The theological implication of this conclusion is that the
imago Dei emerges from matter. The natural self-organization of matter bears the image
of God. Morphodynamics helps explain how this image begins to take form through
natural process.
Deacon analyzes several illuminating examples of morphodynamics, including
whirlpool formation, Bénard convection cell formation, directional heat transfer through
a contained gas, and snow crystal formation.293 The final example of snow crystal
formation presents a special case of morphodynamics. In this process constraints or
boundary conditions are doubly significant over time, and they are the reasons why every
snowflake is unique. Every snow crystal takes on a recognizable hexagonal form due to
the angled “shape” of the electromagnetic field of the water molecules and the radial
symmetry of heat dissipation. The varying temperature, pressure, and humidity
conditions the snow crystal encounters as it falls influence the form of the crystal as it
grows. Thus, the initial conditions of crystal seeding, in addition to atmospheric boundary
conditions over time, have a cumulative effect on the form of the growing snow crystal.
Even if two snow crystals share identical initial conditions, the diachronic effects of their
divergent boundary conditions will create two very different snowflakes. Likewise, if two
snow crystals share even slightly different initial conditions, the diachronic effects of
identical boundary conditions can also create two very different snowflakes.294 Perhaps it
is no wonder snowflakes have become symbolic of the delicate dance of conformity,
divergence, and unpredictability that make realities like life so wondrous.
293

Ibid., 235-63; cf. “Emergence: The Hole at the Wheel’s Hub,” 130-37; “Three Levels of Emergent
Phenomena,” 99-105.
294
In larger weather phenomena, the exaggerated shorthand for this aspect of the increasing
unpredictability of a complex system over time is the “butterfly effect” of chaos theory (Deacon,
Incomplete Nature, 548).

128

Teleodynamics and final causality
In addition to variability, the characteristic of snow crystal formation most
relevant to the qualitative transition from morphodynamics to teleodynamics is
crystallization itself—the morphodynamic record-keeping of the diachronic effects of
extrinsic boundary conditions, which become, in turn, intrinsic boundary conditions of
subsequent growth or decay. In a very real sense, the history of the snow crystal becomes
frozen within its form in a potentially preservable way. While semiotic “information” or
“memory” might still be an emergent order away, this historical record-keeping of
variable morphodynamic processes and products is a precursor to the information-laden
teleodynamic processes of life, reproduction, evolution, sentience, consciousness, and
culture.295 In these teleodynamic processes, according to Deacon:
[T]hanks to memory, constraints derived from specific past higher-order
states can get repeatedly re-entered into the lower-level dynamics which
lead to future states. This is what makes the evolution of life both
chaotically unpredictable on the one hand, and yet on the other hand also
historically organized, with an unfolding quasi-directionality. […] This is
because memory allows every prior morphodynamic relationship itself to
become a potentially amplifiable initial condition contributing to any later
relationship.296
In its first occurrence, however, the transition from form-creating emergent
dynamics (morphodynamics) to end-directed, consequence-organized emergent dynamics
(teleodynamics) does not entail semiotic information or memory as a constituent
property. Rather, Deacon suggests, because information “is both about something and has
normative characteristics,” it is best understood as a function of two or more mutually
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constraining teleodynamic processes.297 In this sense, information involves a compound
end-directedness. Information directs (constrains, supervenes upon) subvenient enddirected processes and their morpho- and homeodynamic substrates, which may
themselves be the physical bearers of the information. In life as we know it, for example,
reproduction is a teleodynamic process which depends upon the information-bearing
morphodynamic substrate polymer DNA and its teleodynamic effects under certain
(thermodynamically rich) conditions.
Yet the first teleodynamic systems from which life in this form likely emerged
were what Deacon terms “autogens.” An autogen is “[a] self generating system at the
phase transition between morphodynamics and teleodynamics; any form of selfgenerating, self-repairing, self-replicating system that is constituted by reciprocal
morphodynamic processes.”298 Deacon goes to greater lengths than space permits in order
to theorize how autogens might emerge, and with them the rudiments of reproduction,
evolution, and genetic information.299 The emergence of the first autogens is a watershed
moment in biocultural prehistory because their “[t]eleodynamics is the dynamical
realization of final causality, in which a given dynamical organization exists because of
the consequences of its continuance, and therefore can be described as being selfgenerating.”300 A teleodynamic process is thus “a consequence-organized dynamic that is
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its own consequence.”301 In rudimentary form, such a system would not be conscious or
living. At the same time, life, consciousness, and concepts—including theological selfdefinitions—necessarily build upon these first teleodynamic foundations.
Non-Darwinian teleodynamics
What, then, of the more than three billion year transition from autogenic evolution
to the emergence of the image of God? Whence the emergence of a personhood capable
of formulating this kind of values-laden distinction? According to Deacon, “Beyond
explaining the linked contribution of self-organization and Darwinian selection to
phylogenetic evolution, [teleodynamic] analysis may also shed light on their interaction
in other biological and even non-biological processes, such as epigenesist, neural signal
processing, and language evolution.”302
The emergence of teleodynamics also brings with it the emergence of
normativity—the possibility of success or failure in achieving the ententional end(s) of
complex system dynamics. In a very real sense, benefit and harm—good and evil—
emerge with teleodynamics. For Deacon, “even these simple molecular systems [i.e.,
autogens] have crossed a threshold in which we can say that a very basic form of value
has emerged.”303 Deacon, much in the same vein as Hefner, proposes a thoroughly
bottom-up account of the emergence of values.
Recall Hefner’s teleonomic axiom discussed in chapter 1: “The structure of a
thing, the processes by which it functions, the requirements for its functioning, and its
relations with and impact upon its ecosystem form the most reasonable basis for

301

Ibid. 275; emphasis original.
Ibid., 320; emphasis added.
303
Ibid., 322; cf. 543-45.
302

131

hypothesizing what the purpose and meaning of the thing are.”304 Interestingly, Deacon
finds the term teleonomic to be too modest or reductionistic when applied to living
functions, coining a new term to get beyond these mechanistic connotations.305 In light of
Deacon’s recent work, perhaps Hefner would not object to redubbing his principle the
teleodynamic axiom. Such an axiom might better preface Hefner’s hypotheses concerning
the emergence of freedom—the condition of having to make and contextualize choices
based on the wholesomeness (or lack thereof) those choices might produce.
Theologically speaking, emerging in the image of God with a knowledge of good
and evil is the arrival in natural history of the conditions of possibility for the emergence
of mythology, religion, and consequently, theological anthropology and ethics. Emerging
in the image of God with a knowledge of good and evil means gaining the ability to
discern and define—to co-create—the constellation of values-laden, person-constituting
cultural distinctions and symbols which (teleo)dynamically supervene on our actions.
Citing Hefner, Murphy and coauthor George F. R. Ellis find grounds to critique
this thoroughgoing bottom-up account of moral values and theological ethics. However,
they do qualify their comments with the caveat that “[t]he differences between Hefner’s
system and [theirs] are more a matter of focus than direct disagreement.”306 Hefner
argues persuasively that there are valid visions of wholesomeness to be inferred directly
from natural scientific study. In Murphy and Ellis’s approach, by contrast, “What is
needed is a concept of the good for humankind drawn from an account of ultimate reality
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and thus from theology rather than from science.”307 In Hefner’s account the is which
informs our ought is not necessarily “ultimate” in the sense of being insuperable. The
symbolic universe of what really is may include theology or it may not. Theology is not
necessary for the emergence of valid moral values and norms. At the same time, theology
can qualitatively transform ethics in terms of that-for-the-sake-of-which persons and
cultures pursue wholesomeness. In Deacon’s terms, theology is a qualitatively distinct set
of potential constraints on culturally embedded ententional phenomena. Theology and
theological developments open up novel ways of thinking, being, and acting in the world.
This form of religious awareness has emerged recently in humanity’s biocultural
history from the mental phenomena of sentience, which many other animal species
display in diverse ways. The following two subsections discuss briefly how various forms
of normativity, ethical value, and moral freedom and responsibility have emerged in the
cosmos, mentioning that when the capacity emerges for ethical norms and values to take
on theological and eschatological significance so emerges the images of God.
Sentience and value
The evolution of nervous systems is a higher-order realization of the high-stakes
calculus of teleodynamic success or failure. Emergent neuro-cognitive adaptations persist
because they serve an adaptive function vis-à-vis the generation, preservation, and
propagation of teleodynamic constraints and their material-energetic substrates.
Sentience—“the background ‘feeling of being here’”—is a compound system of
teleodynamic constraint generators designed to serve the functions of maintaining and
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reproducing the organism.308 Although sentience may allow organisms to pursue various
kinds of activity, the Darwinian necessities of survival and reproduction ensure that
mental adaptations will only persist in a given lineage if they do not greatly hinder these
most basic teleodynamic ends.
Built upon autonomic nervous system functions, sentience is a centralized
awareness of whether or not an organism’s internal and external conditions are conducive
to maintaining system dynamics and procuring the ends (and correlative means) toward
which they are oriented. An organism feels hungry, so it seeks food, thirsty, so it seeks
water. It senses danger, so it seeks refuge, pain, so it seeks escape or relief. In this way
Deacon argues that the emergence of sentience is “the emergence of ethical value,”
because it is the emergence of the ambivalent form of life which includes the possibilities
of flourishing and suffering.309 Thus, as Hefner hypothesizes through his created cocreator theory, Deacon proposes that through understanding the emergence of sentience,
“we will discover new ways of asking old questions about the relationship between minds
and brains, and perhaps even find ways to reintegrate issues of subjective value into the
natural sciences.”310
The compound teleodynamic emergence of sentience is the bridge from entension
to intention. In this transition, Deacon reiterates, “sentience is constituted by the
dynamical organization, not the stuff (signals, chemistry) or even the neuronal cellularlevel sentience that constitutes the substrate of that dynamics.”311 The causal power of
efficacious mental function is not located in (i.e., reducible to) the thermodynamic
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activity on which it depends, but “in” the (teleo)dynamics themselves. The brain imaging
technology of fMRI, PET, and MEG can locate the thermodynamics fueling the
supervening teleodynamics at work.312 Yet this kind of analysis, as Clayton would agree,
is not the same thing as pinpointing the physical “tokens” of mental phenomena, let alone
the cultural or religious concepts and values they embody.313
Consciousness and morality
According to Deacon, human mentality emerges from “a form of sentience built
upon sentience” known as consciousness.314 In emergentist terms, the hyper-recurrent
teleodynamics of wakeful human brain function results in a compound sentience framed
by a virtual “world of should and shouldn’t, kindness and abuse, love and hate, joy and
suffering.”315 To fuse Deacon’s and Hefner’s assessments of the emergence of
conscientious thought and action, the values- and symbol-laden world of biocultural
normativity generates the condition of freedom lived out by created co-creators. The
ongoing creation of humankind’s symbolic universe and its historical consequences are
those biocultural dynamics through which the image of God emerge.
At every level of teleodynamic emergence arises a corresponding level of value
and normativity, from the pre-living “self-concern” for structural integrity of autogens to
the moral concerns of human persons. Illustrated in chapter 2, Brown’s shaded cone
depiction of mentality, with its (Deacon-inspired) symbolic threshold, may help to
illumine some of Deacon’s concluding remarks about consciousness:
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Although each is discontinuous from the other by virtue of dynamical
closure, neuronal-level sentience is nevertheless causally entangled with
brain-level sentience, which is entangled in a virtual-self-level of
sentience. And human symbolic abilities add a further, yet-higher-order
variant on this logical type-violating entanglement. This latter involves the
incorporation of an abstract representation of the self into the
teleodynamic loop of sentience. Thus we humans can even suffer from
existential despair.316
With the emergence of a symbolically constituted phenomenology arrives the
condition of freedom through which Homo sapiens (co-)create the meanings which make
manifest what really is and ought to be for us. The free and responsible creation of
meanings is the wellspring of the person-constituting distinctions of value which give
shape and strength to concepts like “good” and “evil” and the norms which precipitate
from them.
In an environment harboring myriad threats to wholesomeness, despair and hope
often form the poles of the ambivalent symbolic world we traverse with freedom and
responsibility. As the condition of freedom has emerged within humanity’s biocultural
history from the bottom-up, it has also gained a top-down influence on humanity’s
biocultural future. In part the human condition means not having to settle for its
givenness. As Peacocke words it, “we are capable of forms of happiness and misery quite
unknown to other creatures, thereby evidencing a ‘dis-ease’ with our evolved state, a lack
of fit which calls for explanation and, if possible, cure.”317 At the theological level, these
capabilities for experiencing qualitatively unique “forms of happiness and misery” are
part and parcel of the emergence of the image of God.
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When “God” is experienced or understood to be the ultimate supervening
dynamic of how things are or what really is, “happiness and misery,” “dis-ease,”
“explanation,” and “cure” take on new kinds of significance. As Fauconnier and Turner
would suggest, these concepts’ theologically blended meanings have emergent structure.
What emerges with these new meanings is the implication that perhaps our biocultural
capacities and efforts could never accomplish the ethical and existential ends toward
which they point. Theology and eschatology may be fruitful guides toward these ultimate
teleodynamic horizons. In Ricoeurian terms reframing the biblical myth-symbols of the
image of God and the knowledge of good and evil by means of this emergentist
biocultural perspective demands and allows a “qualitative transformation of reflexive
consciousness”—a second naïveté understanding of these anthropological, (meta-)
ethical, and eschatological symbols of Christian theology.318
Conclusion
From “Counting the (Emergent) Cause” to discussing the “Non-Darwinian
Teleodynamics” of sentience and consciousness, emergentism paves promising avenues
for understanding how qualitatively new causal powers come to bear a dynamically
supervening influence in the cosmos. In their respective ways, John Haught and Terrence
Deacon argue that the natural sciences ought to open themselves to the idea of distinct
and irreducible forms of causality, each requiring its own layer of explanation. From the
material and efficient causality of (thermo-) homeodynamics, to the formal causality of
morphodynamics, to the final causality of teleodynamics, emergence makes room for a
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robust account of conscientious human-being that may yet be open to a theological layer
of explanation.
Framed by these conceptual foundations, the following two chapters employ
careful biblical scholarship in the construction of a second naïveté understanding of the
image of God and the knowledge of good and evil. The goal of these chapters is to
facilitate the emergence of historical-critically “constrained” yet novel meanings of these
myth-symbols and renew their ability to inform human-being and action in intellectually
honest and humanizing ways.
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CHAPTER 4
THE IMAGO DEI: WITHIN A BIBLICAL AND EVOLUIONARY VIEW OF THE WORLD
By establishing a set of construction techniques, tools, and framing materials, the
preceding chapters have been building upon a hermeneutical foundation at least as deep
as the earliest strands of the biblical tradition. Constructing a second naïveté
understanding of biblical myth-symbols in which current science reframes and informs
what it means to emerge in the image of God with a knowledge of good and evil involves
recapitulating in a post-critical way the general hermeneutical process which resulted in
relevant biblical texts and their meanings in context. The primary reference for the image
of God is Genesis 1:26-27, a passage which has proven as important for Christian
anthropology as it is brief and enigmatic. In the face this exegetical ambiguity, the tasks
of theological interpretation and reappropriation are made less daunting by Paul Ricoeur
and André LaCoque’s insight that Genesis 1 follows the “trajectory” (trajectoire) of
temporally earlier creation tradition, especially Genesis 2-3.319 While Genesis 1:1-2:4a
may open the biblical canon, this Priestly creation narrative is the culmination and
prologue of a written faith tradition in which “the very idea of Creation emerges enriched
from [a] proliferation of originary events.”320
This chapter continues the hermeneutical trajectory of Genesis 1, by constructing
a second naïveté understanding of the image of God, reframed by an emergentist
biocultural evolutionary perspective. The hermeneutical lens ground and polished in
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previous chapters now brings into focus several guidelines for interpreting the meaning of
the image of God already present in the original text. Through this lens first- and second
naïveté formulations of the image and likeness of God represent parallel, commensurate,
and complementary modes of understanding this human condition. In the following
sections of this chapter, I argue that in these pre-critical and post-critical conceptions of
the image of God (1) the emergence of this understanding and the human condition to
which it refers involve double-scope blending—a unique cognitive fluidity evident in
linguistic ability; (2) the image of God is a product of nature, wrought of the creation and
embedded within it to the same extent as non-human creatures; (3) the image of God is
neither a spiritual nor corporeal reality, as if these could be separated, but a function—a
vocation—of the living person as a psycho-somatic unity; and (4) the image of God
involves a condition of freedom, a conscientious response-ability to discern and respond
to God’s invitation to co-create a “very good” world in cooperation with one another and
the rest of the creation.
Illustrating the hermeneutical procedure described in chapter 1, each of these four
sections begins with a diagram of the (double-scope) conceptual integration at work in
generating a second naïveté understanding of the image of God and the knowledge of
good and evil. A fifth diagram in the concluding section combines the other four. These
diagrams’ increasing intricacy is not meant to confuse but to draw attention to the
developmental nature of interpretation and the wondrous complexity of the meaningmaking process.
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The emergent meaning of the image of God in Genesis and contemporary interpretation
As a way to visualize the argument of this section, figure 3 below employs the
components of the conceptual integration diagram modeled in chapter 1. Fauconnier and
Turner’s illustration is instrumental in picturing parallel processes of meaning-making in
ancient and contemporary contexts. The small diagram to the left of the main diagram
depicts the emergence of the image of God concept in the primeval history as an example

Figure 3: Image, Knowledge, and Blending Capacity
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of double-scope blending. In this complex confluence and clash of ancient ideologies,
Israelite and Neo-Babylonian concepts frame one another to generate a biblical
conception of the image of God.
Following Gerhard von Rad’s exegesis, Ricoeur argues that the theological
cosmology of Genesis 1:1-2:4a, in which (Yahweh) Elohim has no celestial rivals and is
the sole creator of the cosmos, emerges from the conviction that Yahweh is the God of
Abraham and Moses, of the promises of place, people, and provision. Beginning in the
Patriarchal sagas, the continuum of biblical Heilsgeschichte (salvation history) shifts
thematic focus from redemption to creation “in a concentric fashion,” proceeding through
hymnic passages such Psalm 136 and 148; Isa. 40:27-28; 44:24-28, then through passages
about the act of creation as types or precursors to acts of redemption (Isa. 44:5; Psalm 89
and 74), to the notion that creation as a whole bears witness to divine wisdom (Psalm 8,
19, and 104; cf. Prov. 3:19; 8:22; 14:31; 20:12; Job 38).321 For von Rad and Ricoeur,
Israel infers that (Yahweh) Elohim is the one who separates the primordial waters
because “[t]he One who opened a way in the Red Sea is the same One who cut Rahab in
pieces (Isa. 51:9f.).”322 In the end, and thus “in the beginning,” the concepts of creator
and creation emerging through Genesis relativize even these canonical vestiges of the
Chaoskampf motif so prevalent in Enuma Elish and other ancient Near Eastern
parallels.323 Within the symbolic universe of the text, the center of gravity around which
the Genesis cosmology maintains its orbital trajectory is the religious experience and
theological inference that creation can only be understood fully as the realm, and
321

Ricoeur, “on the Exegesis of Genesis 1:1-2:4a,” 130-32.
Ibid., 131; cf. Neil B. MacDonald, Metaphysics and the God of Israel: Systematic Theology of the Old
and New Testaments (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2006), 118.
323
See J. Richard Middleton, The Liberating Image: The Imago Dei in Genesis 1 (Grand Rapids: Brazos
Press, 2005), 263-69.
322

142

therefore product, of God’s loving, gratuitous, and redemptive action. By implication, to
be a God-imaging creature is to reenact God’s beneficent creativity.
To the extent this exegetical reasoning is tenable, it strengthens Philip Hefner’s
hypothesis that Homo sapiens image God as conscientious created co-creators of
meanings, called to discern, construe, and enact God’s intentions for the creation and its
wholesomeness. Yet even without subscribing fully to von Rad and Ricoeur’s exegesis,
there is overwhelming scholarly consensus that the theological cosmology and
anthropology of Genesis 1 belongs to a late—perhaps the latest—textual and ideological
strand of the Hebrew Bible’s primary history (i.e., Genesis to 2 Kings), which takes a
critical stance toward other ancient Near Eastern ideologies.324
However, the polemical nature of Genesis 1 takes on a form of myth, ritual, and
praxis much more subtle than overt counter-argument. Rather than discrediting
competing cosmologies, theologies, and anthropologies directly, the Priestly creation
narrative makes a Ricoeur-like “wager” that its mythology provides greater
“intelligibility,” “power of reflection,” “coherent discourse,” and “power to raise up, to
illuminate, to give order to […] human experience,” despite any historical
contraindications.325
In cognitive linguistic terms, Gilles Fauconnier and Mark Turner could argue that
the emergent meaning of the Genesis cosmology is the product of blending Israelite
religious experience and tradition with common but contrary ancient Near Eastern
mythology. Through what could be understood as an act of double-scope conceptual
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integration, these symbolic worlds clash and reframe one another in the primeval history
of Genesis. While Genesis 1 bears striking similarities to Enuma Elish and the Atrahasis
and Gilgemesh epics, its re-signification of Mesopotamian mythology is just as dramatic.
This new understanding of what really is extends to the concepts of creator, creation, and
creaturehood, thereby generating a novel conceptual framework through which to
describe and prescribe what it is to bear the image of God.
The biblical myth-symbol of the image of God did not emerge in a vacuum;
neither is the concept of human beings bearing an image or likeness to a deity unique to
biblical literature. Rather, the consensus among exegetes today is that the biblical
understanding of what it means to bear a divine image and likeness is likely a complex
(double-scope) clash and integration of Neo-Babylonian concepts and uniquely Israelite
understandings of divine identity and agency. Through the inferences emerging from this
conceptual integration, Genesis 1 is able to convey something qualitatively different
about divinity and humanity than its ancient Near Eastern parallels. The
writer(s)/redactor(s) of Genesis 1 reframed these concepts in ways that monotheize the
concept of deity and democratize the idea that human beings can image or represent
divine power and will. These conceptual shifts relativize the power and authority of
earthly despots and their heavenly counterparts, elevating the status and function of the
ordinary and oppressed vis-à-vis their earthly rulers and human creatures vis-à-vis their
creator. The creator God of Genesis 1 has no divine rivals from whom to wrest power and
authority. The Lord God—Yahweh Elohim—is not a despotic ruler who creates through
violence against other gods, implying a radical restatement of ancient Near Eastern royal
ideology. In this new symbolic worldview, the clearest human reflection of divinity may

144

not be monarchy, its tyranny, or its ability to conquer and subdue other peoples as a god
vanquishing a rival.
Biblical scholars like J. Richard Middleton and Richard J. Clifford note that in the
royal ideology of the ancient Near East, rulers represented (imaged) their gods by waging
holy war against other peoples as a god whose enemies’ defeat made way for the
establishment of the earth and civilization. Although the idea of creation through struggle
against primordial forces of chaos (i.e., Chaoskampf) is not fully excised from the
cosmology of Genesis (vis-à-vis other textual traditions within and without the emerging
primary history of the Hebrew Bible), Yahweh Elohim’s lack of personal rivals in
Genesis 1 may be interpreted as disclosing an anti-violent ideological trajectory
reframing the concepts of creation and the divine image.326 This study’s second naïveté
retrieval of the image of God and the knowledge of good and evil trace this theological,
anthropological, and ethical trajectory beyond the symbolic world of the text, seeking to
follow its anti-violent thrust as far as a biocultural understanding of the human condition
will allow.
From another angle supplementing this nonviolent interpretation, some scholars
suggest that Genesis 1 anthropomorphizes the concept of cultic images while deanthropomorphizing the God imaged. Yahweh Elohim has no physical form to represent
or restrict with an idol. While the prohibition to worship images predates Genesis 1 and
does not bear explicit mention in the text, there may be some merit to Walter
Brueggemann’s suggestion that in order to assert the freedom of their God, the Hebrews
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insisted that “God is not imaged in anything fixed but in the freedom of human persons to
be faithful and gracious.”327 While there is little doubt that specific ancient Near Eastern
parallel texts frame the theology, cosmology, and anthropology of Genesis 1, the
religious experience and understanding of the Priestly writer(s)/redactor(s) radically
reframes the symbolic universe from which the biblical text derives so many of its
background distinctions.
While there are no definitive data linking the image of God in Genesis 1 to a
specific body of source material, geographical location, or historical time period,
Middleton defends the “reasonable assumption” that
along with a shared Mesopotamian royal ideology concerning the cultic
role of kings and the Assyrian reworking of originally Babylonian
compositions, it is quite plausible, even in the absence of written
documentation, that the two cultures shared a specific notion of kings as
the image of god. If we take this together with the distinctive
Mesopotamian background of ideas for the primeval history, it is certainly
possible that the biblical imago Dei derives from a Neo-Babylonian
context.328
Though no one expects to find a missing link between Genesis 1 and contemporary
ancient Near Eastern parallels, the circumstantial and textual evidence support the thesis
that the Babylonian poem Enuma Elish constitutes a major catalyst and source for the
theological cosmology encapsulated in Genesis 1.329 Historians and exegetes were
conducting some of the most in-depth explorations of this connection when Ricoeur first
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gauged the conceptual distance and relative pull between the Adamic myth and “the
drama of creation and the ‘ritual’ vision of the world” found in Enuma Elish.330 While
mapping out his metaphorical cycle of myths, Ricoeur assumed that the conceptual
distance between the Babylonian and Israelite creation mythologies correlated to a lack of
gravitational influence. Yet comparative studies consistently conclude that while “the
‘Adamic’ myth and the ‘eschatological’ vision of history” eventually took up residence in
the center of Ricoeur’s mythic solar system, Enuma Elish is quite likely its most
influential satellite. Genesis 1 is conceptually distant from Enuma Elish, but it only
became the “star” of Ricoeur’s cycle of myths because it absorbed, fused, and
reconstituted so much of Enuma Elish’s material.
The specific influence of Enuma Elish on the primeval history has been a topic of
interest in biblical studies for over half a century. Middleton argues that this clash of
symbolic worlds may have influenced the Priestly tradition and its creation account in the
seventh century B.C.E or earlier.331 Nonetheless, a vast majority of biblical scholars agree
that around or during the time of the Babylonian captivity in the sixth century, the
Priestly redactor(s) of Genesis 1:1-2:4a brought this tradition together with that of the
older Yahwistic creation account of the Garden Narrative. This composite text formed a
new redactional whole at the beginning of the emerging canon of sacred literature that
would become the Hebrew Bible.332 From this historical insight, and beginning in the late
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1950s, biblical scholars and ancient Near Eastern historians began to draw close
conceptual ties between Mesopotamian cosmology and the Genesis cosmology. By
tracing this long interpretive history from the seminal works of Alexander Heidel and
Gerhard Hasel to today, Middleton has distilled and continued these research efforts in
recent years, providing a systematic description and analysis of the original range of
meaning of the image of God, the social context in which that meaning emerged, and
some ethical implications of living out that meaning. In broad strokes, this body of
critical scholarship concludes:
(1) The cosmology of Genesis 1, along with its mention of the image of God, is very
likely a polemical ideological critique of the Babylonian cosmology depicted in
Enuma Elish, in which the god Marduk ascends to power through military and
political conquest.333 After becoming chief among the gods, Marduk creates the
heavens and earth by killing and mutilating the body of Tiamat, the goddess
representing the chaos of the deep salt seas. He and his ally Ea create human beings
from the blood of Tiamat’s consort, Qingu, as a means of punishing this rival and for
the purpose of bringing to life human creatures who toil in order to provide the gods
with sustenance and occasion to rest.334
(2) The order and means of creation and the purposes of created entities are similar in
Genesis and Enuma Elish. Both Marduk and Elohim create through fiat335 and
separation—light from dark, waters from waters, heavens from earth, and water from
land. Heavenly luminaries also bear similar functions in each account. Both
cosmologies define the role of the sun, moon, and stars in marking the passage of
days and seasons. However, since the Hebrews do not involve heavenly bodies in
worship, the luminaries are given a lower status—they “serve” not as divine sources
primary historical texts existed by 587 B.C.E. The addition of further prophetic material in redaction and
dissemination of the primary history is supposed to have occurred during the Babylonian captivity itself.
This hypothesis coincides with the latest corroborable date referenced in 2 Kings 25:27-30—ca. 561 B.C.E.
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of light but as carriers of light to govern the day and night.336 Further, Elohim does
not create by separating the body parts of dead deities.337 The forces of chaos that
Marduk must overcome in order to create are utterly de-personified in the Genesis
cosmology. The goddess Tiamat is almost unrecognizable as the tehom—the deep
sea—over which the breath of God so effortlessly hovers.338 In Enuma Elish Marduk
must breathe or otherwise conjure a great wind to disturb the insides of Tiamat,
affording him the opportunity to kill her, and only then to create. Yahweh Elohim is
not a mere replacement of Marduk. The Hebrew God has no personal rivals, and
whatever semblance of primordial chaos can be found in Genesis 1, it is brushed
aside by the constitutive utterance, “Let there be…”339 In Genesis created reality and
its purposes come about through acts of divine freedom and generosity, rather than
retribution and necessity.
(3) Finally, both cosmologies call for political and ethical mimesis.340 With Enuma Elish
the move from myth to ritual and politics is more straightforward than with Genesis
1. Political conquest, such as that of the Southern Kingdom of Judah ca. 593-587
B.C.E, is a reenactment Marduk’s rise to power over the forces of chaos. Captive
peoples then provide the labor force on which Babylonian society and its elite
depended. In the drama surrounding the annual New Year’s festival, the Babylonian
king stood in as Marduk, a representation or “image” of this god on earth, set there to
implement divine purposes.341
In the Genesis 1 cosmology this royal image concept is democratized. It still bears
a functional purpose, but in very different ways. If Genesis 1 is redacted in an exilic
setting, it calls the Hebrews in hope against hope to bear the image and likeness of God

336

Gerhard F. Hasel, “The Significance of the Cosmology in Genesis 1 in Relation to ancient Near Eastern
Parallels.” Andrews University Seminary Studies 10 (January 1972): 14.
337
See Middleton, The Liberating Image, 164.
338
Hasel, “The Significance of the Cosmology in Genesis 1,” 5-6; cf. Middleton, The Liberating Image,
241-42, 264; Mary C. Callaway, “Canonical Criticism,” in To Each Its Own Meaning, ed. Steven L.
McKenzie and Steven R. Haynes (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 1999), 150. Building on
the work of Heidel and others, Gerhard Hasel notes several recurring motifs in both the Babylonian and
Hebrew texts. The notion of the “deep” (tehom) in Gen. 1:2 is similar though not identical to the
personified Tiamat, who is the goddess of the deep salt seas. Though many have argued for a strong
correspondence between these terms, Hasel relies on Heidel’s argument in Babylonian Genesis that these
cognates merely rely on a common Semitic root. This argument rests largely on the fact that the tehom of
Genesis 1 is a masculine noun, where Tiamat is feminine. Further, there is not as complete a transliteration
between these terms as there is with other biblical terms that have been identified as borrowed from
Akkadian. While tehom might conjure images of Tiamat, ti/e’ama would be a fully transliterated form of
this representation of “the deep.” The notable conceptual difference here is that the impersonal tehom of
Genesis 1 offers no resistance to the preeminence of Elohim.
339
See Middleton, The Liberating Image, 261, 264-65.
340
Ibid., 177.
341
Ibid., 161, 181-84; cf. Nahum M. Sarna, The JPS Torah Commentary: Genesis (Philadelphia; New
York; Jerusalem: Jewish Publication Society, 1989), 12; Gordon J. Wenham, Word Biblical Commentary,
Volume 1: Genesis 1-15 (Waco: Word Books, 1987), 30-31.

149

as divinely appointed rulers. In the midst of being “subdued” and “ruled over” in
captivity, the exiles are invited to “fill the earth, and subdue it; and rule over” its
creatures (Gen. 1:26-30). Yahweh Elohim is able to rest after creating humankind, but not
due to the fruits of human labor (Gen. 2:3). Rather, this creator calls humankind to join in
this Sabbath rest, as Exodus 20:8-11 records. More thoroughly than a solitary king, a
royal statue, or a mute idol, all humankind bears an “image” of God that is a “likeness”
unto beneficent divine agency. As D.J.A Clines argues in his classic scholarship on this
biblical concept, the image of God in Genesis is representational, not merely
representative.342 Or, as Hefner suggests, “humans are, in some manner, created to be an
explicit representation and presence of God’s will in the creation. Humans have the
created calling to articulate within the natural world what God’s intentionality might
be.”343
Yet what clues does the primeval history give to indicate “what God’s
intentionality might be”? If novel meanings emerge from the collision and integration of
ancient symbolic worlds, one of Deacon’s readers might search for them in what is
constitutively absent from the text—a contextualizing hermeneutical dynamic
constraining the meaning of the text and its application. What is conspicuously absent—
but hermeneutically relevant—is a positive role for creation through violence in Genesis.
Unlike Marduk, Yahweh Elohim does not create through conquest. Being created in the
image of this God entails strong prohibitions against interpersonal violence (Gen. 9:6).
From Cain and Abel (4:5-15) to Lamech (4:23-24) to Noah (6:11; 9:6) to Babel (11:4),
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the primeval history condemns the temptation to establish divine favor, political power,
and social order through violent means.344
The Genesis cosmology reframes the concept of creation through violence by
praising the power of speech, extending an invitation to participate, and thus describing
the human condition of freedom to co-create something “very good.” Old Testament
scholar Graeme Auld highlights the first of these developments and its theological and
anthropological implications:
One of the most remarkable features of the opening of Genesis (1:1-2:3) is
the prominence of speech. This is not only a relative judgment, in
comparison with chapters 5 and 9. It also emerges from a simple internal
examination of the wording of the chapter. No less than 40 percent of the
verbs denoting the divine actions are explicitly verbs of speaking: “said”
(’mr, 10x), “called” (qr’, 5x), and “blessed” (brk, 3x), eighteen out of a
maximum of forty-five relevant verbal forms. But even that is to
understate the matter. Because the report of every “day” of creation opens
with “and God said” and is followed by the divine fiat, all the making
(8x), separating (2x), granting (2x), and sanctifying (1x) were also
achieved by divine word. In Genesis 1, God is a God who speaks, and who
acts by speaking. It stands to reason, then, that human beings created by,
and made very like such a God would be preeminently speakers.345
Coincidently, the biocultural conception of human uniqueness constructed in the
above chapters emphasizes very much the same thing. For good and ill much of what
makes Homo sapiens qualitatively distinct among species is the conscientious ability to
(co-)create the symbolic universe of what really is and ought to be.
Hence, cognitive linguistics not only provides hermeneutical insight as to how
new meanings might emerge through integrating ancient and current concepts, but also
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that this uniquely human capacity did not escape the notice of the biblical writer(s). Auld
gives hints that the Priestly contributor(s) to the Hebrew Bible may have understood, in a
pre-scientific way, that humankind’s cognitive fluidity, embodied in language, made us
unique among creatures and somehow similar to the God before, behind, and beyond the
creation. After reading van Huyssteen’s 2004 Gifford Lectures,346 Auld “suggested to
him that his emphasis on speech as marking off the human from the rest of the world was
in fact consistent with a plausible reading of Genesis 1:26-27, and the novel insistence
there on humanity created in the image and likeness of God.”347 Auld holds that van
Huyssteen’s “fascinating interdisciplinary account of speech” in Alone in the World?
could have benefited from greater engagement with Genesis 1 in conjunction with this
work’s more thorough interdisciplinary exposition of Genesis 3.348
In Genesis 1 the creator invites all constituents of the creation to participate in the
process to the utmost of their inherent ability and degree of freedom. Light is called to
“be”; waters are called to “be gathered”; the earth is called “to sprout vegetation”;
celestial objects are called to “govern” the passage of time and “give light”; waters are
called to “teem with swarms of living creatures”; birds are called to “fly above the earth”;
the earth is called to “bring forth living creatures”; all life is called to “be fruitful and
multiply.” Middleton praises “the text’s depiction of the process of creation as God
sharing power with creatures, inviting them to participate (as they are able) in the creative
process itself.”349
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Still, the grammar of Genesis 1 implies that one creature’s ability and freedom to
fulfill its created role is qualitatively distinct. Until verse 26, God speaks to no one in
particular, manifesting and empowering created realities through jussive fiat. Then there
is a shift. The participle of verse 22 becomes a direct address in verse 28: “God blessed
them, saying, ‘Be fruitful […]’” becomes “God blessed them; and God said to them, ‘Be
fruitful […].’” As Auld highlights, the formula, “‘And God said’ is used absolutely nine
times in this opening prologue. Only once do we read ‘and God said to [someone].’”350 In
Genesis 1:28-30 human beings are given a say in the future of the creation, including
their own.
Re-reframing the ancient myth-symbol of the image of God though an emergentist
biocultural evolutionary perspective is no more or less complicated than hearing God
“speak” through the natural processes that have resulted in Homo sapiens and the
conceptions of a “very good” world we are co-responsible for envisioning and establishing
cooperatively as culturally-constituted creatures. Of course, this task raises many more
questions about how to construct a second naïveté understanding of Genesis 1 within the
framework of creation through evolution. One of the more vexing of these questions is
how resolve the apparent clash between the theme of non-violent (co-)creation and “nature
red in tooth and claw.” While no one can claim to have resolved this issue, the next
chapter looks for direction in Genesis and the natural sciences for how to reexamine the
knowledge of good and evil that makes such questions possible and necessary. The
following section explores in greater depth how the creation is called to “bring forth living
creatures,” including human beings and the image of God they bear.
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The image of God as a product of nature in Genesis and biocultural evolution
The blending diagram in figure 4 below lists a number of concepts in an
emergentist, biocultural perspective which bring into focus certain features lying within
and behind the text of Genesis 1, its depiction of human creatures, and the image of God
they bear. Allowing these biblical and scientifically-informed concepts to frame one
another generates the interpretive inference that as God creates through evolutionary

Figure 4: Image, Knowledge, and Nature
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processes, bearing the image of God (with a knowledge of good and bad/evil) may be
understood as a biocultural product/process of nature (and nurture).
Despite centuries of highly spiritualized and dualistic interpretations of the imago
Dei, most biblical scholars today agree that the Hebrew terms for image—tselem—and
likeness—demut—in Genesis 1 refer to a creature wrought of the creation and embedded
within it to the same extent as all other animal species. While the primeval history
indicates in its own way that humankind bears this bottom-up origin and kinship with the
rest of creation, emergentism and a biocultural understanding of human uniqueness
provide new modes of interpreting how this human condition has come about and what it
might mean to image God through it.
The human creature, like all other land dwellers, is an animated amalgam of dust,
breath, and blood. In Genesis human beings are no less “earthly” than other animal
species. Read as a redactional whole, the first two chapters of Genesis recount that
humankind and all other land animals are created from the “earth” or the “dust of the
ground”—’adamah (Gen. 1:24; 2:7, 19). The human hails from the humus. Likely an
intentional play on words, ’adam is created from ’adamah to bear the demut—a likeness
to the creator. Likewise, although Gen. 2:7 speaks of a unique inbreathing of life for the
first human being, the “breath of life” (nishmat chayyim) is not identical to the “spirit” or
“breath of God” (ruah ’elohim ) in Gen. 1:2. According to Gen. 6:16 and 7:22-23 all
creatures dwelling or nesting on land are counted among those “in whose nostrils was the
breath of the spirit of life.” Even the special in-spiration of Gen. 2:7 causes the human to
become a “living creature/being” (nefesh chayyah), a designation shared by the animal
species called forth from the earth on sixth day (1:20, 24; cf. 2:7, 19).
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Another vital element shared by humankind and other animal species is
“blood”—dam—which bears sacred (even cultic) significance, requiring special attention
in meat preparation and retributive justice in cases of human bloodshed (Gen. 9:3-6).
Thus, in four interrelated anthropological terms arising in the primeval history of
Genesis, the consonants dalet ( )דand mem (מ, —םfinal mem) point to a creature whose
vital elements and their integration, functioning, and flourishing are consonant and
contiguous with the rest of creation. As an animated amalgam of dust, breath, and blood,
the human creature derives every aspect of its life from the world in which it is imbedded
among the other nefesh chayyah.
Even so, and without taking leave of this ontological plain, one of these Hebrew
terms signifies a special calling and set of capacities borne for the purpose of discerning
and enacting the creator’s intentions for the creation with freedom and responsibility. In
this way ’adam bears a demut, a “likeness,” to God.
The visual similarity of these terms is especially apparent in the unpointed
Hebrew text:
דם
אדם
אדמה
דמות

dam
’adam
’adamah
demut

blood
human(kind), Adam
ground, earth
likeness

The simplest form, דם, is the common thread among the terms;  אדםand  אדמהare linked
by their initial guttural ’( אalef); and  אדמהand  דמותbear a connection through the visual
similarity of their final ( הhe’) and ( תtav).351
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One biblical scholar, J. Maxwell Miller, submits evidence that the Priestly
redactor(s), and perhaps earlier contributors to the primeval history, were well aware of this
visible and audible pun, citing Gen. 9:6: “Whoever sheds the blood of man, by man shall
his blood be shed; for in the image of God, he created man” ( דמterms italicized).
Conspicuously, this passage points out that humankind deserves this special moral
consideration because it is made “in the image”—tselem—of God, without any mention of
the divine “likeness”—demut. This break in consonance, Miller supposes, is to avoid any
suggestion that the image of God is created from a divine substance. In Enuma Elish and
other ancient Near Eastern parallels, human beings are made from divine blood—dam.352
However, Yahweh Elohim has no blood and has no need to spill any in order to create. In
the final form of the text, the Priestly redactor interpolates, or at least interprets and
extends, this anti-anthropomorphic aspect of Israelite theology and cosmology. Through
humankind, as through every other living creature, the ground breathes, not God.
Middleton ventures further, arguing that the concept creation from the blood of a
lower god is meant to devaluate humankind in Enuma Elish:
As the consort of Tiamat and leader of her forces, [Qingu] is one of the
arch enemies of Marduk. The text thus attributes to humans, who are
created from Qingu’s blood, an essentially rebellious and degraded nature,
much as the cosmos contains within it an evil or chaotic principle,
constructed as it is out of the dead carcass of Tiamat. […T]he mythology
of Enuma Elish proclaimed in no uncertain terms the servitude (even
bondage) of humanity, “created out of evil substance,” as cheap slave
labor to do the “dirty work” of the lower gods.353
In Enuma Elish creation from blood is a reminder of the violence needed to create and
maintain order in the godly and creaturely realms. In Genesis creation in the divine image
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means that human blood is precious in its own right. As an indication of status and role,
Genesis implies that the image of God is borne out in the dynamic likeness humanness
bears to (a singular kind of) godness. Being made from dust of the ground in the image
and likeness of Yahweh Elohim is a much more positive job description than being made
from the blood of Quingu.
In this vein, many biblical scholars interpret the terms for image and likeness to
overlap semantically and modify one another, in both a negative and positive sense.354
Negatively, image may keep likeness from becoming a reference to a divine substance
running through human veins; likeness may keep image from becoming a reference to a
mute and non-agential conduit of the divine, an object of cultic devotion, or a despotic
ruler disseminating the divine will in the socio-political sphere.355 Positively, while many
exegetes point out that the definitions of image and likeness are not self evident, several
scholars agree that together the terms portray humanity as not merely representative of
the creator, but representational as well—a likeness-bearing image.356
This ideological trajectory of Genesis 1 warrants Hefner’s conclusion that fully
embedded within the creation is a “created co-creator.” Divinity is not the only form of
self-conscious intentionality and causality. From the ground has emerged a fully
creaturely form of personhood. As a pre-scientific prelude to Hefner’s hypothesis that
Homo sapiens “have the created calling to articulate within the natural world what God’s
intentionality might be,” the primeval history implies that one of God’s intentions for
354
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creation is that one of its creatures discerns and enacts the creator’s purposes freely,
according to their God-imaging response-ability.357 As I argue in greater detail in chapter
5 below, this human condition includes the original and ever-present possibility of getting
things wrong—of encountering and effecting both good and evil.358 In parallel,
complementary ways, both the biblical and biocultural narratives of human origins
indicate that this condition of freedom is the de facto necessary and ambivalent result of
emerging as an animated amalgam of dust, breath, and blood.
An emergentist understanding of the evolutionary origins of Homo sapiens is able
to inform a second naïveté Christian understanding of the human person as a unique,
God-imaging creature, because the exegetical insight that humankind derives from and is
embedded within creation to the same extent as all other nefesh chayyah (living
creatures/beings) is commensurable with this scientifically-informed conception of
human development and uniqueness. For Hefner, “the fact that the co-creator is created
through nature’s evolutionary processes justifies the inference that nature itself
participates in the image of God. This is a novel interpretation.”359 But is it really novel?
And in what ways? As Hefner alludes, what is novel about a conception of human
uniqueness which synthesizes exegetical and scientific findings is that it forces presentday theologians to reconsider and reformulate what it means for God to “speak,” “form,”
and “breathe” humanity into life, what it means for the natural world to be a “creation”
open to the ongoing creative and redemptive influence of the creator.
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Imaging God as an emergent vocation
Figure 5 below illustrates the meaning-making process of defining the image of
God, which also encapsulates a uniquely human creative capacity through which we
might be said to bear the divine image. Following the hermeneutical trajectory evident in
Genesis 1, I argue that blending ancient and contemporary understandings of human
uniqueness warrants the theological conclusion that bearing the image of God (with a
knowledge of good and bad/evil) is the vocation of behaviorally modern Homo sapiens.

Figure 5: Image, Knowledge, and Emergent Vocation
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Through biocultural processes, our species has emerged with the calling to re-present the
beneficence of the God who shares power with created entities and does not create
through violence.
Any faith perspective which understands God to be the insuperable
contextualizing element of what really is must understand human thought and action as
one avenue presumably open to divine influence. Broadly speaking, a theistic conception
of deity, such as in Christianity, presume that created reality is valued by its creator, that
the creator God wills the wellbeing of creaturely processes and/or entities, that God
communicates or reveals divine beneficence and its normative implications, and that
humanness affords a singular form of receptivity to divine (self-)communication. Having
a theology of this sort cannot but lead to real-world consequences.
To be a culturally-constituted creature is to live out of a particular set of valuesladen distinctions. What human persons understand themselves to be informs what they
find appropriate or imperative to do or not to do. Our is informs our ought. Theistic
conceptions of our is can be some of the most empowering and relativizing modes of
thinking, because they set human existence and activity against a trans-cosmic backdrop.
Those who consider themselves to bear the image of God have accepted a calling to
discern, construe, and enact the beneficent intentions of the creator for the creation. As
the indeterminate future of the cosmos continues to unfold, bearers of the divine image
have emerged with the freedom and response-ability to cooperate with one another and
the rest of the creation in order to co-create a very good world. Re-presenting the
beneficent creativity of God is humankind’s emergent theological vocation—a call to
bear the image of God with a conscientious knowledge of good and evil.

161

For good or ill theological motivation for human action means that “God” finds a
loophole in the causal closure principle “that the basic causal laws of the universe also
form a closed system—all changes come from within.”360 This is not to say that God
somehow acts directly on the cosmos from “without.” Indeed, the much more tenable
theological view in light of current science is that any divine activity in the creation
would come from within. Rather, the seeming violation of the causal closure principle
emerges with the concept that a trans-cosmic reality might exist, that its necessary
existence is source and constraint of all contingent existence, and that this relationship is
relevant to what people ought to think and do. Many look beyond the material world for
guidance as to what to do within it. Deacon may be correct that all causal influence
comes from within the cosmos. Yet this view does not entail that all causally efficacious
emergent dynamics are wholly immanent to the space-time of our universe. The
emergence of the image of God is the emergence of a uniquely human behavioral domain
in which Homo sapiens “hear” the divine—however faintly and faultily—calling across
the infinite qualitative distinction between creator and creation.
In every major strain of interpretation, the image of God concept denotes a
creature able to perceive this ontological disjunct. The way in which believers describe
the qualitative ontological distinction between God and the image of God frames—for
good and/or ill—how they might live out that reflection of divinity in the world.
Historically, there are at least three major strands of Christian interpretation of the
imago Dei in Genesis, which I term the rational, the relational, and the royal. The
rational conception of the image points to humanity’s psycho-spiritual capacities and/or
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the substantive spirit possessing them as the locus of the image. The relational school of
thought looks primarily to interpersonal or God-human interaction to find God imaged in
the “I-Thou” existential of personhood. The royal interpretation already outlined is the
most tenable of these and depicts humankind as bearing the image of God though its
creaturely function and calling to discern and disseminate the rule of God on earth.
The eschatological interpretation of the image of God, based on the New
Testament portrayal of Jesus Christ as the quintessential image or icon of divinity, can be
read as an extension of the functional-royal interpretation, since “image” passages in the
New Testament characterize Christ as the redeeming “Lord” who reveals and inaugurates
God’s righteous reign on earth as in heaven.361 In both Old- and New- testaments,
imaging God as royal representative involves conscientious human participation.
The sections above have outlined much of the evidence supporting the functionalroyal interpretation of the image of God in Genesis. The bulk of this historical and
intertextual evidence lends credence to the conclusion that the image of God in Genesis
criticizes and democratizes Neo-Babylonian royal ideology.362 In a synthetic study of
Gen. 1:26-28 over a hundred years of Old Testament scholarship, Gunnlaugur A. Jόnsson
has discerned an emerging consensus in biblical studies that the image and likeness of
God in this passage pertains largely to the commands given to humankind in verse 28—to
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fill and subdue (kavash) the earth and rule over (radah) its creatures.363 In addition to
Jόnsson and Middleton, eminent commentators such as Gordon Wenham and Nahum
Sarna come to the same conclusion.364 Being created in the image and according to the
likeness of God means bearing a response-ability to hear and act upon the call of the
creator to co-create the future of the cosmos.
Yet, despite the mounting exegetically relevant evidence, Jόnsson notes that
systematic theologians too often succumb to the momentum of the traditional rational
interpretation or the popular relational interpretation. The rational interpretation, which J.
Wentzel van Huyssteen calls the “substantive interpretation,” finds humanity to bear a
likeness to divinity in its psycho-spiritual capacities of reason, personality, selfconsciousness, free-will, intellect, and speech.365 This line of interpretation traces its
origins to Philo of Alexandria, Augustine, and other prominent ancient writers. While
elements of this interpretation are visible in the text, there are several reasons why the
rational-substantive interpretation is incomplete at best, and misleading at worst.
First, these cognitive capacities are not explicitly mentioned in the immediate
context of Gen. 1:26-27. Second, a purely spiritual definition of the divine image and
likeness would imply a dualist anthropology foreign to the text. Clines is not alone in
insisting that the human person is always portrayed as a “psychosomatic unity” in the
Hebrew Bible, and that the conceptual background for the image of God passages
includes the same basic anthropological framework.366 Third, Old Testament scholars like
Phyllis Bird rehearse well-founded complaints that this hierarchical spirit-body dualism is
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intertwined with countless historical instances of humanity-over-nature and male-overfemale dualisms contrary to both the letter and spirit of the text.367
These hierarchical dualisms also bear the danger of surfacing in the relational
interpretation made especially popular by Karl Barth in his Church Dogmatics (III.1,
182ff.). This influential strand of theological exegesis focuses on the plural jussive (“Let
us…”) of Gen. 1:26, the creation of ’adam as male and female, and the capacity for
interplay between God and human creatures expressed in the final verses of Genesis 1.368
This interpretation sees human beings as uniquely capable of a God-like “I-Thou”
relationality among themselves and between themselves and the divine. The Barthian
reading locates the divine image within creative relationality, rather than within the
person or a created substance. While this theological development is an encouraging
move in the direction of a more dynamic conception of the image of God, Jόnsson
cautions that this interpretation is a product of the dialectical philosophy of the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.369 This philosophical framework may not be the
most tenable for theological exegesis today, because natural-scientifically based
paradigms for analyzing human cognition and behavior are arguably more coherent and
comprehensive than the existential paradigms of dialectical philosophy. By synthesizing
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data from evolutionary biology, paleoanthropology, and neuroscientific research,
evolutionary psychology is a much stronger framework for understanding the human
condition today than is the philosophical psychology born out of the Enlightenment. As a
result, the second naïveté reappropriation of biblical understandings of human nature is
better served today by biocultural conceptions of humankind’s evolutionary emergence.
Nonetheless, Jόnsson finds that the Barthian interpretation remains prevalent in both
dogmatic and biblical studies and that it provides the only rival to the recent functionalroyal consensus concerning the biblical meaning of image and likeness.370
Bird adds that regardless of the ethical dangers and opportunities inherent to the
sexualized relational interpretation, the divine announcement of blessing and bisexuality
in Genesis 1 is most likely a provision for the capacity to “be fruitful and multiply, and
fill the earth.” This inherent capability facilitates the functional vocation of rulership. For
Bird a reproductive capacity intrinsic to humanity and the rest of the “male and female”
creatures (cf. Gen. 6:19; 7:3, 9, 16) also implies the lack of need for a fertility cult,
perhaps augmenting the monotheizing thrust of Genesis 1 over against its contemporary
parallels.371
Still, the rational and relational interpretations are not completely devoid of merit.
The functional-royal interpretation certainly entails the understanding that humankind
bears unique cognitive and relational capacities. However, against a Neo-Babylonian
backdrop and the theme of creation, the image and likeness language of Genesis 1 seems
to point beyond these capacities to the kinds of things people ought to do with them.
Though not in Hefner’s post-critical sense that human uniqueness emerges through
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biocultural evolution, Genesis depicts humankind as a created co-creator, able to hear and
respond to the direct address of the creator, to detect the movement of God in the world
(Gen. 1:28, 2:17, 3:8-13). This unique creature is called to do very creator-like things—
filling the earth and ruling (1:28-30), resting on the seventh day (2:2-3; Exod. 20:8-11),
naming things (Gen. 2:19, 23, 3:20). Though Yahweh Elohim equips and calls all created
things to participate in the creative process, only one creature participates in a manner
qualitatively similar to God’s own modus operandi of “saying,” “calling,” and deciding
for itself whether things are “good” or “not good”/“evil.”372 Auld emphasizes that
throughout the days of creation, previously created entities participate as agents in
future making. It is consonant with this that the first actions reported of the
earthling in the garden are that he “names” (qr’) those brought to him by the deity
(2:19) and “says” (’mr) why his new partner should be called “woman” (2:23)—
exactly as God’s first actions (1:3-5) had including saying and calling.373
This exegetical observation supports the interpretive inference that bearing the
image of God means exercising a singular form of social and environmental
responsibility and creativity—to image the creator’s beneficent rulership, evoking from
the creation and one another whatever “good” each is equipped to produce for their own
sakes and the common good. As Middleton concludes, the image of God in Genesis is an
affirmation of dynamic human agency, rather than “static status or privilege”:
Essential to the meaning of the image in Genesis 1 is the dynamic power
or agency that God grants humans at creation (signified in the terms rule
and subdue). Although it is not explicitly stated in Genesis 1, it is
reasonable to think that this power is to be exercised responsibly, with
God’s own exercise of power in creation perhaps as the model.374
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Implicit but integral to understanding the way in which Yahweh Elohim operates is the
constellation of concepts emerging from the clash of symbolic worlds underlying the text.
This God does not create through violence but enables and allows the waters and land of
the earth to bring forth everything that environs and constitutes humankind. Likewise,
and in a unique manner, human beings are invited to make and keep things “very good”
throughout the earth.
There is a sense throughout the first chapters of Genesis that God’s invitation to
“let there be” informs but does not determine the exact shape nature and culture will take.
Bringing the language of emergence into the realm of biblical interpretation, Middleton
proposes that “[t]he God who is artisan and maker, reflected rhetorically in the complex
literary artistry of the text, does not overdetermine the order of the cosmos. There is a
helpful analogy here to what chaos theorists call a ‘strange attractor.’”375 Following the
ideological trajectory of Genesis 1, Middleton finds that the text “depicts a creator less
like a Newtonian lawgiver and more like a strange attractor.”376 In Deacon’s terms,
divine reality acts much like an attractor or constraint, facilitating new orthograde
statistical tendencies to be explored in and by the cosmos.
What does this depiction of divine creativity mean for a second naïveté
understanding of the image and likeness of God? What does it mean to bear the royal
vocation of filling, subduing, and ruling over creation as a species of bioculturallyconstituted created co-creators in the 21st century? For the tribes of Israel in the sixth
century B.C.E., filling and subduing the earth were not the immanent possibilities and
problems they are today. For good and ill the scope of humankind’s technological, socio-
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economic, political, military, and ecological impact has increased astronomically over the
past few millennia, and especially over the past few centuries. Our species must now
collaborate world-wide to develop and articulate the values and norms by which it will
exercise and temper its capability to “be fruitful and multiply, and fill the earth, and
subdue it; and rule over” its creatures and their environments. The very survival of each
and/or every one of earth’s species may depend on our willingness to recast our ability to
rule over other creatures in terms of cooperating with them to ensure a sustainable global
ecology.
As a message originally addressed to a minority people group, the commands and
provisions listed in Gen. 1:28-30 are more a message of hope that the meek will inherit
the earth than a warrant to treat and mistreat it as a cache of resources designed for
human consumption. For 21st-century believers, the expectation for struggle connoted by
the verbs “subdue” and “rule over” must open our eyes to the reality that our earthly
home has always presented meaningful challenges to our ability to discern and implement
the good intentions of the creator. Read through this interpretive lens, the commands of
Gen. 1:28 are not an open invitation to bend the creation to human will, but to bend
human will to the creator’s plan for the world to be a “very good” home for all kinds of
creatures.
While biblical scholars like Bird and others note that the verbs of dominion in
Gen. 1:28 were harsh, even in their original context, these commands to represent and
extend the rule of God throughout the earth must be read as an extension of the creator’s
“Let there be”—Yahweh Elohim’s invitation to bring forth “good” in all parts of the
creation. Today, answering God’s call in Genesis 2 to “name” all living creatures and
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“serve” the “garden” in which we have been placed together with them means seeking to
know everything we can about the world in which we live and acting to promote the wellbeing of everything in it. Imaging a God who does not create through violence and who
“sees” the “good” in the simplest created entities means identifying, avoiding, and
remedying human-created causes of undue harm to ecological, biological, personal, and
cultural realities. In emergentist terms, the call to embody the creator God’s beneficence
in and to the creation is most urgent where the minimal requirements for teleodynamic
constraint propagation are most threatened—among the impoverished and the
endangered. Human beings create through violence and ignore their vocation when they
knowingly and avoidably seek the perceived “good” of some in ways which
systematically restrict or eliminate the ability of other persons, other cultures, or other
species to seek and achieve their own well-being.
As creatures who are products of co-evolution, we owe our emergence in the
image of God to the interactions of our evolutionary ancestors among themselves and
other species in various environments of evolutionary adaptedness (EEA). It stands to
reason, therefore, that the vocation to discern, construe, and enact the beneficent
intentions of the creator in the world today entails a self-critical and empathetic analysis
of the value—the “good”-ness—of every created entity to every other, from the bottomup, from the least complex to the most. In Deacon’s terminology, the emergence and
enjoyment of the image of God has always depended upon the presence of diverse and
sustainable boundary conditions, from the proto-biotic emergence of the first autogens, to
the biodiversity characterizing the EEA of our earliest behaviorally modern ancestors,
and from today into the future.
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The emergence of the image of God—of human-being—is the emergence of the
response-ability to define, evaluate, and envision our impact on one another and the rest of
the creation. The emergence of the image of God is the emergence of the response-ability
to “rule over” the creation in a unique way, to cooperate in order sustain and perhaps
expand its “very good”-ness. The ongoing created co-creation of the image and likeness of
God through biocultural processes will continue to take shape based in no small part on
humankind’s ecological and social legacy from each moment to the next. For good or ill,
the conscientious choices of Homo sapiens constrain the future open or closed to bearers
of the image of God, other animal species, our home planet, and beyond.
Imaging God with a condition of freedom
The biocultural perspective outlined in input 2 of figure 6 below focuses attention
upon several features of Genesis 1-3. According to Genesis, created entities are called to
participate in the act of creation as an actualization of their God-given potential to “be,”
to “be gathered,” to “sprout,” to “separate,” to “govern,” to “swarm,” to “bring forth,” to
“be fruitful and multiply,” to “fill,” to “subdue,” to “rule over,” to “eat” and/or choose
not to eat, to “serve” or “cultivate the ground,” to “name” other creatures and other
people, to “know good and bad/evil.” Integrated with a biocultural understanding of
human evolution, these aspects of the Genesis cosmology support the theological
inference that the emergence of the image of God culminates in an ambivalent condition
of freedom emblematic of humankind’s biocultural nature. Described as the human
condition of “knowing good and bad/evil,” this ambivalent aspect of bearing God’s
image is the topic of the following chapter.
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Figure 6: Image, Knowledge, and Freedom

Homo sapiens have emerged in biocultural history to bear the image and likeness
of God as free and responsible creators of their symbolic worlds. Our species evolved to
become culturally-constituted creatures who embody the kind of freedom Hefner
describes as “the condition of existence in which humans unavoidably face the necessity
of both making choices that govern their behavior and of constructing the stories that
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contextualize and hence justify those choices.”377 Following the hermeneutical trajectory
of Genesis 1 and Hefner’s interpretation of the image of God, to exercise this condition of
freedom as a theological vocation is to take on the role of created co-creator. Affirming
this call requires cooperating across cultures and species to strike a harmonious and
sustainable coexistence which upholds the value of the creative potential emerging from
every person, species, and the world we must learn to share.
While I would not claim that the imago Dei is only borne by those who take on
this label for themselves, in the strictest sense, the divine image is borne uniquely by that
species who has emerged with all the psycho-somatic, biocultural conditions of
possibility for developing this kind of person-constituting distinction. In both the biblical
and biocultural narratives of human origins analyzed above, the freedom conditioning the
creation of the dynamic, living image and likeness of God is such that the imago Dei is
itself a continually co-created reality. In Deacon’s terminology, one could say that the
imago Dei emerges diachronically through the ever-changing teleodynamics,
morphodynamics, and homeodynamics constraining and constituting humanity’s
biocultural existence. As culturally conditioned creatures, we are responsible for many
developments in our recent biocultural history and its future. Human-being is dynamic
and self-constituting in this strong sense because the cultural singularities of behaviorally
modern Homo sapiens are not reducible to the Darwinian dynamics through which the
much more open-ended processes and results of human cognition and culture emerge.
The biocultural future of created co-creation is an open question. The imago Dei is still
evolving, and its bearers are co-responsible for what it will become.
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For good and ill human-being emerges within a matrix of unique behavioral
domains, including ethics and religion. By framing this external scaffolding of our
culturally-constituted existence, and by allowing its emergent meanings to shape our
every thought and action, we open up ourselves to new conceptual, behavioral, and
ethical possibilities. We open up ourselves to new ways of discerning and construing
God’s past, present, and future activity in the world. As an act of created co-creation, we
open up ourselves to new ways of imaging God with faith, hope, and love. As a test case,
this construction of a second naïveté understanding of the image of God is a theological
act of created co-creation—of faith seeking understanding. From the “bottom-up” and the
“top-down,” human-being, knowing, and doing emerge dynamically as embodied
functions of this kind of hermeneutical circle. Bearing a condition of freedom,
humankind must continually employ its collective and individual biocultural inheritance
to co-create the symbolic university of what really is and ought to be for us.
Inspired by Hefner, I seek to rediscover how the biblical myth-symbols of the
image of God and the knowledge of good and evil might “provide genuine knowledge of
reality, for the sake of our wholesome living.”378 This journey of rediscovery requires
investigating the conditions under which Homo sapiens pursue wholesomeness. There are
at least three elements in Genesis 1 intimating that the image of God entails a condition
of freedom already fraught with the possibilities of both fulfillment and frustration. First,
the direct address of Gen. 1:28 indicates that humankind bears a conscious responseability to obey God’s open-ended commands concerning their oversight of the creation.
Yet how should humankind respond to the mandates to “fill,” “subdue,” and “rule over”?
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How does humanity respond to these commands in the primeval history? Second, the
harsh verbs of dominion in verse 28—“subdue” (kavash) and “rule over” (radah)—imply
that the “very good” creation will nonetheless present challenges to human well-being.
Does the inclusion of these verbs negate the apparent departure from Mesopotamian royal
ideology outlined above? Third, these first two elements, along with other intertextual
connections to biblical and extra-biblical texts, imply that that Garden Narrative of
Genesis 2-3 is likely taken up into Genesis 1 as an elaboration of how humankind came
to “become like one of Us, knowing good and evil” (Gen. 3:22). It may be that the image
of God, in all its ambivalence, is not fully fledged until humankind (’adam) is driven east
of Eden to cultivate the ground (’adamah) from whence it came (3:23).
How does this interpretation challenge popular readings of the primeval history
and present new opportunities for contemporary interpretation engaging natural scientific
conceptions of Homo sapiens’ biocultural emergence? Establishing these connections
within the text and integrating this exegetical understanding with natural scientific data
concerning the morally ambivalent evolutionary origins of humanity’s ethical
wherewithal is the task of the next chapter, which constructs a second naïveté
interpretation of the knowledge of good and evil.
Conclusion
Figure 7 below combines the blends pictured in the four diagrams above,
highlighting many of the main concepts used to integrate biblical and scientificallyinformed conceptions of human-being for the purpose of generating a second naïveté
understanding of Christian anthropology. The numbered points in the blended space
correspond to the four sections of this chapter (and the following), which describe the
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image of God (as a concept and/or human condition) in terms of (1) its precipitation from
double-scope blending capacity or cognitive fluidity, (2) a product/process of nature (and
nurture), (3) an emergent theological vocation, and (4) an ambivalent condition of freedom.

Figure 7: Emerging in the Image of God: A Second Naïveté

The purpose of this chapter has been to blend sound biblical scholarship and
current understandings of human uniqueness and its evolutionary emergence in
biocultural history. The integration of parallel, commensurate, and complementary
ancient and contemporary modes of describing human uniqueness sharpens the
interpreter’s focus on the surprisingly similar features of these first- and second naïveté
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depictions of the image and likeness of God. From this hermeneutical perspective, the
subsections of this chapter have drawn the following conclusions.
First, implicit in the pre-critical biblical understanding of the image is that
theological developments often emerge from a complex clash and integration of
conceptual frames or entire symbolic worldviews. The careful exegesis of Middleton and
his many sources support the historical and hermeneutical claims that the theological
cosmology of Genesis 1 and the primeval history as a whole results from a polemical
blend of Neo-Babylonian and Israelite understandings of divine identity and agency.
Emerging from this conceptual clash is a symbolic world in which all human beings
image a single nonviolent creator. The democratization of the image of God is antithetical
to the ideology in which the cultural elite bear the image of their despotic deities. The
offices of rest and rule become the privilege of the many and of the lowly, despite the
prevailing political and ideological climate of the day. This chapter’s second naïveté
interpretation of the image of God in Genesis 1 follows both the procedural precedent and
ideological trajectory of this hermeneutical move guiding the composition and redaction
of the primeval history.
Second, characterizing the image of God as the result of creation through
evolution helps to highlight the fact that in Genesis, humankind is wrought of the creation
and embedded within it to the same extent as all other living creatures. Every aspect of
human-being, including those through which it images the creator, is established from the
ground up. Human uniqueness, in both biblical and evolutionary views of the world,
arises in organic contiguity with the rest of the creation. “’adam” is an animated amalgam
of dust, breath and blood.

177

Third, the functional-royal language of Genesis 1 and the dynamic ontology of
emergentism both denote a culturally-constituted creature whose personhood is a living
function of psycho-somatic fusion. As a nefesh chayyah (“living creature/being”), human
beings are not embodied souls, but soulful bodies. Emerging from humanity’s unique
form is the unique function of bearing a response-ability to the creator’s call—a blessed
vocation to “Be fruitful and multiply, and fill the earth, and subdue it; and rule over the
fish of the sea and over the birds of the sky and over every living thing that moves on the
earth” (Gen. 1:28).
Fourth, backlit by Neo-Babylonian notions of divine and human agency, the
blessing and commands of Gen. 1:28 place the human condition of freedom in stark
contrast. Yahweh Elohim seems to liberate human beings and the rest of the creation in
several ways. Though God rests on the seventh day, there is no mention that humankind
is created to facilitate this rest through slave labor. Genesis 1 elevates the status and
function of humankind and democratizes the office of God’s royal representative. The
harsh verbs of dominion commanding humankind to “subdue” and “rule over” the earth
and its creatures are colored by the implicit understanding that whatever environmental,
social, or political struggles humanity faces are not mimetic extensions of a henotheistic
Chaoskampf. The character of human rule ought to mirror that of the God who shares
power and creates by uttering an invitation for the world to bring forth what good it will.
The integration of these exegetical insights and a biocultural model of the
emergence of human uniqueness supports Hefner’s theological theory that Homo sapiens
bear the image of God as free and responsible co-creators of potentially humanizing
cultural meanings. The second naïveté interpretations of the image of God and the
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knowledge of good and evil constructed in this chapter and the next seek to make good on
Hefner and Ricoeur’s wager that these myth-symbols can blend with current knowledge
to promote a more intellectually satisfying theological conception of what really is “for
the sake of our wholesome living.”379
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CHAPTER 5
THE KNOWLEDGE OF GOOD AND EVIL: WITHIN A BIBLICAL AND
EVOLUIONARY VIEW OF THE WORLD
While there is an emerging consensus among biblical scholars on the meaning of the
knowledge of good and evil in Genesis 2 and 3, there are two basic and divergent strains
of interpretation concerning the broader import of this myth-symbol for biblically-based
Christian anthropology. The more traditional strain in both Jewish and Christian
interpretation characterizes the knowledge of good and evil as a wholly (or nearly
wholly) negative development—a kind of knowledge that Yahweh Elohim either did not
intend for humankind to have at all, or a knowledge that the creator did not want
humankind to come by of their own accord. In this light the Garden Narrative recounts a
drastic transition in both subjective and objective aspects of human existence before and
after gaining the knowledge of good and evil. That is, according to the narrative, human
life was once objectively free of suffering, and human beings had no firsthand knowledge
of an alternative. Accordingly, the expulsion from the garden in Gen. 3:22-24 marks both
an objective and subjective “fall” from this paradisiacal state, as a consequence of
asserting moral autonomy through disobedience.
The less traditional, though perhaps more tenable, strain of interpretation
highlights the ambivalent nature of the knowledge of good and evil in the narrative,
pointing out that this knowledge is constitutive of both human and divine existence. For
these scholars the “like one of us” of Gen. 3:22 parallels and expands the “Let us” of
1:26, signifying that the knowledge of “tov vara‘,” “good and bad,” fulfillment and
frustration, is an integral aspect of what it means to bear divine image and likeness in a
world where human beings discover that they must “subdue” the earth and “rule” over its
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creatures in order to survive (1:28). This interpretation lends itself to reversing the notion
that life in the garden was a paradisiacal, ideal, or fully-fledged state of existence for
humankind. From this exegetical perspective, gaining a knowledge of good and evil does
not constitute a dramatic change in the human characters’ objective state of affairs.
Rather, the mythic first pair’s eye-opening encounter with the serpent and the tree marks
a shift in human consciousness regarding the ambivalence of creaturely existence. The
God-imaging creatures discover their ability to encounter and effect both good and evil
through singular varieties of freedom and responsibility. The complication here is not so
much a rebellious assertion of moral autonomy through disobedience, but an inevitable,
yet perilous, discovery of practical and ethical wherewithal through a process of
maturation. Where the “curses” of Genesis 3 look more like growing pains, scholars steer
away from concepts like “fall” and “(original) sin,” because these wholly negative
concepts are both foreign to the immediate narrative context and obscure the possibilities
for finding an upside to a knowledge which Yahweh Elohim admits in verse 22 makes
the human creatures “like one of us.”
I argued in chapter 4 that viewing the image of God through a hermeneutical lens
framed by Homo sapiens’ biocultural emergence in recent evolutionary history brings
into focus four guidelines for interpreting the meaning of this myth-symbol today. These
tools aid in developing a second naïveté construal of conceptual elements already present
in the original text. Likewise, through this lens first- and second naïveté formulations of
the knowledge of good and evil present parallel, commensurate, and complementary
modes of understanding this human condition, which open up potentially fruitful avenues
for reasserting its explanatory power and moral fruitfulness today. The following four
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sections of this chapter argue that in these pre-critical and post-critical conceptions of the
knowledge of good and evil (1) the emergence of this concept and the human condition to
which it refers employ a unique cognitive fluidity that is evident in linguistic and ethical
ability; (2) the knowledge of good and evil is a product of nature, a cognitive and cultural
development arising from human interaction with one another and their environments; (3)
the knowledge of good and evil is an ambivalent but integral aspect of what it means to
bear the image and likeness of God as a function and calling—a vocation—incumbent
upon a unique “living creature/being” (nefesh chayyah); and, (4) imaging God with a
knowledge of good and evil involves a condition of freedom, a conscientious responseability to discern and respond to God’s invitation to act as beneficent co-creators in a
“very good” world.
The emergent meaning of the knowledge of good and evil in Genesis and
contemporary interpretation
Biblical and hermeneutical scholars have identified motifs and symbolism in
mythology contemporary to the textual tradition of the Garden Narrative which shed light
on the meaning of the knowledge of good and evil in the primeval history. In cognitive
linguistic terms, a biblical conception of the knowledge of good and evil emerges through
a cross-cultural process of conceptual integration. Biblical commentator Claus
Westermann locates thematic similarities among several ancient texts, while
hermeneutical philosopher Paul Ricoeur highlights the distinctiveness of the Adamic
myth among various mythologies concerning the origins of evil.
For example, Westermann traces a leitmotif through several sources, concluding
that the human desire to attain god-like knowledge/wisdom is a theme common to many
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ancient Near Eastern mythologies. Wisdom, in these contexts, may be defined generally
as a kind of self-mastery which includes the ability (however fallible) to direct one’s own
actions and destiny toward beneficial ends. Westermann notes that the Adapa Myth
contained in the Gilgamesh Epic is among the manuscripts comprising the textual and
conceptual prehistory of the Hebrew Bible’s primeval history. Like the Garden Narrative
in Genesis, the Adapa Myth recounts how a theophanic encounter allots human beings a
certain portion of wisdom but not everlasting life. Similarly, according to another episode
in the Gilgamesh Epic, Enkidu is created by the god Aruru in order to subdue Gilgamesh.
When Enkidu is seduced by a cult prostitute, he loses his immortality and many aspects
of his virility, but he gains wisdom. Though Westermann does not find any biblical or
extra-biblical narratives presenting definitive parallels or precursors to Genesis 2-3, he
does locate a set of common motifs among these texts. Shared themes include envy of the
gods, strong human aspirations for both life and knowledge, a working definition of
“knowledge” or “wisdom” connoting a mastery of one’s own existence and actions, a
categorical denial to human beings of immortality, and a complex fulfillment and
frustration of the human desire for wisdom.380
As summarized in chapter 1, Ricoeur compares and contrasts “the ‘Adamic’ myth
and the ‘eschatological’ vision of history” with three other symbolic worlds: “the drama
of creation and the ‘ritual’ vision of the world,” “the wicked god and the ‘tragic’ vision of
existence,” and “the myth of the exiled soul and salvation through knowledge.”381
Ricoeur concludes that within the gravitational sphere of influence he calls the “cycle of
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the myths,” the Adamic myth and the biblical tradition in which it is embedded have
taken residence at the center of this symbolic universe. Among Western religious
traditions, the Adamic myth has gained this place of preeminence through a complex
relationship of appropriation or accretion vis-à-vis these other myths orbiting it.382 The
biblical witness integrates and resignifies concepts from these other myths concerning the
beginning and end of evil.
Moving beyond Ricoeur’s original interrelation of these myths, I argued in
chapter 4 that the myth-symbol of the image and likeness of God relates more to “the
drama of creation and the ‘ritual’ vision of the world” found in Enuma Elish than any of
the other myths. Yet with respect to the biblical account of how human beings attain the
knowledge of good and evil, Ricoeur argues convincingly that the Adamic myth relates
most “closely” to a tragic vision of existence, while sublimating a number of chaotic
elements. In the Chaoskampf of Enuma Elish, the serpent character Tiamat hypostatizes
that chaotic and untamable aspect of reality which precedes human evil and personifies
the impetus for it. However, in contrast to the myth of chaos, the serpent in the garden is
not a divine being but an especially crafty creature—a “beast of the field which the Lord
God had made” (Gen. 3:1). As a tragic symbol, the serpent represents a quasi-fatedness
about the commission of evil to which human beings are blind, except perhaps in
hindsight. The human creatures in the garden are tragic heroes in the sense that their
freedom and responsibility to effect good and avoid or eradicate evil is already
conditioned by a tragic element “which is already there and already evil.”383 According
to Ricoeur, this quasi-adversarial characterization of human peccability symbolizes the
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conviction that “the evil for which I assume responsibility makes manifest a source of
evil for which I cannot assume responsibility.”384
Reading Genesis 1 as a Priestly prologue to the Garden Narrative supports the
narrative-critical inference that Yahweh Elohim’s “very good” creation is originally open
to bringing about, of its own capacities, the “bad.” The primeval history bears no
indication that this ambiguity of the creation is vicious in itself. The text does allude,
however, that the creator is well aware of this state of affairs, that attaining the
knowledge of good and bad/evil requires human creatures to come to terms with this state
of affairs, and that human creatures have taken on a novel form of freedom and
responsibility underscored by the creator’s announcement that they have “become like
one of Us, knowing good and evil” (Gen. 3:22).
Yet despite the presence of an extra-human impetus for evil, Ricoeur insists that
the “Adamic myth is anti-tragic.”385 There is no malevolent god blinding and fating the
heroes to commit the transgressions for which they are somehow still culpable. The
emergence of bad/evil in Genesis is a mystery presented as a negative reality belonging to
the shadow side of an open-ended creation, rather than a positive reality fated by a
wicked and over-determining deity.
Whether conclusions consonant with Ricoeur’s can emerge through blending
biblical and biocultural understandings of human beginnings is the topic of the next
section, which focuses on the knowledge of good and evil as a product of nature. By
exploring the conceptual background of the Garden Narrative as a foundational step
toward constructing a second-naïveté reappropriation of biblical myth, Ricoeur’s
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hermeneutical insights effectively demonstrate that one purpose of this tale is to
appropriate and recast common motifs for narrating the problem of evil in ways that
sublimate chaotic and tragic elements which cast blame on divine agents for hardship and
wickedness. The conceptual blending which resulted in the Garden Narrative presents a
hermeneutical-procedural precedent for framing a second naïveté understanding of the
biblical myth-symbol of the knowledge of good and evil, its origins, and implications.
To this end, the following two subsections exegete in greater detail the
significance of what the woman and man have come to know in the Garden Narrative—
(1) the meaning of the knowledge of good and evil in Genesis and (2) how this definition
might be situated within a functional-royal interpretation of the image of God.
The biblical meaning of the knowledge of good and evil
While Westermann’s comparative study of common motifs in ancient Near
Eastern texts helps to shed light on the meaning of the knowledge of good and evil in
Genesis 2-3, careful study of this concept in the context of the primeval history and the
wider canon of the Hebrew Bible yields similar results and a more detailed picture of this
myth-symbol’s meaning. Like Westermann, the majority of biblical scholars in more
recent years have concluded that the knowledge of Good and evil refers to the kind of
wisdom associated with making values-based distinctions and moral judgments
without—or even against—heteronomous guidance or mandates like divine commands.
Although this definition is not self-evident from the immediate literary context of the
Garden Narrative, exegetes have established its relative plausibility over against several
competing proposals. Taking a brief look at one of these other definitions helps to clarify
what the knowledge of good and evil is by ruling out what it is not. None of these other
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exegetical proposals are completely without merit. However, they all lack or contain
elements which have prompted biblical scholars to scour the Hebrew Bible and other
texts for the variety of themes, terms, and accounts that have led to the present consensus
in contradistinction to other definitions of this myth-symbol. These other definitions
variously characterize the knowledge of good and evil as a consequence of disobedience,
knowing “right” from “wrong,” sexual knowledge, and even omniscience.386 Two of
these possibilities warrant further explanation.
First, commentators Gordon Wenham and Nahum Sarna list “moral discernment”
as a popular definition for the knowledge of good and evil explored by various
scholars.387 However, as a basic understanding of the difference between right and
wrong, “moral discernment” seems much too narrow and unilaterally positive a definition
for the knowledge of good and evil in its narrative context. Additionally, the decision to
eat presupposes that the mythic first pair already possessed this kind of knowledge. The
woman necessarily understands the meaning of both disobedience and consequences in
386
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the first few verses of Genesis 3. Without this capability, the divine command and
warning would be pointless.
Second, Gerhard von Rad made popular the omniscience interpretation by
suggesting that “tov vara‘” constitutes a merism meaning “everything.” Accordingly, the
terms tov and ra‘ represent the inclusive bookends of an infinite symbolic universe. The
phrase “heaven and earth” often serves this literary function. However, there is no
indication that the couple in the garden expected to become omniscient by eating the
fruit. The narrative may hold an element of irony in that the quality of the knowledge
gained by eating was other than expected. Yet there is no hint that the quantity either
exceeded or fell short of expectations.388 As implied by the “curses” and violent exploits
of the remainder of the primeval history, perhaps the human knowledge of good and evil
is fraught with so much peril precisely because it is not omniscient. The divine
pronouncement of Gen. 3:22 leaves little room for denying that the human creatures gain
a God-like capacity to discern and effect good rather than evil, but not good to the
exclusion of evil.
Citing Julius Wellhausen’s commentary, Westermann endorses a qualified
version of von Rad’s interpretation, according to which “good” means helpful or useful
and “evil” means harmful or injurious. Westermann affirms Wellhausen’s “functional”
and “all-embracing” definition of the knowledge of good and bad, which is not exactly
knowledge of everything without remainder, but a practical wisdom for distinguishing the
helpful from the harmful, the virtuous from the vicious, the good from the bad.389
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Likewise, Sarna states succinctly that “it is best to understand ‘knowledge of good and
bad’ as the capacity to make independent judgments concerning human welfare” in any
arena.390 This lesser infinity presents a plausible via media between the moral
discernment presupposed at the opening to Genesis 3 and the omniscience found nowhere
in the narrative. Also, in rare biblical parallels, the phrase tov vara‘ connotes a mature
and sound ability to make values-based judgments autonomously and responsibly. The
writers of Deut. 1:39 and 2 Sam. 19:35 presuppose that the young and old can anticipate
the consequences of disobedience and understand the difference between right and
wrong. Yet they hold that the immature “have no knowledge of good or evil,” and the
elderly sometimes lose the ability to “distinguish between good and bad.”391 Westermann
and Sarna’s interpretation of the knowledge of good and evil falls into the semantic range
connoted by these verses and has entered the conceptual background of current exegesis
colored by legal and royal conceptions of wisdom and knowledge in the Hebrew Bible.
The royal and legal background for the knowledge of good and evil
Bringing greater precision to the definition of the knowledge of good and evil,
many biblical scholars have discovered promising exegetical paths in the royal and legal
background of this myth-symbol. Where the image of God democratizes the concept of a
royal figure acting as a representative of the divine, a correlative conception of the
knowledge of good and evil has come to light against the backdrop of biblical passages in
which God occasionally grants kings a special ability to pronounce judgment or in which
prophets and priests bear a singular ability to disclose or interpret the “Law” or
“instruction” of God mediated through the Torah.
390
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Two recent biblical scholars exploring the legal and royal background for the
knowledge of good and evil are W. Malcolm Clark and William N. Wilder. Clark makes a
strong case that there are two sets of passages in the Hebrew Bible’s primary history
shedding light on the meaning of the knowledge of good and evil in Genesis.392
In the first set of passages—1 Kings 3:9; 2 Sam. 14:17, 20—kings Solomon and
David are granted the ability by God to pronounce judgment between “good and evil” in a
legal context. In a comprehensive analysis of these and similar passages, Clark concludes
that the knowledge of good and evil is best understood in many contexts as the God-given
ability to discern and pronounce a judgment of “yes” or “no” in ambiguous and/or highstakes situations. Highlighting the biblical writers’ claim that the human judges in these
passages often “hear” God before “saying” “good” or “bad,” Clark defines this kind of
wisdom as the God-guided judgment of an authoritative person, like a king, priest, or
prophet.393 In these passages the ability to discern between good and bad is a divine
prerogative, beyond the immediate purview of any person, let alone every person.
Analyzing a second set of passages—Deut. 1:39; 2 Sam. 19:35—Clark, like
Sarna, expresses confidence that the knowledge of good and evil described in these
passages is the kind of autonomous judgment concerning human welfare gained through
maturity or coming of age. According to Clark, the Priestly formulation of Deut. 1:39 is
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the closest parallel to Genesis 2-3 but postdates the Yahwist’s use of the formula
“knowledge of good and evil” in the Garden Narrative. In Deuteronomy the knowledge
of good and evil likely refers to a kind of legal responsibility which the youngest
members of the exodus generation had not yet attained. Being legal minors, these young
ones are not held accountable for those transgressions keeping their elders from entering
“the good land.”394
Like Clark, Wilder cites 1 Kings 3 and 2 Samuel 14 as portraying a divine
“investiture” of wisdom which brings about an “illumination” expected but not fully
attained in Genesis 3, when the eyes of the human beings are opened to knowing good
and bad. He notes that in biblical literature this kind of illumination and investiture is
usually the privilege of kings and is God’s alone to bestow.395 Therefore, Wilder ties this
interpretation of the knowledge of good and evil directly to the functional-royal
conception of the image and likeness of God, according to which human beings act “as
God’s vice regents over the earth.”396
Against this backdrop, Wilder understands the Yahwist to paint the primordial
pair as a couple of unruly rulers. Their disobedient and premature grasping at the
394
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knowledge of good and evil short circuits the royal illumination and investiture of
wisdom God intended to give them. Failing to await God’s blessing frustrates forever
humanity’s prospects for attaining the more lavish illumination and investiture they might
have expected otherwise. The command not to eat from tree of the knowledge of good
and evil does not represent a cruel temptation or a categorical prohibition. Rather, human
creatures might reasonably expect to partake from the tree when both they and the fruit
are ripe, as it were. Having their eyes opened by God in this way, they would have also
been clothed in God-like royal splendor or light (’or), rather than mere skins (‘or).397
Still, Wilder concludes that at the close of the Garden Narrative, God grants the
pair a gracious portion of both illumination and investiture, which nonetheless falls short
of the unmentioned expectation for God-like royal wisdom and splendor that come with
patient obedience. God does not leave the couple naked or clothed in inadequate
garments of their own fabrication. Rather, the Lord God clothes the couple with sturdier
garments as a lasting reminder to these royal image bearers of the ultimate source of their
dignity, splendor, and wisdom.398
In light of the functional-royal interpretation of the image of God, Wilder proposes
that at the end of Gen 2 there is the sense that naked Adam and Eve must
be clothed simply because the completion and fulfillment of their rulership
demands such an investiture, as it would for any “image of god” in the
ancient Near East. The only question is how and under what circumstances
this investiture will be accomplished.399
Discovering the ambivalent but integral role the knowledge of good and evil plays
in a functional-royal interpretation of the image of God, many recent exegetes have
become divided over this question of circumstances and whether or not the Yahwistic and
397
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Priestly contributors to the primeval history had something like Wilder’s idealistic
alternative in mind. Taking the traditional tack, Wilder asks the “what if?” questions the
narrator has left out: “What if Adam and Eve had not sinned? What if they had obeyed
instead? What if they had passed their test and had been escorted into God’s presence
with honor instead of shame?”400
However, the writer(s) and/or redactor(s) of the primeval history may not have
shared these questions. Other biblical scholars wonder whether recent understandings of
the primeval history’s rhetorical thrust render these questions moot. For example,
theologian Neil B. MacDonald, finds the Garden Narrative to raise a different set of “ifs”
than Wilder. Instead of asking, “What if…?,” MacDonald states, “Even if….” According
to MacDonald’s “subjunctive conditional” interpretation of Genesis 2-3, “The story is
essentially a deflationary tale whose moral is that even had the natural history of
humankind begun life in a paradisiacal ideal state (which it did not), it would still have
arrived at the less than perfect place it is now.”401 MacDonald’s “Even if” may ring truer
than Wilder’s “What if?” when considering that in Genesis 1-3 chaos and tragedy are
always waiting in the wings, because Yahweh Elohim’s “Let there be” and “Let Us
make” grant ever greater shares of creative freedom and power to the finite and fallible.
Many scientifically-informed theologians today, including J. Wentzel van
Huyssteen and Gregory R. Peterson, latch onto this more complex “falling up” reading of
the Garden Narrative, because it is both exegetically plausible and more conducive to an
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evolutionary reframing of the biblical concept of the knowledge of good and evil.402
Evolutionary history is morally ambiguous, as should be any cognitively fluid biocultural
species emerging within it.
Section summary and conclusion
This opening section has cited many exegetes who argue that in Genesis 2-3 the
formula “knowledge of good and evil” and the human condition to which it refers derive
from a unique cognitive fluidity evident in linguistic and ethical ability. Westermann and
Ricoeur have shown that the concept of the knowledge of good and evil is an integration
and reformulation of background concepts belonging to several sources of ancient
mythology. In a post-critical, second naïveté interpretation, their hermeneutical insight
warrants the inference that this myth-symbol is a product of what it describes—a unique
capacity to blend concepts across diverse behavioral domains in order to construct
values-laden distinctions like “good” and “bad.”
Through intertextual analysis, many biblical scholars argue convincingly that this
special form of wisdom bears legal and royal connotations. For Wilder and others, this
functional-royal interpretation of the knowledge of good and evil feeds into that of the
image and likeness of God, implying that the biblical writers understood the former
condition as part and parcel of the latter. Although human creatures discover that they
could never exercise their God-like wisdom without erring, to bear the image and
likeness of God is to know good and evil.
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The following section develops the thesis that in pre-critical and post-critical
conceptions of this human condition, a fallible knowledge of good and evil is an
ambivalent consequence of being wrought of the creation and embedded within it to the
same extent as all other creatures.
The knowledge of good and evil as a product of nature in Genesis and
biocultural evolution
If the writers and redactor(s) of the primeval history understood the human person
to be an animated amalgam of dust, breath, and blood, and if they understood the
knowledge of good and evil to be an integral aspect of bearing the divine image, it stands
to reason that according to the narrative this ambivalent condition is wrought of the
creation to the same extent as every other God-imaging aspect of human life. Clues in the
text imply that the biblical writers conceived of a “very good” creation immanently
capable of producing tov vara‘. Although there are chaotic and tragic concepts (in the
Ricoeurian sense) latent in the cosmology of Genesis 1-3, there is nothing divine or
diabolical about the sources of the knowledge of good and evil in the Garden Narrative.
The following two subsections explore the creaturely harbingers of (the knowledge of)
good and evil in the Garden Narrative and the biocultural evolutionary perspective which
bring them into focus.
Creaturely sources of the knowledge of good and evil in Eden
Contrary to popular belief, the Garden Narrative may not be a simple tale of
paradise lost. As mentioned just before the conclusion of chapter 4, there are at least three
elements in Genesis 1 suggesting that the creation is fraught with the possibilities of both
fulfillment and frustration “in the beginning.” These include (1) the open-endedness of the
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divine commands to humanity in Gen. 1:28, (2) the harsh verbs of dominion within these
commands, and (3) the repetition of the divine first person plural in Gen. 1:26 and 3:22.
The direct address of Gen. 1:28 suggests that the Priestly writer(s) redactor(s) of
the primeval history understood humankind to bear a conscious response-ability to obey
God’s open-ended commands concerning their role within the creation. However, there
appears to be no assumption that humankind has the ability to discern and disseminate the
beneficent rule of the creator perfectly. Admittedly, this absence of evidence should not
count for evidence of absence. The first positive evidence that the creation is able to both
sustain and challenge humankind from the beginning are the harsh verbs associated with
enacting the image of God in an earthly environment.403 These verbs imply that
humankind must struggle to “fill the earth”; that flourishing means having to “subdue”
(kavash) the natural environment and “rule over” (radah) its creatures. The harsh
verbiage of the Priestly writer(s)/redactor(s) suggests a perception that relating to the
creation, one another, and God in unique ways means being aware of the original and
ever-present possibility of fulfillment and frustration, cooperation and conflict, “good and
evil.” The so-called “curses” of Genesis 3 list the looming trials of one kind of creature
who has come to a conscientious awareness, somehow similar to God’s, that maintaining
and producing life can be fraught with all sorts of hardship, that conflict and power
disparities can arise in the most intimate of relationships. There are dangerous animals
lurking in the Garden, crafty creatures of the Lord God’s making (Gen. 3:1), sources of
wisdom able to open human eyes to all these dangers and more.
In this light, Eden does not appear to be what most people would call a paradise.
The tree and the serpent are fully part of God’s good creation. A talking snake and an
403
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eye-opening tree are certainly unusual beings, but there is nothing in the narrative to
suggest they are in any way supernatural. According to Genesis 1-3, the origins of tov
vara‘ are creaturely, intimating that the knowledge of good and evil is wrought of the
creation and embedded within it to the same extent as all other created realities, including
the image of God. As liberating and empowering as it is for all created entities, there
appears to be a shadow side to God’s “Let there be….”
Hebrew Bible scholar John F. A. Sawyer makes a convincing case that the verses
framing the passages in which the creation of human beings is the main topic ought to
give pause to anyone presuming to dissociate the image of God from the knowledge of
good and evil. He draws attention to the fact that Gen. 1:26 and 3:22 are the only passages
in which the divine first person plural is used to describe the resemblance of humanity to
God: “‘Let us make [humankind] in Our image, according to our likeness…’”; “‘Behold,
the [human] has become like one of Us, knowing good and evil….”404
These parallel pronouncements affirm human agency and its likeness to God’s in
some potentially surprising ways. At the end of Genesis 1, the creator “saw” all of the
creation and pronounced it “very good.” By the end of Genesis 3, the human creatures’
eyes have been opened to see for themselves the “good and bad” they will encounter and
cause outside Eden. In an ironic twist of imagery, “God blessed them…” (Gen. 1:28)
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becomes, “the Lord God sent [them] out…” (3:23). Expulsion in Genesis 3 parallels
God’s blessing in Genesis 1 in two ways. First, both the blessing and the expulsion
follow the use of the divine first person plural in describing humanity’s similarity to God.
Second, both God’s blessing and the expulsion extend humankind’s God-imaging
function to the whole of the creation. The human creatures are not fruitful and cannot
hope to fill the earth and rule over the whole of it until leaving Eden. In this sense,
expulsion from Eden might be considered a blessing in disguise, an unceremonious
emptying of the nest, a bit of tough love.
Beyond this striking parallel suggesting in yet another way that for the biblical
writers the image of God is not complete without the knowledge of good and evil, there
are additional hints that the so-called “curses” of Gen. 3:14-19 are less about changes in
the world than changes in worldview. Having their eyes open to the knowledge of good
and bad, human creatures come to realize that they and their environment are capable of
being harbingers of “bad” as well as “good.” In other words, the first pair’s illicit action
does not bring about a change in their objective circumstances so much as their subjective
means of encountering, evaluating, and changing them for better and worse.
If the Garden Narrative is presupposed by Genesis 1 and its Priestly
writer(s)/redactor(s), the commands to “be fruitful,” “fill the earth,” “subdue it,” and
“rule over” its creatures seem to be reserved for the world outside Eden. According to
Sawyer and other exegetes already cited, this understanding that the Yahwist’s creation
account is taken up into the Priestly redaction of the primeval history as an elaboration of
its prologue alleviates the exegetical difficulty that the image and likeness to God is
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largely undefined in Genesis 1.405 The intricate connections among Genesis 1-3 support
Sawyer’s hypothesis that (1) the material following Genesis 1 ought to clarify the
ambiguous definition of image and likeness from the previous passage, and that (2)
Yahweh Elohim’s first person plural declaration that the human creature “has become
like one of us” (3:22) announces in language parallel to that of Gen. 1:26 that all the
conditions have been met for human creatures to bear the divine image outside the
relative sanctuary of Eden. In Genesis and biocultural evolution, these conditions are
products of nature.
However ironic the narrator intended to be in recounting the primordial pair’s
eye-opening experience, Yahweh Elohim’s announcement at the climax of the narrative
calls attention to an irreversible development in humankind’s likeness to their creator—a
new creative potential rife with the realization of the enormous challenges and
opportunities it confers.
Yet this new, ambivalent, and perilous God-likeness does not rain down from the
creator directly; nor is it mediated through the spoken or written word from a prophet or
priest of Yahweh. This knowledge is there for the picking from a plant, and the
encouragement to take and eat comes from a “beast of the field,” presumably named by
the man and subject to human rule (Gen. 1:28-30, 2:19-20, 3:1). Although “the Lord God
caused [the tree of knowledge] to grow,” in this sense, it is no different than any other
“tree that is pleasing to the sight and good for food” (2:9). The knowledge of good and
evil comes directly from below, and only indirectly from above. In light of the
intertextual studies of Clines and Wilder, this narrative element may symbolize the
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conviction that while God’s very good creation is replete with sources for knowing the
good from the bad, human beings are not the kind of creatures who can read, understand,
or apply them perfectly.
In Genesis, as in a biocultural understanding of humanity’s physical and symbolic
universe, human beings discover that for good and ill we are only able to seek knowledge
and wisdom from our cultural and ecological surroundings. Even if one believes there is
no surer source of guidance than God, no one could ever claim immediate access to
divine wisdom. Bearing God’s image is a trial and error process—a hermeneutical circle
of discernment, decision, action, and critical reflection. By the end of Genesis 3, the
biblical writers appear to be suggesting that no matter how “very good” one believes the
creator and creation to be, surviving and thriving are not guaranteed, and people are
prone to exacerbating this state of affairs.
Defending this understanding of the Garden Narrative, Sawyer describes how the
serpent aptly symbolizes the kind of practical wit and wisdom needed to survive and
thrive in challenging circumstances. In ancient Near Eastern contexts, snakes are as
revered as they are feared, able to deal death in a single bite and equipped to thrive in
environments from sea to sand that often kill human beings in short order. In Genesis 3
the serpent is an otherwise ordinary creature whose ability to talk is not unlike that of the
animals found in Aesop’s fables and other cautionary tales.406 At the same time,
according to the narrator, “the serpent was more crafty [‘arum] than any beast of the field
the Lord God had made” (Gen. 3:1). Citing Prov. 12:16, 23; 13:16; 14:8, 15, 18; 22:3;
27:12; Exod. 21:14; Josh. 9:4; and Isa. 5:21, Sawyer notes that the term ‘arum is
ambiguous and ambivalent, signifying everything from thoughtful prudence to sinister
406
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guile, depending on the context.407 The wily ways of serpents are praised in both Prov.
30:18-19 and Matthew 10:16. In the latter reference, Jesus purportedly instructs his
followers to “be shrewd as serpents and innocent as doves,” in a world where literal and
metaphorical wolves prey on sheep. In popular ancient Near Eastern parlance and the
mythology emerging from it, the snake’s ‘arum relates to its ability to move quickly and
evade capture without legs, its seeming perpetual youth and renewal through shedding its
skin, its near imperviousness to heat and dehydration, and its venomous bite.408 All of
these characteristics make snakes ideal survivors.
Much like Bird, Sawyer associates this concept of survival with the verbs of
dominion in Gen. 1:28. The harshness of kavash (“subdue”) and radah (“rule over”)
carry a sense that from the start humanity must always struggle in order to subsist.409 As a
heuristic articulation of this notion, the Garden narrative signifies that acquiring the
knowledge of good and evil means gaining the self-conscious awareness that life is full of
tov vara‘, “happiness and catastrophe, success and failure, life and death,” and that
human beings bear the freedom and responsibility to bring the good along with the
bad.410 Sawyer claims that because the most “crafty” of beasts facilitates this shift in
perspective the human creatures receive a God-like wisdom exceeding that of the serpent,
a shrewdness with strong inclinations toward singular forms of good and bad/evil.
Sawyer emphasizes that in becoming wise—‘ârum—like the serpent, the human
creatures discover that they are naked—‘ārum—vis-à-vis certain harsh realities of life
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and death.411 He also suggests that after becoming aware of this “cursed” state, the
“garments of skin” mentioned in Gen. 3:21 may allude to snake skin. The snake’s everregenerating skin becomes a symbol of renewal and immortality. By contrast, the skins
worn by the couple exiled from the garden serve as a reminder that the tree of life and its
promise of immortality are out of reach, and that humankind must struggle in order to
fulfill the creator’s commands to “‘be fruitful and multiply, and fill the earth, and subdue
it; and rule over the fish of the sea and over the birds of the sky and over every living
thing that moves on the earth’” (Gen. 1:28).412 Gaining enlightenment (’or) means
needing a thicker skin (‘or), because becoming wise (‘ârum) means discovering that we
are naked (‘ārum).
Does this narrative development create a contradiction between the closing verses
of Genesis 1 and Genesis 3? Are there loose ends and open seams in the redacted text? Or
do biblical and contemporary cosmologies and anthropologies suggest ways for
describing the world as both “very good” and immanently capable of producing both
good and bad from “the beginning”? The final verse of Genesis 1 implies that the
primeval history’s writer(s)/redactor(s) saw something “very good” about the unique
creative possibilities that enter the world with the creation of humankind. Yet they also
saw fit to caution that when the creation is at its “best,” its future is also at its most
uncertain, due to humankind’s open-ended, ambiguous, and ambivalent response-ability
to discern and extend the beneficent intentions of the creator to one another and the rest
of the creation. The shift in Genesis 1 from “good” to “very good” corresponds to the
shift from the jussive—“Let there be…”—to the imperative—“Be fruitful…” This
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grammatical shift may imply the advent of humankind’s unique response-abilities
demarcates the beginning of a “very good” stage of creation in that through humankind
the creation is now able to envision, decide, and “see” for itself what novel goodness it
will include. Hence, (Yahweh) Elohim’s occasion to “rest.” For good and ill, ’adam
steps into the roles encapsulated by the formulae, “Let there be…” and “Let us make…”
Human creatures certainly bear unique capacities to enjoy, evaluate, and
manipulate their world. But to glean wisdom from the Genesis cosmology today, biblical
interpreters must underscore the writers’ conviction that (Yahweh) Elohim “sees” the
“good” of all created entities—heavenly bodies, earth, air, water, plants, and animals—
independent of and prior to the creation of humankind. Theologians and ethicists today
stand to gain from amplifying the text’s non-anthropocentric elements and the intrinsic
good its writers locate in the nonhuman world.
As theologian Philip Hefner and I have suggested, human beings bear the image
of God by acting as free and responsible created co-creators of the cultural meanings by
which we describe and justify our roles and actions in the world. Similarly, in Genesis 13 the positive commands to “fill,” “subdue,” and “rule over”; the invitation to name all
the animals; the negative command not to eat; and the encounter with the serpent all
suggest that the biblical writers understood human creatures to have been given a cooperative role in the creative process and that the undetermined character of the creation
will present meaningful challenges and opportunities to humanity’s God-imaging
response-ability to co-create a future outside Eden. Because ’adam is wrought of the
creation and embedded within it to the same extent as all other creatures, created cocreation ought to be understood in terms of co-operation among all human creatures, as
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well as the rest of the natural world. Only this characterization of human creativity as
God-imaging can re-present the modus operondi of a God who shares power and does not
create through violence.
The inherent challenges to creaturely wellbeing “outside Eden” do not necessarily
detract from the primordial goodness of the creation or the creator, which are
quintessential to Judeo-Christian cosmology. However, a non-paradisiacal conception of
the creation’s “very good-ness” in Genesis reframes or discredits “paradise lost”
interpretations of the Garden Narrative. At the same time, this exegetical reframing
facilitates a theology of nature perspective—a doctrinal development in light of current
science—emerging from a complex consonance and clash between ancient and
contemporary understandings of human uniqueness and its development. Locating the
potential for tov vara‘ always latent in Yahweh Elohim’s “very good” creation
strengthens Hefner and Ricoeur’s wager that a conceptual integration of ancient and
contemporary symbolic worlds will allow the myth-symbols under investigation to
remain integral to an intellectually and ethically fruitful (second naïveté) understanding
of Homo sapiens’ origins, uniqueness, purposes, and destiny.
Natural sources of the knowledge of good and evil in biocultural evolution
An evolutionary hermeneutical lens helps the present-day interpreter of Scripture
to focus on the non-paradisiacal elements in Genesis 1-3, because evolution means
looking back at the beginning through “nature, red in tooth and claw.” The theologian
today must engage the evolutionary perspective that Homo sapiens’ unique ability to
construe and cause good and the bad has emerged within—and because of—a biocultural
milieu already beset by cooperation and conflict. This is not to read Darwin into Genesis,
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but to emphasize that the biblical writers experienced the need to account in their own
way for the realization that the creation is a wild and ambivalent place, capable of
bringing human beings to the heights of joy and the depths of sorrow. The Garden
Narrative encapsulates the perennial struggle to account for the good and bad human
beings and their environments are capable of producing, while attempting to preserve the
primordial goodness of the creator and the creation. Underlying the “curses” of Genesis 3
are vexing questions about why there are dangerous creatures like snakes with which
human beings seem to have an innate enmity, why relationships become power struggles,
why subsistence is arduous, why producing offspring is so painful. In short, the
knowledge of good and evil emerged when our species’ eyes were opened to a world
begging for an explanation to these mysteries. The knowledge of good and evil emerged
through the cognitive fluidity of behaviorally modern Homo sapiens in recent
evolutionary time and has directed the course and content of humanity’s biocultural
history ever since.
As a biocultural reality, knowledge of good and evil is a product of nature and
nurture because, in the words of evolutionary psychologists John Tooby and Leda
Cosmides, “more nature allows more nurture.”413 For good and bad, although the specific
behavior of an individual person is not reducible to biological or cultural processes, the
entire gamut of conscientious human behavior is bioculturally constrained. For good and
bad, human beings are culturally-constituted creatures, blessed and cursed with the
condition of having to contextualize and justify our actions and experiences. In
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biocultural and theological terms, the knowledge of good and evil and the image of God
are co-emergent.
According to neuroscientist and emergentist Terrence W. Deacon, the rudiments
of this condition emerged with the first self-propagating—i.e., teleodynamic—systems.
Through the autogenic capacities of self-constitution, self-repair, and self-replication, “a
very basic form of value has emerged,” because the components of these teleodynamic
processes can be defined in terms of autogenic integrity or lack thereof.414 The much later
arrival of sentience brought with it “the emergence of ethical value,” because “the
background ‘feeling of being here’” enables the perception of comfort and pain, joy and
suffering, fulfillment and frustration.415 With the symbolic threshold and the emergence
of consciousness comes the emergence of morality, because personhood facilitates the
(co-)creation of a symbolic universe framed by concepts like “good” and “evil.”
I suggested in chapter 3 that Hefner’s bottom-up “basis for beginning to reflect
upon values” harmonizes with Deacon’s to such an extent that neither should object to
Hefner redubbing his “teleonomic axiom” the “teleodynamic axiom.” Hefner’s axiom
states that “[t]he structure of a thing, the processes by which it functions, the
requirements for its functioning, and its relations with and impact upon its ecosystem
form the most reasonable basis for hypothesizing what the purpose and meaning of the
thing are,” within its ecological and/or cultural context.416 The evolutionary roots of the
knowledge of good and evil are as deep and ancient as the first selection pressures

414

Terrence W. Deacon, Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter (New York; London: W. W.
Norton and Company, 2012), 322.
415
Ibid., 486; emphasis added.
416
Philip Hefner, The Human Factor: Evolution, Culture, and Religion (Minneapolis: Fortress Press,
1993), 40.

206

threatening the systemic integrity of the earliest autogens, which evolved into the first
organisms, which evolved into every other species, including ours.
This perspective begs a vexing set of questions. For instance, what if an animal
species has evolved to be an apex predator and “the requirements for its functioning”
include killing and consuming other animals? A successful hunt is of great value to the
predator, but what is in it for the prey besides fear, pain, and death? Like it or not,
predation and other forms of calamity often called “natural evil” have been the catalysts of
biodiversity and ecological balance, of sensation and reaction, of quick feet and minds, and
of the physical and cultural tools Homo sapiens have constructed in order to manipulate
their ecological and social environments for the sake of their wholesome living.
Both first- and second- naïveté readings of Genesis leave open the question of
whether the various forms of freedom bestowed to all created entities by God’s “Let there
be” is a kind of “good” capable of offsetting the creation’s inherent capacity to include
the “bad.” As the creative wellspring of biotic complexity and diversity on earth, is the
evolutionary arms race of horns and hooves, teeth and claws, brains and tools selfredeeming? Ultimately, these philosophical and theological questions must remain open
to some extent. The mystery of the origins of evil defies any comprehensive
rationalization. Through his Symbolism of Evil, Ricoeur reminds the philosopher and the
theologian that myth and the second naïveté interpretation thereof facilitate the kind of
docta ignorantia required for wrestling with these perennial questions.
Approaching this paradox from an evolutionary angle, philosopher Holmes
Rolston, III suggests that creativity and tragedy in evolutionary processes are two poles
of a dialectic with a track record of producing positive net results. For Ricoeur Genesis 1-

207

3 sublimate and reconfigure tragic and chaotic understandings of reality. Similarly,
Rolston attempts to transvaluate the chaos and tragedy of evolutionary history. For him
the term tragic is an evaluative translation of the fact that “in amoral nature” exist
“predation, parasitism, selfishness, randomness, blindness, disaster, indifference, waste,
struggle, suffering, death.”417 Blending imagery from Genesis 2-3 and Romans 8, he
suggests that “perhaps the poetry of nature as garden and as groaning in travail can be
demythologized, or remythologized, for our scientific era.”418 The evolutionary labor
pains of bringing forth new life and new life forms are “redeemed” by their own positive
results. From the perspective of a creature complex enough to enjoy its own existence,
complexification is an intrinsic good. The Darwinian processes driving biological and
cognitive complexification are ambivalent and indifferent but have led to every valuable
reality, including the ability to value. Examining both sides of the evolutionary coin,
Rolston explains:
Nature is random, contingent, blind, disastrous, wasteful, indifferent,
selfish, cruel, clumsy, ugly, struggling, full of suffering, and ultimately,
death? Yes, but this sees only the shadows, and there has to be light to cast
shadows. Nature is orderly, prolific, efficient, selecting for adapted fit,
exuberant, complex, diverse, regenerating life generation after generation.
There are disvalues in nature as surely as there are values, and the
disvalues systematically drive the value achievements […]. Translated
into theological terms, the evils are redeemed in the ongoing story.419
The “good” results of the competition-driven emergence of novel forms of life and
mentality are not redeemed from “sin” or “guilt” but from entropy, from chaos—the
enemy and engine of emergence.420 Life has made spectacular gains in its ongoing
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struggle to fill the earth. Rolston emphasizes that eco-systemically speaking, the so called
circle of life is self-renewing—“[p]lants become insects, which become chicks, which
become foxes, which die to fertilize plants.”421 But this circle does more. Evolutionarily
speaking, the circle of life is more like a self-ratcheting spiral. Rolston notes that humanbeing could only emerge, “at least in life as we know it,” in a natural history fraught with
predation, blind chance, and catastrophe.422
In the evolutionary emergence of the image of God and the knowledge of good
and evil, do the evolutionary ends justify the means? Well, yes and no. This question
holds a twofold category mistake. First, ends can only follow means; ends cannot elevate
or diminish the moral status of means. Second, ethical or juridical categories like
“justification” do not apply to amoral processes. Catholic theologian Denis Edwards
emphasizes that “it is important to understand natural selection in a nonmythological and
nonanthropomorphic way.”423 Although a great deal of animal life is able to experience
pain, animals do not suffer or cause suffering within a values-laden symbolic universe of
“good” and “evil.” The tragedies which animals, persons, and their environments incur at
the hand of the nonhuman world are not insignificant, but they are also exempt from
moral evaluation. There is no one to blame for so called “natural evils.”
By contrast, the undue and avoidable tragedies which animals, persons, and their
environments incur at the hand of the conscientious human world are indeed subject to
moral evaluation. Human action is accountable to a knowledge of good and evil.
According to Rolston, here is where the more traditional, theological sense of redemption
begins to take root. For him, although “[s]uffering in a harsh world did not enter
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chronologically after sin and on account of it,” the biocultural arrival of culpability
“introduces a novel tragedy.”424 According to a biocultural perspective and a second
naïveté reading of Genesis 1-3, the possibility and necessity for morality emerge from the
creation itself when our species’ eyes were opened to the knowledge of good and evil.
From that point on, human creatures have been blessed and cursed with the responseability to give an account for the tov vara‘ they produce in the course of living out the
God-imaging vocation to participate conscientiously in ongoing drama of creation.
Knowing good and evil as an emergent vocation
Clark and Wilder have argued convincingly from intertextual evidence for the
royal and legal background of the concept of the knowledge of good and evil in Genesis
2-3. These findings are strengthened by their consonance with a functional-royal
interpretation of the image of God. According to Wilder, “the completion and fulfillment
of” humankind’s capacity to rule over the earth as the creator’s royal image-bearers
requires the illumination and investiture that comes with gaining the knowledge of good
and evil.425 Finding that the image and likeness of God is largely undefined in its
immediate context, Sawyer also argues that for the biblical writers the Garden Narrative
chronicles the completion of the image of God and begins to specify what it means to fill,
subdue, and rule over.426 In the garden the human creatures learn that fulfilling their
vocational response-ability to the commands of God means naming other creatures and
other people, falling into power struggles among themselves, toiling to produce
sustenance, laboring to bear children, and navigating a world of fierce creatures. These
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scholars conclude that for the writers of Genesis, bearing God’s image ultimately means
leaving Eden. The following two subsections describe this call out of Eden according to
one recent strain of biblical scholarship and a scientifically-informed perspective with the
potential to blend with it.
Called up and called out—exegetical considerations
For Wilder and Sawyer the knowledge of good and evil is part and parcel of
bearing the image and likeness of God in, to, and through the creation. However, their
analyses differ when they begin to draw interpretive conclusions from their exegetical
findings. In Wilder’s interpretation part of the narrator’s intended message is that if the
primordial pair had only awaited further instructions from God about the tree of
knowledge things would have turned out much better for them and perhaps the rest of the
world. In Sawyer’s interpretation part of the narrator’s intended message is that bearing
God’s image means discovering some harsh realities about the good and bad the world
and human creatures are capable of producing. Called to be co-operators with God, one
another, and the rest of the creation, human beings have a unique response-ability to
discern, construe, and pursue the good the creator intends for the creation. However, as
the remainder of the primeval history implies, human beings have a penchant for making
things very bad, as well. Setting the stage for the sobering reminders of human fallibility
in Genesis 4-11, the Garden Narrative represents a time-honored attempt to account for
the realization that human creatures have always stumbled only too late upon the
ambivalence of their condition, their singular but fallible capacity to effect the good, their
unique ability to appropriate, but also misappropriate, what they and their communities
have considered to be mediations of divine wisdom.
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In this light the Garden Narrative is less about falling from something than it is
about stumbling into something as wonderful as it is wild, as promising as it is perilous.
The Reverend John Baker interprets the forbidden fruit of the tree of the knowledge as a
symbol of the realities to which it introduces humankind in the narrative—the unknown
and knowledge. As loci of power capable of taking away ignorance as well as innocence,
both the unknown and knowledge/wisdom present opportunity as well as danger.427
Accordingly, Baker understands the Garden Narrative to chronicle an “awakening,” not a
“Fall.” That is, Genesis 2-3 mythologizes a transition from “an unconscious innocence, an
identity of [the hu]man with God (similar to that of animals with nature)” to the possibility
of a self-consciously chosen harmony with God’s intentions, “even in the face of
temptation and stress.”428 The path to maturity is fraught with growing pains. Yet mature
knowledge inevitably trumps the bliss of ignorance and innocence. Like the pair expelled
from the garden, those with the potential to do the most good are also those whose eyes
have been opened to the realities of hardship, death, and the human capacity to bring about
both or to shield one another and the rest of the creation from avoidable harm.
Choosing to step beyond the protection of the Garden and the sheltering,
heteronomous world of “eat this, don’t eat that” means having one’s eyes opened to a
potentially richer but much more challenging existence “east of Eden.” Growing up
means moving out and having to face all the dangers and opportunities of the world with
new eyes, even when feeling naked at the prospect. In Baker’s terms, “now that
[humankind] has claimed knowledge for [itself], and the power that goes with it, [we]
must learn to use that power under God’s guidance, and for that [we] must find, of [our]
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own free will, a new harmony with God.”429 Discerning and enacting this new kind of
harmony with God’s intentions for the creation is the vocation of humankind beyond the
bounds of Eden. “In those conditions,” remarks Baker, “the choice of freedom cannot be
called ‘sin,’ nor can the resultant state be called a ‘Fall.’ The true story of [humankind’s]
Fall could, for a theologian determined to find it in the Bible record, only begin with the
sin of Cain, who exercised his power to do an evil deed.”430
While Baker and others have good reason to interpret Genesis 2-3 as a tale of
awakening, Clines and Clark both point out that the story does not contain a simple,
linear “progression from immaturity to maturity.”431 However accurate the latter insight
may be, it also implies an assumption that the biblical writers envisioned a world in
which the maturation process could be relatively painless and drama-free. However,
given the exegetical considerations of Sawyer, Baker, Bird, and to a certain extent
Wilder, the more likely message of the Garden Narrative is that the transition from
immaturity to maturity is not simple or straightforward at all. The response-ability to bear
the image of God with a knowledge of good and evil is a vocation harboring a great
variety of occupational hazards, including many of humanity’s own making. This call and
response-ability to co-create means remembering that Yahweh Elohim does not create
through violence. It means re-presenting, though often mis-re-presenting, the creator’s
good intentions. It means opening oneself to hearing those convicting words, “Where is
your brother,” whenever others suffer or perish needlessly (Gen. 4:9). It means striving
penitently and empathetically to make things right or better wherever it is in one’s power
to do so.
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Called up and called out—evolutionary considerations
Viewing these biblical passages and relevant ancient Near Eastern parallels from
a hermeneutical perspective informed by biocultural and emergentist understandings of
human uniqueness and its development helps the 21st century interpreter of scripture to
highlight and magnify (though not necessarily distort) the developmental and dynamic
nature of the image of God in Genesis. The final verses of Genesis 1 present an
ambiguous picture of what it means to bear the image of the creator in and to the rest of
the creation. These verses recount that (Yahweh) Elohim creates a creature—male and
female—who bears the response-ability to carry out the commands that the creator
addresses “to them.” Reading Gen. 1:26-2:4a through the Garden Narrative generates the
inference that the conditions of possibility for bearing the image of God are the results of
a creative process of “forming,” “breathing,” “building,” “eating,” “seeing,” and
“knowing.” The human creatures participate in this process, ultimately emerging from the
garden as co-creators who bear the image of God with a knowledge of good and evil.
A second naïveté interpretation of these processes of creation and co-creation
which describes the ability to discern, construe, and enact God’s good intentions for the
creation as the vocation of behaviorally modern Homo sapiens must incorporate the
understanding that the cognitive fluidity necessary to discern and respond to this calling
is the result of evolutionary processes. The biocultural emergence of humankind’s
response-ability to their environments, to one another, to themselves, and to God was—
and is for every person—the process of having one’s eyes opened to the ambiguous and
ambivalent character of creaturehood. The natural and cultural words have produced
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every value and disvalue for life on earth. The advent of the cognitive-linguistic ability to
translate values into culturally-borne concepts, moral visions, and actions to which
human beings hold one another accountable is also the emergence of a theological
vocation to promote personal, cultural, and ecological wellbeing. Capable of evaluating,
envisioning, and directing ecological and cultural realities, behaviorally modern Homo
sapiens bear a (bioculturally constrained) moral responsibility for the “good” and
“bad/evil” they are able to “see” (discern/locate), to “know” (experience/conceptualize),
and to “create” (imagine/effect). Human-being is constituted by a choice to act as
blessing or curse to one another and other creatures.
Unfortunately, human beings have displayed a deleterious tendency to conflate an
apparently unique ability to assign value and the criteria by which we assign it. That is,
we mistakenly make human beings and human wellbeing the measure of all things, as if
the nonhuman world had only relative value vis-à-vis human flourishing.
Several biblical scholars, including J. Richard Middleton, cast doubt on the
assumption that the Genesis cosmology is unilaterally or irremediably anthropocentric, as
it is often interpreted to be. Analyses of Genesis as ideological critique pit the symbolic
worldview of the primeval history against the exploitative trickle-up theological
cosmology of Enuma Elish and other parallels. If the Garden Narrative gives greater
specificity to the vocation to bear the divine image, the command to “rule over” the land
and its creatures is clarified by the express purpose of humankind (’adam) to “serve”
(‘avad) and “preserve” (shamar) the garden and the earth as source and “ground”
(’adamah) of human-being and wellbeing (Gen. 2:15; 3:23).
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By extension, the biblical concept of “Sabbath” resists the idea that exploiting the
land, animals, and other people is the god-imaging prerogative of the social and religious
elite. According to Enuma Elish, the Babylonian pantheon depends on slave labor to
provide sustenance and the occasion to rest. Conversely, Yahweh Elohim is selfsufficient by comparison, and the creation is self-sustaining enough that members of all
social strata, all species of domesticated animal, and even the land itself must be allowed
to rest (Gen. 2:2-3; Exod. 20:8-11; 23:10-12; cf. Lev. 25:1-12). Over against competing
ideologies, the primeval history and many other texts of the Hebrew Bible reflect a
conscientious shift away from a “Let us take” ethos toward a “Let there be” and “Let us
make” ethos.
In parallel fashion, both an evolutionary worldview and the biblically-based
cosmology it brings into focus are antithetical to the anthropocentric view that the
cosmos is a cache of resources serving human enjoyment and consumption. In Deacon’s
view, rudimentary forms of value and normativity emerged with the first autogenic
(teleodynamic) systems. To live is to bear a values-laden existence. Responding to
various selection pressures, all organisms have a stake in the preservation of biotic
conditions conducive to constraint propagation across all levels of (id)entity constituting
emergent dynamics. In a sense, evolutionary development is a function of the fact that all
life must “subdue” the earth in order to “be fruitful and multiply.”
Such creativity—the kind through which our biocultural species has emerged—is
catalyzed as much by environmental pressures as ecological sustainability and
biodiversity. If bearing the image of the creator God is a call to participate
conscientiously in creatio continua through co-operating with one another and the rest of
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the natural world, should not Homo sapiens of biblically-grounded faith seek to value,
preserve, and enhance the immanent creativity of diverse and sustainable ecosystems?
Should not God-imaging creatures seek just and equitable cultural practices and policies
that acknowledge the equal stake of all human beings in the biocultural future of
humankind? By delimiting the creative potential of persons and their environments,
social injustice and ecological degradation silence the creator’s “Let there be” and distort
the call to bear the image of God in, to, and through the creation.
Knowing good and evil as imaging God with a condition of freedom
Following the ideological trajectory of the Genesis cosmology, if human creatures
bear the image of a God who does not create through violence, the condition of freedom
into which we have emerged calls us first to distinguish between amoral and moral
aspects of created co-creation in an evolving world. On the one hand, nature, red in tooth
and claw is not culpable for the disvalues natural selection produces in catalyzing the
increased complexity and diversity of life. On the other hand, mature, mentally
competent human beings can be morally culpable for actions which lead to the creation’s
inability to sustain its ecological and cultural complexity and diversity in response to
God’s “Let there be.”432
432

While space prohibits a constructive philosophical and/or theological argument on the ethics of animal
use, this perspective bears several implications for many human activities involving the keeping and/or
killing of other animals. Perhaps the most scandalous aspect of Darwinian evolution for Christianity today
is the realization that humanity’s metabolically expensive bodies, brains, and their functioning have
evolved at the expense of other sentient creatures and their once living flesh and bones. In Deacon’s
terminology, if constraint propagation in teleodynamic emergence and evolution is a struggle against disintegration, how does creation through natural selection shed light on Genesis without reintroducing the
Chaoskampf of Enuma Elish, particularly where constraint propagation in one organism involves or
requires preying upon another?
Genesis 3 and 9 seem to be occupied with a similar question. Before eating from the tree of
knowledge there is no mention of animal killing or consumption. In Gen. 1:28-29 only plants are listed on
the menu for human beings and other creatures. Then in Gen. 3:21, God covers humanity’s nakedness with
skins, presumable those of dead animals. And after the flood narrative, in language parallel to that of Gen.
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Now, more than ever before, forgetting or failing to discern that human beings
bear the image of a god who does not create through violence has meant threatening and
even delimiting the earth’s ability to respond to the creator’s “Let there be.” Likewise,
this failure has meant threatening, delimiting, and too often extinguishing other people’s
ability to realize their creative potential. Theologically speaking, bearing a condition of
freedom in God-imaging ways means acknowledging that seeking some “good” (or the
good of some) by willfully, knowingly, and avoidably producing some “bad” for other
people or the environments that sustain them and all other life is creation through
violence, a misuse of the knowledge of good and evil, and a violation of the vocation to
act as co-creators in a very good world.

1:28-29, God places meat on the menu, but only under certain conditions. These verses imply that the
condition of freedom with which human beings bear the image of God generates the cognitive imperative
to specify the conditions under which it is permissible to extinguish sentient life for the purpose of
achieving some other perceived good, such as nourishment.
There is something both noble and tragic about perceiving the need to contextualize the taking of
life for the purpose of sustaining it. Genesis 9:3-6 records that human beings may eat the flesh of another
creature as long as its life—its blood—has been thoroughly drained. These verses also contain much
stronger prohibitions against human bloodshed, for the reason that human beings are created in the image
of God. This passage seems to place theological significance behind the conviction that there is something
disordered about taking the life of a creature that can suffer and something wrong about taking the life of
creature who can suffer existentially. Animals can only become meat when there is no more “life” in them
to continue dying, when they are more like plants than a nefesh chayyah, when they are dust without breath
or blood. Human beings are allowed to take animal life, perhaps because nature eventually does that on its
own, but they are not allowed to take in the life of another creature, to make the source of its life and death
a means of sustenance and a part of themselves. Perhaps the prohibition to consume blood relates to J.
Maxwell Miller’s insight that Gen. 9:6 and its use of “image” (tselem) instead of “likeness” (demut) is an
implicit way of emphasizing that human beings are not created from divine “blood” (dam), as in Enuma
Elish (“In the ‘Image’ and ‘Likeness’ of God,” Journal of Biblical Literature 91 [1972]: 299-302, 304).
These instructions to Noah in Genesis 9 appear to be a ritualized reminder that despite humanity’s failings
it must still image a creator who does not create or sustain life by means of another’s blood.
Admittedly, this principle to avoid blood seems to be at odds with a prima facie understanding of
Israelite sacrificial rites. However, these same cultic practices may uphold an anti-violent theological ethic
in a painfully ironic way—by evoking empathy for victims and repentance for wrongdoing through bloody
spectacle. The role ritualized bloodshed plays in the cultic lives of biblical communities is well beyond the
scope of this study. Its concluding chapter, however, touches upon this topic among several others to which
it may contribute.
432
Gunnlaugur A. Jónsson, The Image of God: Genesis 1:26-28 in a Century of Old Testament Research
(Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell International, 1988), 221-23.
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Facing phenomena such as famine, poverty, war, genocide, and ecological crises,
many recent biblical scholars and theologians lament that some interpretations and
applications of the image of God concept may have motivated attitudes and actions which
have led to environmental degradation and various social ills. A host of presuppositions
underlie this problematic interpretation, including: (1) the commands of Gen. 1:28 to fill
and subdue the earth are universal across time and culture, and (2) imaging God is a form
of “dominion” best expressed in dichotomous “power-over” relationships rather than cooperative, power-sharing relationships—e.g., humanity over against nature, male over
against female, and mind over against matter.433
Offering a more plausible and palatable alternative to this variety of functional
interpretation, Van Huyssteen seeks to “revision the idea of the dominium terrae without
a power-centered and violent anthropocentrism.”434 His dynamic conception of the
“imago Dei as embodied self” relies heavily on Hefner’s created co-creator model and
Middleton’s theological exegesis depicting human creatures as royal representatives of “a
generous creator, sharing power with humans and inviting them to participate in the
creative, historical process with responsibility and care.”435 In short, power-over models
of imaging God misunderstand and misdirect human freedom by their failure to
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Old Testament scholar Gunnlaugur A. Jόnsson has identified this situation as a common side effect of
the functional-royal interpretation of the imago Dei, making the additional historical argument that these
negative ideological and ethical consequences of the functional-royal interpretation have also strengthened
the appeal of the less coherent relational interpretation of the image of God among theologians in the latter
half of the 20th century (The Image of God: Genesis 1:26-28 in a Century of Old Testament Research
[Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell International, 1988], 221-23). Van Huyssteen is among contemporary
theologians wary of functional interpretations of the image. He contends that in response to ecological and
feminist critiques functional-royal interpretations have “been eclipsed” in theological exegesis by relational
and existential readings inspired by Karl Barth (Van Huyssteen, Alone in the World?, 136; cf. 134-38, 15058). Jόnsson does not disagree, in that he notes many holdouts for the relational interpretation in
theological circles, despite recent archeological and textual evidence sparking a resurgence of the
functional-royal interpretation among biblical scholars (223-25).
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acknowledge and appreciate Homo sapiens’ cognitively fluid form of creative freedom as
a particularly complex emergent expression of the freedom and creativity of natural
world in which we live, move, and have our being.
Blending ancient and scientifically-informed concepts, Middleton compares the
creative power of the God who speaks reality into existence in Genesis 1 to a strange
attractor—a dynamical principle of order harnessing the constant pull of entropy for what
in the end could be considered the “very good” purposes of producing novel and
irreducible forms of self-organization, from snowflakes to snowy owls to synapses to
symbolic worlds.436 An emergentist understanding of causal powers like Deacon’s is
conducive to theological, ontological, and ethical understandings that are antithetical to
power-over models of divine and human freedom and creativity. This is not to say that
there is no longer any room in theology for “top-down” explanations for why things do or
ought to happen. Rather, as explained in chapter 3 above, Deacon’s three-tiered
taxonomy of emergent dynamics yields the inference that all supervenient—“topdown”—causal powers in the world, including those constituting human personhood,
derive evolutionarily and diachronically from the “bottom-up.” The human power to
affect nature is also the causal power nature effects.
Viewed from the bottom-up, imaging God with a knowledge of good and evil is
something the creation accomplishes through the emergent dynamics constituting humanbeing. The evolutionary emergence of the human condition of freedom has introduced a
unique kind of responsibility for the ways in which one kind of living being (nefesh
chayyah) positively and negatively affect the wellbeing of one another and the ecological
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and cultural worlds through which they live, move, and have their being. Given the
planetary scope of Homo sapiens’ influence today, the categorical distinctions of value
with which we describe ourselves and our roles in the creation can greatly magnify or
muffle the cosmic call of the creator to “Let there be” a very good world for all kinds of
creatures and everyone who bears the image of God. Awesome response-ability begets
awesome responsibility.
Hefner argues that because all human self-understanding is bioculturally situated
theologians exercise humankind’s God-imaging condition of freedom when reinterpreting
the troubling biblical passage through which generations of religious thinkers have
contextualized humanity’s status and role within the creation. Acknowledging “the
traditional anthropocentrism” with which so many have read the commands Genesis 1:28,
Hefner cautions that no understanding of what it means to bear the image of God is
exempt from the influence of the biocultural milieu through which theological selfdescriptions emerge.437 For him, to bear the image of God is to be a “free creator of
meanings, one who takes actions based on those meanings and is also responsible for
those meanings and actions.”438 To bear the image of God is to be a created co-creator, a
defined self-definer, knowing good and evil. The job description of “created co-creator”
is always a provisional and revisable product of created co-creation conditioned by Homo
sapiens’ morally ambivalent biocultural past, present, and future.
Yet because humankind’s conscientious ability and necessity to discern, construe,
and enact the good are necessarily conditioned, finite, and fallible, the emergence of
human freedom introduces the likelihood—the eventuality—of mistaking the bad for the
437
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good, mistaking the good for the bad, and negatively affecting ourselves, others, and our
environments, both unintentionally and intentionally.439
In this regard, the “conditioned” aspect of humankind’s condition of freedom is
twofold: its exercise is (1) unavoidable and (2) bioculturally emergent. First, we cannot
but make choices with social and ecological repercussions, be accountable for those
choices, and share responsibility for the symbolic worlds environing those choices and
our responses to their consequences. Second, human freedom is further conditioned by
the biocultural history through which it has emerged. As a species and as individuals we
are predisposed to repeat the triumphs and tragedies of our progenitors, but we are also
free to reconsider and recontextualize them in potentially more humanizing ways.
Enabling this condition of freedom, the cognitive fluidity or blending capacity of
the culturally embedded human body-brain-mind is constantly expanding the horizons of
human thought, behavior, and technology—for good and bad. Because more nature
allows more nurture, behaviorally modern Homo sapiens have displayed an unparalleled
ability to articulate, act upon, normalize, analyze, and revise the values at the epicenter of
our experience of and interaction with the world and one another. This dynamic cognitive
and cultural milieu is that through which we know “good” and “evil.” Because this
hermeneutical circle of critical reflection on values, behaviors, and norms is always open
and bioculturally situated, evolutionary psychologists like Cosmides and Tooby predict
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This conception of Christian anthropology also reframes the traditional reading of Genesis 1-3 from
which the doctrines of “Fall” and “original sin” have emerged. For one thing, the biblically-based portrait
of human freedom brought into focus through a natural-scientific lens includes a positive picture of the
knowledge of good and evil. Although humankind’s condition of freedom is wildly ambivalent, it is also
integral to fulfilling the creator’s call to enjoy and augment the goodness of the creation through
cooperative actions across cultures and species in order to preserve the creative potential of a diverse and
sustainable global ecology and human community. Thus, in this second naiveté understanding of Christian
anthropology, ethics is none other than remembering, reinterpreting, re-iterating, and re-presenting, the
creator’s beneficent invitation to “Let there be…” and decision to “Let us make…”
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that Homo sapiens are always inclined toward some bad behaviors.440 The work of
humanizing ourselves is never complete, which is not to say that our efforts to better
ourselves are ultimately unguided or that there are no reasonably universal criteria by
which to judge our progress. Pinpointing some of these loci of moral guidance is the aim
of the next chapter, which analyzes some of the effects of reframing Christian ethics by
means of the scientifically-informed anthropology constructed heretofore. I contend that
within this framework Christian ethics stand to gain intellectual credibility, moral
fruitfulness, and precision in articulating their unique contribution to ethical discourse
and their potential to establish harmonious moral commitments across cultural and
confessional boundaries.
Conclusion
Biblical and evolutionary understandings of human uniqueness and its
development are parallel to one another and do not overlap in any direct way. Yet one
can argue with integrity that it is intellectually and ethically fruitful to integrate biblical,
philosophical, and natural-scientific concepts in order to recontextualize and
reappropriate traditional myth-symbols which remain indispensable for theological selfdescription in academic and ecclesial discourse today. Following the structure of chapter
4, the four sections of this chapter have focused in on some surprising similarities
between ancient mythology and contemporary anthropology. Blending these
understandings has facilitated the construction of a second naïveté conception of the
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knowledge of good and evil that is faithful to both current science and the ideological
trajectory of the biblical witness to which this myth-symbol belongs. Viewing this
concept through the hermeneutical lens of Homo sapiens’ evolutionary emergence, this
chapter has engaged four theses designed to frame the discussion of how the knowledge
of good and evil has emerged in biocultural history as both a concept and the condition of
freedom to which it refers.
The first of these theses claims that the concept of the knowledge of good and evil
is a product of the uniquely human form of cognitive fluidity to which it points. Various
exegetical definitions of this concept have characterized the knowledge of good and evil
as a consequence of disobedience, knowing “right” from “wrong,” sexual knowledge, and
even omniscience. Over against these definitions, and in light of the royal and legal
contexts of biblical parallels, biblical scholars today generally agree that for the writers
and redactor(s) of the primeval history, this myth-symbol refers to a God-like wisdom to
make judgments concerning human welfare. This definition is consonant with the
functional-royal interpretation of the image of God discussed in chapter 4, implying that
the democratization of the royal image of God also includes a democratization of a form
of wisdom usually reserved for the political and religious elite.
Given the inter-cultural conceptual background of the image of God in Genesis,
and following Ricoeur and Westermann, there is good reason to formulate a biblical
definition of the knowledge of good and evil in light of extra-biblical parallels. As with
the emergence of the Priestly understanding of the image and likeness of God, the
conception of the knowledge of good and evil emerging in the primeval history displays a
hermeneutical precedent for faith communities today to develop and reformulate religious
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understandings through a complex collision and collusion of concepts and perspectives.
For Ricoeur the development of a second naïveté perspective recapitulates, in a postcritical manner, the perennial hermeneutical task of faith seeking understanding.
Reappropriating the biblical concept of the knowledge of good and evil along the
ideological trajectory of the primeval history and in light of a biocultural model of Homo
sapiens’ evolutionary emergence is an example of this kind of theological endeavor.
The second thesis holds that in parallel ways biblical and biocultural explanations
of human uniqueness and its development depict the knowledge of good and evil as a
product of nature. As an animated amalgam of dust, breath, and blood, human creatures
are necessarily finite and fallible, and their eyes are opened to a unique knowledge of
good and bad through creaturely purveyors of wisdom—the “crafty” serpent, the tree of
knowledge, and their own response-ability vis-à-vis these created entities, one another,
and God. There are verbal clues in Genesis 1-3 that the garden of Eden is not exactly a
paradise, that the world human creatures must fill and subdue is already immanently
capable of bringing the “good” along with the “bad,” and that an essential aspect of
bearing God’s image in and to the creation is coming “to know good and evil” and to
understand the human capability to make things better or worse for themselves, one
another, and the rest of the world.
An emergentist model of biocultural evolution includes very similar views ripe
for theological appropriation. According to Deacon, the teleodynamic threshold brings
with it the emergence of normativity, because the holistic integrity of dynamically fused
systems is always vulnerable to dis-integration. On a rudimentary level, “good” and
“bad” have emerged in the natural world through autogenesis. The emergence of
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sentience compounds this emergence of values through a perceptive and reactive
awareness of values and disvalues. This emergence of ethical value is further
compounded through the emergence of consciousness, which allows creatures to be
aware of their own awareness. The capacity for recursive reflection on values and
disvalues via language constitutes the emergence of moral wherewithal—the knowledge
of good and evil. For good and ill, the collective and individual moral legacy of human
beings must reflect the fact that this unique capability has emerged in the midst of and as
a result of an evolutionary history beset with cooperation and conflict, joy and suffering,
fulfillment and frustration, good and bad.
The third thesis contends that the knowledge of good and evil is the capstone
component marking human creatures as bearers of the divine image and likeness, because
the vocation to fill, subdue, and rule over the creation (and to recontextualize these roles in
new contexts) requires the response-ability to discern, construe, and enact the creator’s
beneficent intentions for the creation. The interaction with the serpent and the tree of
knowledge in the Garden Narrative encapsulates the ambiguity and ambivalence of
humankind’s response-ability to the creation, to one another, and to God. The perilous
path toward maturity is a exodus from the relative security of the garden, from the
nakedness of innocence (Gen. 2:25) to the nakedness (‘ārum) that comes with the wisdom
(‘ârum) needed to face humankind’s vulnerabilities to temptation, coercion, conflict,
frustration, pain, and death. Bearing the image of God in the world east of Eden means
that in the midst of hardship, human beings are still called to discern and act in concert
with the intentions of a creator who shares power and does not create through violence.
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The fourth and final thesis makes explicit the presupposition underlying the three
theses above that emerging in the image of God with a knowledge of good and evil
entails bearing a condition of freedom uniquely open to the possibilities of encountering
and causing all kinds of good and bad. This condition compels us to justify our actions
and the narratives, concepts, values, and norms we employ to contextualize them. An
evolutionary view of the emergence of human-being implies that God’s creative
interaction with the world is ongoing. Creatio ex nihilo is also creatio continua. Ideally,
this state of affairs means that there are new realizations of the creation’s very good-ness
yet to emerge and that Homo sapiens will take an active and humanizing role in
continuing to co-create a very good world. Bearing the image of a God who does not
create through violence means amplifying and echoing Yahweh Elohim’s invitation to
“Let there be...” It means sharing power and striving to safeguard and/or enhance the
creative potential of all people and their cultural and ecological surroundings. To emerge
in the image of God with a knowledge of good and evil is to be born into a biocultural
milieu through which Homo sapiens are response-able to re-present—though we often
mis-re-present—the creator’s beneficent intentions for the creation.
The next chapter explores some of the ethical implications of this second naïveté
understanding of Christian anthropology. Other theological ethicists and anthropologists
have already constructed similar and harmonious construals of the ambivalent epicenter
of humankind’s moral and religious awareness. By blending what I have identified as
these scholars’ three “(meta-) ethical camps” with one another and the re-presentation of
the image of God and the knowledge of good and evil already discussed, I aim to
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complete the constructive portion of this study by proposing an anthropologically-based
framework for conducting ethical discourse from a Christian theological perspective.
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CHAPTER 6
ETHICS: IMAGING GOD WITH A KNOWLEDGE OF GOOD AND EVIL
The second naïveté understanding of Christian anthropology I have proposed lends itself
to the construction of a fundamental ethical framework that is at once universally human
and particularly Christian in its origins and aims. An ethic of the image of God is a
human ethic, if being human(e) means bearing the image of God. And, an ethic of the
image of God is a Christian ethic, if Jesus of Nazareth is understood to be the revelatory,
exemplary, and eschatological image of God. I have argued that biblical and biocultural
depictions of human uniqueness can be mutually informative and that the integration of
biblical and scientifically informed conceptions of the human condition support the
following theological inferences: (1) the concepts of the image of God and the knowledge
of good and evil have emerged and must reemerge as products of the cognitive fluidity to
which they refer; (2) imaging God and knowing good and evil are natural, dynamic
functions of human-being, wrought of the creation—the world of nature—and embedded
within it; (3) bearing the image of God with a knowledge of good and evil means
emerging with a response-ability—a vocation—to see and serve the primordial goodness
of the creation; and (4) responding to this call is an outworking of humankind’s morally
ambivalent condition of freedom and creativity. Looking back at “the beginning” through
“nature, red in tooth and claw” brings focus to the shadow side of God’s “Let there be…”
in Genesis 1-3. In the only world Homo sapiens have ever known, bearing the image of
God with a knowledge of good and evil is an ongoing struggle through hardship and
temptation to re-present the beneficent intentions of a God who shares power and does
not create through violence.
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This anthropological framework gives ethical discourse a general demeanor, a
direction, and the principles that human beings ought to preserve and augment the
creative potential of the natural world and one another in ways that generate positive
moral outcomes for all people, all living species, and their earthly home. The present
chapter builds upon this framework with the help of several contemporary theological
ethicists, anthropologists, and other scholars who also seek to locate universal
motivations and conditions of possibility for morality, which in turn inform the normative
content of ethics.
I place these ethical thinkers into three camps. The first camp discovers the
impetus and conditions of possibility for morality in the negative experience of suffering,
which helps to indicate, by way of contrast, the positive experience of wellbeing or
salvation. Relying on the insights of theological ethicists Patricia McAuliffe and Edward
Schillebeeckx, I call this first camp the “negative contrast experience” (NCE) camp. The
second camp discerns the impetus and conditions of possibility for morality in a general
and pervasive sense of wonder about the world, a spontaneous “experience of the value
of persons and their environment.”441 Using moral theologian Daniel Maguire’s
terminology, I call this second camp the “foundational moral experience” (FME) camp.
The third camp locates the motives and possibilities for morality in the human ability and
desire to imitate others. In light of works by and indebted to Catholic structural
anthropologist René Girard, I call this third camp the “mimetic desire” (MD) camp. Each
of these camps’ meta-ethical concepts—NCE, FME, and MD—can be described as
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integral and interrelated aspects of what I have defined as the knowledge of good and
evil, and by extension, the image of God.
Working to shape and support to this conceptual framework, I propose that these
three camps provide a contemporary anthropological foundation for Christian ethics, as
they relate to one another in the following four ways:
1) All three camps share the conviction that the human “is” informs the human
“ought.” Anthropology is foundational to the construction of ethical norms and
the procedural frameworks through which they arise and evolve, because human
being, agency, and experience in general entail all the essential motivators and
conditions of possibility for being morally free and responsible in particular and
often predictable ways.
2) Proponents of all three camps argue that their fundamental ethical concept is
constitutive of human-being and agency in a more or less self-evident way. At the
same time, they argue that while the human capacity and propensity for the
conscientious pursuit of both good and evil defy direct empirical observation and
explanation, current scientific and philosophical understandings are able to help
ethicists elucidate the pre-rational psychosomatic infrastructure making possible
the emergence, description, evaluation, sensitization, and orientation of the NCE,
FME, and MD. In other words, these concepts provide powerful explanations of
how and why Homo sapiens became a moral animal—the biocultural is informing
the ethical ought.
3) While the fundamental insights of these three camps are materially different, their
(meta-) ethical contributions are mutually inclusive, complementing one another
and supplementing this study’s contemporized understanding of what it means to
bear the image of God with a knowledge of good and evil.
4) Scholars in the three camps discover their fundamental ethical concepts outside
explicitly theological discourse. Yet they all argue, in a manner resembling a
Ricoeurian wager, that the ethical affinities of the FME, NCE, and MD find firm
footing, humanizing content, and ultimate fulfillment in religious visions of
salvation, particularly those of Christianity.
With subsections framed by these four theses, what follows is an analysis of these
three (meta-)ethical “camps” and their integration with one another and the concepts of
the image of God and the knowledge of good and evil.
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Negative contrast experience (NCE), knowing good and evil, and imaging God
Patricia McAuliffe begins her monograph entitled Fundamental Ethics: A
Liberationist Approach by asserting that “[o]ur fundamental human experience is one of
suffering and struggling against suffering for salvation.”442 Human beings are able to
wage this struggle in terms of “suffering” and “salvation,” she theorizes, because of what
theological ethicist Edward Schillebeeckx calls the “negative contrast experience.”443 For
McAuliffe the NCE is “foundational” for ethics because the “situation of suffering in the
world makes ethics necessary and the contrast experience which propels us to act against
suffering makes ethics possible.”444 Thus, the “first imperative or first principle for
ethics” is “to resist suffering.”445
Because of what it is and what it requires, the NCE blends well with the concepts
of the image of God and the knowledge of good and evil. All of these concepts and the
human condition to which they point emerge out of a values-laden, concrete, and
universal experience of the ambiguity besetting creaturely existence. They all underscore
the moral ambivalence of human agency. They all share a defiant trust in the primordial
goodness of existence, or what McAuliffe calls the “ontological priority of positivity.”446
And, they all require creativity, or “innovativeness” in resisting suffering and envisioning
and promoting various forms of wellbeing or salvation.447
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I have argued that, viewed from the bottom-up, values and norms are bioculturally
borne expressions of the fact that increases in (teleo)dynamic complexity raise the stakes
of their own dis-integration. With varying intensity and quality, every living thing
“wants” to flourish. I have also argued that, viewed from the top-down, humankind’s
creative moral wherewithal ought to take its cues from the conviction that we bear the
image of a creator who “sees” “good” in the worlds of nature and culture, shares power,
and does not create through violence. Similarly, McAuliffe’s bottom-up argument is that
the NCE of “those who experience the contrast most acutely” affords them an
“epistemological privilege […] regarding what is wrong and what would count as getting
it right.”448 From the top-down, she looks to the ethical and eschatological NCE of Jesus
of Nazareth and his disciples for trans-historical horizons fit to orient the NCE and guide
human responses to negativity toward ever more humanizing ends.
NCE as impetus and condition of possibility for ethics
At base, the NCE is an instance of the pain and pleasure principle—the instinct to
avoid pain and seek pleasure (in that order). In an emergentist view of human
phenomenology, the rudiments of the NCE arose with the first teleodynamic entities.
Recall that according to neuroscientist and emergentist Terrence W. Deacon
teleodynamics entail normativity, because when components and processes gain
significance in terms of the whole they constitute, they can either succeed or fail to
achieve their ententional functions vis-à-vis the integrity of the whole. Evolutionary
development is catalyzed by this contrast between systemic integrity and dis-integration.
Selection pressures force organisms to adapt over generations—to get better at
448
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minimizing negativity and maximizing positivity. Ironically, sensation and sentience
emerged, in no small part, because the creature capable of suffering pain and terror stands
a better chance at stopping harm at any given moment and avoiding it in the future.
Therefore, the experience of negativity is good relative to the positivity it presupposes as
remedy. McAuliffe acknowledges this analogy between human and nonhuman struggles
against negativity, if not the organic continuity between them, as a dialectical tension
entailed by evolution. She submits that
the unitary experience of suffering and striving against suffering not only
captures the rhythm of human history, but also, analogically speaking,
captures the rhythm of the cosmos itself. Not only are we called to negate
negation in our science as well as our ethics, but everything in the cosmos
tends to respond in an analogous way. In nature, we can think of this as
the necessity to adapt and seek new equilibrium.449
McAuliffe also notes human experience is uniquely dialectical, consisting of
“both subjective and objective dimensions.”450 Perceptions are always interpreted in light
of past experience, as they are mediated through linguistic concepts formed in a
community of persons.451 As a species of the pain and pleasure principle, the NCE
becomes uniquely human when it is self-conscious, future-oriented, and open to the
possibility of creative, free, and responsible reaction. For human beings “negativity […]
is productive; it reveals the way things are by revealing the way they are not. And it
reveals the way things ought to be by revealing how they ought not to be.”452 The
experience of negativity is always values-laden. The situation of suffering is the
motivation for being moral (i.e., that which “makes ethics necessary”). The agential
avenues open to human persons through their condition of freedom are the conditions of
449
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possibility for acting conscientiously (i.e., that which “makes ethics possible”). In short,
with regard to their knowing good and evil, the NCE can be construed as humankind’s
wide open eyes. Focusing our gaze, reflecting critically, and acting on what we see are
the tasks of ethics.
NCE as self-evidently constitutive of human-being
To say that the NCE gives us ethical eyes predisposing us to see and resist
suffering is both a metaphor and an inference based in intuition. While McAuliffe agrees
with Schillebeeckx that the NCE is the concretely and universally human epicenter of
ethics, she admits:
To say that the negative contrast experience captures the starting point and
core and first imperative of ethics is, in part, to appeal to intuition. But
intuition is based on experience. It involves an appeal to self-evidency but
a self-evidency which […] makes the best sense of our experience of
history whose movement can be defined in terms of suffering and seeking
salvation.453
As both self-evident and fundamentally human, the NCE is what McAuliffe calls an
“anthropological constant.”454 This constitutive aspect of human existence and agency
implies that, despite the presence of tendencies to the contrary, human persons tend to be
ethical—resisting suffering and seeking wellbeing, often before conscious ethical
deliberation.455
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Listing Schillebeeckx’s anthropological constants, McAuliffe begins with four
phenomenological givens of human existence: “our relationship to our body and nature,
to other humans, to social structures and institutions, and to our spatio-temporal
context.”456 The final three anthropological constants, which have specifically to do with
the “contrast” aspect of the NCE, are that these first four “involve the interplay between
theory and practice, a commitment to the basic goodness of life, and finally, the synthesis
of all these.”457
However, some individuals are unable to live out of these anthropological
constants in a conscientious way, requiring assistance, accommodation, or perhaps even
institutionalization in order that they and those around them can enjoy as positive an
existence as possible. Some human beings experience psychosomatic impairments, which
limit their ability to identify, combat, and/or cope with negativity without the ongoing
advocacy and aid of others. Many more people struggle under cultural or socio-economic
conditions which make it difficult or impossible to combat or perhaps even name the
dehumanizing sociological and psychological dynamics in which they find themselves.
For McAuliffe, because the NCE emerges through the socially interdependent context in
which it functions, the experience of negativity ought to evoke sensitivity to the suffering
of others and social solidarity in combating negativity with deliberation, diligence, and
creativity.458
Viewed in this light, the universality of the NCE has to do not only with the
“fundamental” part of McAuliffe’s ethics, but also her “liberationist approach.” If the
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NCE provides the motivation and possibility for the universal norm to alleviate suffering,
it stands to reason that those who live “out of the negative contrast most acutely, [i.e.,]
the poor, the oppressed, and those in solidarity with them,” ought to possess an
epistemological privilege in ethical discourse and a primary place in moral
consideration.459
Relating this principle to the concepts of the image of God and the knowledge of
good and evil, mere subsistence is not conducive to evoking or sustaining the full creative
potential of persons and their environments. People preoccupied with simply surviving or
barred systemically from enriching forms of education, interaction, and amusement are
limited in their capability and opportunity to hear and respond to their creator’s invitation
to participate in co-creating the future. Impoverishment is an affront to the image of God
and the God whose image we bear, because, as McAuliffe words it, “The destitute are
furthest removed from full humanity.”460 Injustices of this kind are tantamount to creation
through violence. Therefore, if Homo sapiens bear the image of a God who invites
participation and does not create through violence, the image of God is a liberating
image, and an ethic of the image is a liberating ethic. This is certainly the contention of
biblical scholar J. Richard Middleton, whose anti-violent interpretation of the image of
God supports the “ethic of interhuman relationships and ecological practice we are
aiming for and that is rooted in the imago Dei, an ethic characterized fundamentally by
power with rather than power over.”461
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NCE as pointing to its positive counterpart
Although negativity “reveals the way things ought to be by revealing how they
ought not to be,” the conceptual content of positivity or salvation is not self-evident.462
At the same time, those who experience negativity most deeply, have a keen, if intuitive,
sense of what is most valuable.463 This sensitivity to what is valuable can spark insight
into what is most normative. Creating an accurate portrait of both negativity and
positivity requires critical reflection on the history of human experience and practice—a
“hermeneutical circle” of combating suffering, reflecting upon those efforts,
reconfiguring one’s approach, and combating suffering again.464
Yet, in this constant struggle against suffering, the negation of negativity cannot
be the ultimate aim of ethics. The remaining void must be filled with something positive
and concrete, because the NCE as a contrast experience presupposes an actual opposite to
the experience of negativity. As McAuliffe puts it, while there is a self-evident
“epistemological priority” of negativity, this experience “presupposes the ontological
priority of positivity.”465 Giving concrete content to this positivity or salvation requires
“innovativeness” and carries a natural affinity for religious visions of salvation, since
eschatological visions of positivity negate all negativity.466
With its insistence that the creation is “good” and “very good,” Genesis 1 reflects
a similar faith in what McAuliffe calls the ontological priority of positivity. This biblical
passage also intimates the capability and necessity for human beings to be creative or
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innovative in facing the challenges associated with “filling” and “subduing” the earth.
Beginning with the Garden Narrative, the remainder of the primeval history dramatizes
some of the kinds of struggles human creatures can expect to face and/or cause—
dangerous animals, arduous labor, physical pain, abuses of power, jealousy, violence,
despair, confusion, and death. The biblical writers seem keen to preserve the primordial
goodness of creator and creation, by implying that Yahweh Elohim is not the immediate
source of these negative realities. As explicated in chapter 5, these hardships emerge
from the shadow side of God’s “Let there be…,” from the open-endedness of the
creation’s ability to sustain itself and the ambivalence of human freedom. Yet if the
creator is not the immediate source of negativity, it would also seem that God is not the
immediate object of human efforts to (co-)create positivity.
Like McAuliffe’s bottom-up approach to theological ethics, this reading of
Genesis “in some fundamental ways, turns classical ethics upside down.”467 When
viewed from the bottom-up, the image of God and the knowledge of good and evil are
bioculturally emergent. They are wrought of the creation and embedded within it for the
benefit of the creation, not the creator. As a consequence, re-presenting the beneficent
intentions of a god who does not create through violence is a service rendered directly to
the creation and ultimately (though indirectly) to the creator. Theological ethics add this
top-down element of ultimacy to concepts like suffering, struggle, sin, and salvation,
which emerge out of the NCE from the bottom-up.
Though not directly in dialogue with McAuliffe, theologian Marjorie Suchocki
gives a similar, and perhaps more systematic, set of reasons for why and how the
traditional definition for the theological category of negativity known as “sin” must be
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turned upside down. Suchocki redefines sin in terms of violence and in contradistinction
to Augustinian-Niebuhrian definitions. The more traditional conception characterizes sin
as first and foremost a rebellion against God. By contrast, Suchocki contends that
“violence is the destruction of well-being”468; “sin is the participation through intent or
act in unnecessary violence that contributes to the ill-being of any aspect of earth or its
inhabitants.”469 These definitions of sin in terms of violence and violence in terms of
human and ecological ill-being blend well with this study’s second naïveté interpretation
of the image of God and the knowledge of good and evil, especially in its reliance on
Middleton’s anti-violent functional-royal reading of the imago Dei in Genesis.
By redefining sin in terms of the ill-being of creation and by eschewing the
traditional definition of sin as rebellion against God or the divine will, Suchocki seems to
propose an a-theistic definition of “sin.” Her justification for this redefinition correlates
to the insight that the reasons for being moral are not immediately theological, because
God is not the primary object of actions that lead to well- or ill-being. She lists four
reasons why sin is first rebellion against creation and only derivatively against God.
First, one can account for the emergence of humanity’s “vertical” orientation to
the infinite from within creation.470 Theologians in dialogue with current, non-reductive
conceptions of evolutionary science endeavor to make plausible the idea that the ultimate
condition of possibility for Homo sapiens’ ability to conceive of and communicate with
the divine is the actuality of a creator God. At the same time, they must admit, as does
interdisciplinary theologian J. Wentzel van Huyssteen, that human self-transcendence in
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the form of religious or theological consciousness is explicable on a natural-historical
level.471
Second, self-transcendence is also social in nature.472 This “horizontal” selftranscendence includes three aspects: (1) Past—the emergence of the self through
memory; (2) Present—the empathic recognition of others as other selves; and (3)
Future—the creative imagining of what is ethically possible.473
Third, for Suchocki, the human person is accountable within creation.474
Similarly, according to McAuliffe, any concrete vision of the ontologically prior
positivity calling humanity to moral action must integrate an awareness that human
persons are intrinsically embodied and socially interdependent creatures. In most cases,
what is best for the individual in the long-term is that which is best for others and their
environment. Therefore, any viable vision of salvation to which we might hold one
another accountable must emerge out of an anthropology of social solidarity designed to
articulate and promote the wellbeing of all Homo sapiens and their earthly home.475
Fourth, therefore, violation of this accountability is first a violation against
creation.476 However, to say that sin is first a violation against creation is not to say that it
is only against creation. Self-consciousness, empathy, and future orientation are
conditions of possibility for both ethics and religion. In non-pantheistic religion, where
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deity is immanent to but ontologically distinct from the creation, (incarnation not
withstanding) God can only be a mediate or derivative object of moral action.477
Therefore, even as an anthropological concept, “sin” is already a theological
category in Suchocki’s case, because her argument constitutes a hermeneutical circle. For
Suchocki, an anthropologically-based fundamental ethics presupposes a radical
distinction between creator and creation, which in turn allows religion and theology to
exert a transformative influence on such an ethic. The emergence in natural history of
human moral and religious consciousness allows human beings to recognize what they
perceive to be the divine revelation of qualitatively unique visions of wellbeing which
exceed the immanent capacities of biology and culture. Suchocki, McAuliffe, and I share
a belief that because ethical responsibility emerges within a context that “exceeds the
practical ability of any one person, or any one human system” to remedy, moral
awareness has a natural affinity for religious visions of salvation.478
I propose that a bottom-up, emergentist understanding of the image of God and
the knowledge of good and evil is a fruitful framework for re-theologizing and remythologizing the concepts of sin and salvation. As I have constructed it, a biocultural
conception of Christian anthropology satisfies and extends Suchocki’s theses that the
“vertical” and “horizontal” aspects of human-being emerge through natural process, that
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the conscientious response-ability or condition of freedom enabled by humankind’s selftranscendence make us accountable within the creation, and that sinful acts are therefore
a violation of the creation and the vocation of human beings to bear the image of a
creator who invites participation, shares power, and does not wield it violently.
“Religion has an ethical foundation, but ethics cries out for religion”—Patricia McAuliffe
McAuliffe admits, along with Schillebeeckx, that the non-theist is able to give a
valid, concrete vision of the positive sphere of moral action, with the caveat that human
efforts can never overcome negativity completely.479 Homo sapiens will always lack the
capacity to eradicate the inevitability of experiencing and causing harm. Only a religious
vision can give an account of ultimate or eschatological salvation, which preserves
humanity’s moral accomplishments and compensates for its missteps.480 For example,
McAuliffe lists the contrast between Jesus’ Abba experience and his rejection and
crucifixion, the NCE of disciples from Good Friday to Easter, and the NCE of the
already-but-not-yet character of the Kingdom of God as offering concrete content to a
Christian vision of negativity and salvation.481 While all these instances of the NCE are
recorded in the New Testament canon, the background concepts that give content to
Christian visions of salvation in the first century are vastly different from those of the 21st
century, as are the historical-cultural contexts in which these concepts emerge and
influence action. With all due respect for (and appeal to) the organic continuity of the
first Christian communities and the churches of today, the hermeneutical pursuit of living

479

McAuliffe, Fundamental Ethics, 16, 20, 195-96.
Ibid., 19-27; 118-67.
481
Ibid., 169-71, 200-01.
480

243

out of these Biblical symbols in the present and future requires as much discernment,
imagination, creativity, and faithfulness now as it did then.482
Because McAuliffe describes the NCE as an anthropological constant able to
account for the human ability and tendency to make and abide by valid moral distinction
and sanctions prior to any religious considerations, she characterizes the relationship of
religion or theology to ethics as one of “nonreciprocal dependence.”483 Religion needs
ethics, but ethics does not need religion, even if ethics does tend toward a religious view
of ultimate salvation.
As conditioned but creative, free, and responsible agents, human persons are able
to judge which religions and which aspects of those religions best fit their NCE by the
ways in which each tradition describes and promotes the fullest possible flourishing of
persons and their world. Orthodoxy unable to fulfill this task fails the moral outcome
criterion for truthfulness—a hermeneutical principle McAuliffe gleans from the Jesus of
the Gospels in his insistence that “the Sabbath was made for humans, not humans for the
Sabbath.”484 Jesus’ revelatory mission and identity are not self-evident. They become
apparent to those able to latch onto his theological ethic beholden to human flourishing,
in contrast to a vision of human flourishing beholden to a pre-established and inflexible
theological ethic.485 According to McAuliffe, as a human revelation of the divine, Jesus’
unwitting response to Plato’s famous Euthyphro dilemma is that the viability of
religiously-based norms is a function of their ability to produce good. Orthopraxy (right
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practice) is a criterion for orthodoxy (right belief). The hermeneutical circle out of which
theological ethics emerge demands creative and critical reflection on belief and practice.
Given the spirit of shared responsibility surrounding the biblically-based concepts
of bearing the image of God and Christ in and to the creation, McAuliffe argues
reasonably that humankind’s biocultural and eschatological futures are affected by
human efforts to plumb the depths of our creative capacities in pursuit of humanizing
moral visions. In language echoing that of theologian Philip Hefner’s theological theory
of the created co-creator, she concludes, “Humans are seen as utterly valuable because of
the kind of being they are, because of the kinds of things they can and sometimes do.
Humans are also seen as valuable because they are co-creators with God of a better
world, and because they help to shape the eschaton.” 486 This belief is distilled in the
familiar supplication, “God’s will be done, on earth as in heaven.”
Foundational moral experience (FME), knowing good and evil, and imaging God
“God saw all that [God] had made, and behold, it was very good” (Gen. 1:31a).
“Then the Lord God said, ‘Behold, the [hu]man has become like one of Us, knowing
good and evil’” (Gen. 3:22a). As a prelude to the Garden Narrative, the repeated message
to those charged with the challenge to “fill,” “subdue,” and “rule over” the creation is that
the world is “good,” that it takes bright light to cast dark shadows. The shadows are
where the light is not, where it has been obscured or blocked from view. Evolutionarily
speaking, the emergence of vision presupposes the presence of light. Having eyes open
wide to a cognitively fluid knowledge of “bad” presupposes sensitization to the “good.”
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The FME is the background experience of “knowing good” implicit in every instance of
“knowing evil.”
FME as impetus and condition of possibility for ethics
As Daniel Maguire defines the FME:
The foundational moral experience is the experience of the value of
persons and their earthly home in this universe. This profound valueexperience is the distinctively human and humanizing experience that
marks us as human. It is the primordial “Wow!” from which all moral
theory and all healthy law, politics, and religion derive. This experience is
the seed of civilization, the root of culture, and the badge of unique human
consciousness.487
Ethics is nothing other than the critical application of the FME to concrete reality. The
reason for being moral is that human beings have a spontaneous sense of the intrinsic and
inestimable value of life, the world upon which it depends, and through which it has
come into being.
Christian ethicist James Gustafson and expert on religion and ecology Mary
Evelyn Tucker also appeal to something like Maguire’s FME when evoking
anthropologist Melvin Konner’s concept of the human “sense of wonder.”488 For the
purposes of this study, I equate the concepts of the FME and sense of wonder. Imagining
the dawn of human wonder, Konner surmises that for one animal,
perhaps ten million years ago, in the earliest infancy of the human spirit,
something in the natural world must have evoked a response like this
one—a waterfall, mountain vista, a sunset, the crater of a volcano, the
edge of the sea—something that stopped it in its tracks and made it watch,
and move, and watch, and move, and watch again; something that made it
return to the spot, though nothing gainful could take place there, no
feeding, drinking, reproducing, sleeping, fighting, fleeing, nothing animal.
487
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In just such a response, in just such a moment, in just such an animal, we
may, I think, be permitted to guess, occurred the dawn of awe, of sacred
attentiveness, of wonder.489
Seeming to echo Maguire’s definition of the FME, Gustafson quotes Konner in
describing the sense of wonder as the “hallmark of our species” and the “central feature
of the human spirit.”490 As uniquely human, this sense of wonder constitutes the reason
for being morally responsible and indicates the capacity to act upon this response-ability.
At the same time, Maguire and Gustafson hold that the FME/sense of wonder is nascent
in two senses of the word—it is both inborn and requires nurturing, development, and
maturation. Human beings must work to enhance the FME if it is to be not only human
but humanizing, as well.491
Konner anticipates these ethicists’ concerns, wondering in the face of what he has
called “biological constraints on the human spirit”—rage, fear, lust, gluttony—whether
human beings can maintain and augment a sense of wonder through the positive
indicators of our common humanity—joy, love, and yes, even grief.492 Each of these
biologically-borne constraints on the human spirit evolved as adaptive responses to
specific selection pressures in Homo sapiens’ environment of evolutionary adaptedness
(EEA). However, as evolutionary biologist Francisco Ayala, cognitive linguists Gilles
Fauconnier and Mark Turner, and theologians like Hefner and van Huyssteen have all
theorized, Homo sapiens reached a symbolic threshold, a degree of blending capacity or
cognitive fluidity from which precipitated cultural singularities like ethics and religion,
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which have afforded the human spirit a condition of freedom—a supervening influence
on its less desirable proclivities. In hope against hope, Konner
would paraphrase it this way: Human beings are irrevocably, biologically
endowed with strong inclinations to feel and act in a manner that their own
good judgment tells them to reprehend—that is, if they are in the least
capable of sympathy with the suffering of other human creatures, or if
they have any sense of the joy and order and beauty of life. The judgment,
the sympathy, the sense of joy and order and beauty—all these evolved for
other purposes than to save the human species from a protracted, dissolute
destruction. Yet there they are. Can we not turn them now to this latter
purpose?493
And just as importantly, how might we do so? I strongly suggest that a second
naïveté reappropriation of the imago Dei concept may offer a fruitful framework
for serving “this latter purpose,” because an ethic of the image emerges out of the
conviction that human creatures have been (co-)created and called to display a
sacred attentiveness—a sense of wonder—reflecting that of the creator. A
contemporized ethic of the image yields the principle that human beings bear a
response-ability to “see” and “serve” the very-good-ness of the world which has
evolved to include and environ human creativity.
FME as self-evidently constitutive of human-being
Mirroring McAuliffe’s description the NCE, Maguire and Gustafson concede that
the FME or sense of wonder is not empirically demonstrable or provable, but that it can
be “illustrated.”494 Maguire holds that “the supreme sacrifice” of dying for the sake of
another’s wellbeing often garners widespread approval and admiration. The evolutionary
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paradox of such altruism may offer a radical illustration of the FME and its pride of place
in fundamental ethics.495
Similarly, Gustafson acknowledges that the human sense of wonder cannot be
observed or proven directly through empirical methods. Yet he maintains that its
universality can be established “heuristically” through the anecdotal “data” of narrated
human “experience.”496 On the one hand, Gustafson admits that the sense of wonder is
“something of human experience which, [he thinks, Konner] has not fully backed by the
same kind of data he uses in his examination of rage, lust, love, etc.”497 On the other
hand, Gustafson provides two criteria of truthfulness which seem to make a strong case
for Konner’s concept: (1) explanatory power and (2) moral outcome.498 A hermeneutic of
wonder is able to shed light on the course of human history and prehistory and may also
help to adjudicate what counts as a positive moral outcome.
As in McAuliffe’s “liberationist approach,” Gustafson and Maguire’s approaches
to ethical discourse constitute a hermeneutical circle. Wonderment begets and/or
discloses value for its object; value drives action; and action begs for contextualization—
i.e., critical reflection on historical praxis. Ideally, this hermeneutical exercise sensitizes
and orientates the FME in ways that guide ethical discourse toward greater explanatory
power and positive moral outcomes, especially in the eyes of those with reasonable
claims of epistemological privilege. In other words, in terms of consistency, coherence,
and comprehensiveness, the outcome sought from this hermeneutical circle is moral truth,
ripe for translation into norms to which we might hold one another accountable.
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FME as pointing to its negative counterpart
When piqued, the FME intimates what kinds of experiences, actions, and
consequences are most humanizing. However, the FME needs to be developed and
enhanced because the human sense of wonder is so often scandalized, and it is conditioned
by biological constraints and historical-cultural situatedness. Turns of events and human
actions do not always promote the wellbeing or wholesomeness of persons and their
environment. And yet, human beings are not automatically aware of or sensitive to what is
valuable or the most humanizing means of seeking wellbeing. In theological terms, there
are no such things as a life that does not bring some “bad” along with the “good” or an impeccable knowledge of good and evil. This ambivalence necessitates ethics.
Given this state of affairs, I find good reason to equate the scandalization of the
FME with the NCE. Relating these two concepts in this way shows their
complementarity. McAuliffe has described well this complementarity in terms of the
epistemological priority of negativity as a contrast experience vis-à-vis the ontological
priority of positivity.
The complementarity of the FME and NCE is also apparent in an number of
literary contexts. Illustrating the importance of heuristic data for establishing the
truthfulness of the sense of wonder, Gustafson mentions that that Konner, aside from his
scientific skills, is adept at synthesizing this body of knowledge with literary analysis.499
Womanist ethicist Stacey M. Floyd-Thomas also incorporates literary analysis into her
systematic discussion of methods in womanist ethics.500 What literary analysis provides
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for these scholars is character development—both in the sense of the fictional character
mediated through narrative and the moral character of the reader. The exploits of literary
heroines and heroes display and elicit an affinity for admirable values and personal
qualities. However, this sympathetic piquing of the FME is always accomplished against
the backdrop of adversity—the NCE. According to Floyd-Thomas, in womanist ethics and
the Black women’s literary tradition, negativity most often arises as a collusion of race,
gender, and class discrimination. Because the authors of these narratives have firsthand
experience of these dehumanizing forms of negativity, they have a reasonable claim of
epistemological privilege for identifying them and constructing strategies of resistance.
These heuristic examples demonstrate that it is not only the FME, but also the
scandalization of it (i.e., the NCE), that make ethics possible and necessary. As Gustafson
observes, there are moral dimensions of nearly all human experience.501 Human beings
are involved, willy-nilly, in a values-laden matrix of social and ecological interaction and
interdependence. When experience does not coincide with values, the cognitive
dissonance calls for a response. Analyzing and evaluating this response, whether before
or after the fact, is ethics.
This description of the human condition begs the question of precisely how
theological concepts frame the moral matrix of human experience and action. What do the
concepts of the image of God and the knowledge of good and evil add to ethics that cannot
be gotten by other means? In Gustafson’s terms, exactly how “can ethics be Christian?”502
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FME at the “intersections” of science, theology, and ethics
Maguire constructs a procedural model for engaging in ethical discourse. His
“wheel model” centers on the four interpretive and evaluative “hub” questions of (1)
“What?”; (2) “Why?-How?-Who?-When?-Where?”; (3) “Foreseeable effects?”; and (4)
“Viable alternatives?”503 Informing responses to these questions are the “spokes” of
“affectivity,” “creative imagination,” moral “principles,” sources cited for their
“authority,” “reason” and “analysis”, “individual experience,” “group experience,”
“comedy,” and “tragedy.” These sources all inform the moral choices and characters of
individuals and communities.
For Maguire the “spokes” informing one’s responses to the “hub” questions of the
wheel model may be religious or not. The FME, as an intuitive experience of what is
valuable or sacred, “is also the foundational religious experience,” but it need not be
developed in a theistic way in order to generate valid moral insights.504 Similarly,
Gustafson acknowledges that natural piety does not always entail or lead to religious
piety.505 Yet, like McAuliffe, Maguire and Gustafson both find advantages (as well as
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some potential pitfalls) in looking to religion for a trans-historical vision of the
fulfillment of the FME and its dynamism, because only a theological vision of salvation
can offer eschatological faith and hope for the final negation of all negativity and the
fulfillment of all flourishing. Gustafson lists some of the specific images and symbols
biblical Christian faith offers as reasons for being moral.506 These motivators include the
experience of God as creator, redeemer, revealer, merciful lover, shepherd, master,
exemplar to be imitated, eternal, father, and ground of hope.507 Translating these religious
symbols into moral motivators, Gustafson observes that piety toward this God can garner
“a sense of dependence,” “a sense of gratitude,” “a sense of repentance,” “a sense of
obligation,” “a sense of possibilities,” and “a sense of direction.”508
The myth-symbols of the image of God and the knowledge of good and evil are
able to prompt all of these (and/or other) theocentric expressions of a sense of
wonder/FME. In this vein, and without yet paying due attention to a Christologicaleschatological account of the image of God, I have already suggested that bearing the
image of God with a knowledge of good and evil confers a sense of vocation to co-create
cooperatively a biocultural and ecological future reflecting the beneficent intentions of a
creator God who shares power with created entities and does create through violence.
Fulfilling this call requires (pre)serving and extending the creative potential human
beings and the natural world, that in doing so we might amplify and echo the creator’s
“Let there be…” and “Let us make…,” in order that we and future generations might look
on the human and nonhuman world and utter, “Behold, it is very good.” Working out the
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specifics of this job description in a particularly Christian manner takes critical reflection
on human experience, action, and understanding.
In orthodox varieties of Christian discourse, this hermeneutical practice must
involve critical reflection on the human experiences and actions of God through Jesus
Christ, as depicted in the New Testament and the church’s theological tradition. Looking
to the human revelation of God for insight into what is humanizing helps give shape to a
human ethic with an eschatological horizon of wellbeing or salvation. This is not to say
that a Christian-human ethic and an a-theistic-humanist ethic will not ultimately be
commensurable on the bases of explanatory power and moral outcome. Indeed, they
ought to be.509 It is to say, however, that an eschatological view of history, such as in
Christianity, enables the emergence of an ethic that is qualitatively unique in its
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accountability to a co-created, trans-historical future in which all negativity really does
become negated.
At the same time, when attempting to understand what kind of creatures human
beings are and ought to be, religious scholars and people of faith often need outside help.
On their own, natural scientists can no more propose or preclude an eschatological vision
of salvation than theologians can analyze the influence of biology on behavior.
Nonetheless, scientific descriptions of reality may have a revisionary bearing on certain
doctrinal formulations, theological anthropology, and theological ethics, especially where
contemporary science provides greater explanatory power than traditional doctrinal
formulae and the conceptual frameworks in which they operate.510
On the flipside, the natural sciences sometimes need outside help when brushing
up against the limits of their own expertise. A classic case is that of altruistic behavior,
especially in cases involving what Maguire has called “the ultimate sacrifice.” In
biological terms, trans-kin altruism involves risking or reducing one’s likelihood of
survival and/or reproduction in order to enhance these opportunities for a genetic
competitor. And in evolutionary terms, this type of behavior is a surd for a species like
Homo sapiens. Many evolutionary psychologists argue persuasively that there are likely
selection pressures for cooperative and generous behaviors among non-kin. However,
even some of the most altruistic-looking behaviors studied presuppose an expectation of
immediate or future reciprocity, a campaign of reputation building, and/or a social system
510
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of policing against freeloading and other forms of cheating.511 These scientists
acknowledge that Darwinian “values” cannot fully account for human ethics, particularly
where behaviors that may not result in any benefit for the actor come to be regarded as
good or even exemplary.512 Producing constraints on human behavior not reducible to
their genetic bases, cultural values supervene upon Darwinian dynamics. Explaining how
Homo sapiens became culturally-constituted creatures, the natural sciences can help us
understand how it has become possible for human beings to behave unselfishly, but not
why it might be “good” to do so, or “evil” to behave otherwise. This knowledge of good
and evil emerges from the cultural pole of our biocultural nature. Writing about the
ambivalent nature of aggression, evolutionary psychologist Anne Campbell concludes:
Cultural learning is more than acquiring new behaviors as it is in other
primates. The human abilities to assume an intentional stance, form
symbolic mental representations, and communicate by language allow us
to transmit values about behaviors, modify these evaluations as a function
of context, entertain multiple interpretations of the same event, and even
dispute the legitimacy of these various representations.513
Likewise, to repeat Hefner, God’s image is borne through “the character of Homo sapiens
as free creator of meanings, one who takes actions based on those meanings and is also
responsible for those meanings and actions.”514 Human meanings and actions transcend
their immediate contexts when set against a theistic backdrop. Theological and
eschatological motivations for behavior can create new horizons for the moral
imagination and any actions emerging from it. For example, Hefner argues convincingly
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“that altruism beyond kin is transmitted culturally, not genetically, and that religious
traditions are the chief carriers of this value.”515
I have argued along with Hefner that theological accounts “of what is, of how
things really are”—including second naïveté reappropriations of key myth-symbols—
open up novel vistas for human values that can promote humanizing behavior.516
Specifically, this hermeneutical dynamic lends credibility to the love command—the
biblical imperative to love selflessly one’s neighbor and enemy out of a love for God
rooted in that God’s love (agape, charitas) for humankind revealed in Jesus of Nazareth.
According to Hefner, despite any and all counter-indicators to what McAuliffe would call
the ontological priority of positivity,
This background conviction is powerful affirmation that our moral action
of love for God and neighbor is our way of living in harmony with the
way things really are. The total [myth-ritual-praxis] complex—the love of
God for us and our love for God and for the neighbor—puts in place the
all-encompassing symbolic universe that drives the Christian tradition. It
establishes that the fullness of the Christian proposal functions
unmistakably as myth is supposed to function.517
The concept that Homo sapiens bear the image and likeness of God/Christ with a
knowledge of good and evil is a key gravitational force in this symbolic universe, able to
steer the trajectory of human self-understanding and the actions it motivates and justifies.
In Maguire’s wheel model of ethical discourse, this conceptual framework provides
content for the “spokes” informing human responses to the “hub” questions raised by the
foundational moral experience of having our eyes open to the “good” and the “bad.”
Through interpretation, these myth symbols retain and renew their ability to shape the
creative imagination, analytical reason, ethical principles, human affections, individual
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and corporate experience, loci of moral authority, and our senses of tragedy and comedy.
Whether implied or expressed, Gustafson and Hefner’s Ricoeurian wager is that Christian
conceptions of what really is, when applied to something like Maguire’s wheel model,
may be especially morally fruitful in terms of their explanatory power and positive moral
outcomes.518 Or, as Hefner phrases it, through interpretation, the perennial myth-symbols
of Christianity may gain renewed ability “to provide genuine knowledge of reality, for
the sake of our wholesome living.”519
Because bearing the image of God has come to be understood as something
modeled first in God’s beneficent creativity and self-giving love, the concept of mimesis
is an important analytical tool for understanding how the desire to help create a very good
world can take root and bear fruit.
Mimetic desire (MD), knowing good and evil, and imaging God
Mimesis, a Greek term meaning “imitation,” has come to bear great
anthropological, meta-ethical, and exegetical significance. Catholic structural
anthropologist René Girard is renowned for his analyses of the interconnections among
mimesis, desire, conflict, violence, ritual, and religious myth. Social and natural scientists
today have built upon this legacy, exploring the neuro-cognitive roots of mimesis and
their vital roles in human development, behavior, learning, creativity, and even moral
motivators like empathy. Unearthing many of the pillars of ancient Near Eastern,
Middleton locates conflicting notions of mimesis at the heart of what it means to bear the
image of God in both Mesopotamian and biblical ideologies. Taken together, these
scholarly developments in various disciplines disclose how mimesis propels the NCE518
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FME as a condition of possibility for ethics, which is both emblematic of humankind’s
ambivalent condition of freedom and able to be directed toward potentially humanizing
ends through theological (re)appropriation. As an anthropological concept framing
Christian understandings of why and how to be moral, the imago Dei must be understood
as the imitatio Dei and imitatio Christi.
MD as impetus and condition of possibility for ethics
Mimetic desire can be described as the coin of which the NCE and FME are the
two sides. The FME and NCE are able to account for the conditions of possibility
required to pursue and remain accountable to culturally defined conceptions of wellbeing
and ill-being—of good and evil. However, these concepts do little to explain why most
people experience a profound sense of scandal at the suffering of another person or
sentient being, why the negative experiences of non-kin and even non-humans would
evoke empathy or sympathy or compassion, why so many are blessed and cursed with a
nagging desire to love their neighbors as themselves. The concept of mimetic desire may
help to explain the “I feel your pain” aspect of human-being that drives the FME-NCE in
other-seeking directions.
Like negativity and a sense of wonder, desire indicates the perception of value by
revealing those individuals perceived to be model persons, whether because of their
comforts, character, appearance, possessions, power, privileges, knowledge, abilities, or
relationships. The human ability and drive to imitate or mimic (and attempt to become) a
model is what Girard calls “mimetic desire”—a desire “directed toward an object desired
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by the model.”520 Girard holds that, as uniquely human, MD generates the possibility for
adaptability and creativity that extends far beyond the behavioral potential presented by
instinct and learning to other animal species.521 Wanting to be like another who portrays
or possesses a perceived good, and the ability to become like that person, are necessary
motivations and conditions of possibility for being moral. As Girard observes, “Without
mimetic desire there would be neither freedom nor humanity. Mimetic desire is
intrinsically good.”522 At the same time, MD is ethically ambivalent. Mimesis makes
possible both technology and torture, cooperation and conflict, empathy and envy,
compassion and covetousness, good and evil.
Analyzing the psychological and sociological underpinnings of archaic religion,
Girard argues that MD made it possible and seemingly necessary to sacrifice or otherwise
scapegoat human beings in order to sublimate the violence brought about by the conflicts
incited by MD in a limited goods society. Turning to biblical literature, Girard argues
persuasively that mimetic desire prompted Cain to kill his brother Abel, Joseph’s brothers
to sell him into slavery, and the religious and political elite to crucify Jesus of Nazareth.
Conversely, mimetic desire also allows and propels people of faith to be imitators,
followers, disciples of Christ and models of God-imaging intentions and actions.
MD as self-evidently constitutive of human-being
In one historical or literary example after another, Girard exposes a disturbing
human tendency to fall into a mimetic cycle of violence, which then makes its way into
520
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religious myth and ritual.523 This mythic cycle of violence can be characterized as a
sacrificial version of what Hefner describes with more optimism as the myth-ritual-praxis
complex.524 Girard, however, focuses on human praxis that has yielded very different—
though not unrelated—kinds of myth and ritual than the Judeo-Christian varieties on
which Hefner focuses. According to Girard, sacrificial rites and the mythologies
subserving them begin in the desire to have what a model has, to act as a model acts, and
thus to be as a model is. Where the desired object or role is exclusive or privative, desire
breeds rivalry, rivalry breeds conflict, conflict breeds violence, violence breeds more and
more and more violence, until society verges on collapse.
The stopgap to this cycle is to find a surrogate victim for mimetic violence—a
scapegoat or sacrifice—that satisfies vicariously, if temporarily, the perceived need to
oust one’s rivals. The pacifying effects of the sacrifice or lynching or witch hunt
produces a lull in civil unrest, which becomes attributed to supernatural agency.
Demonized in life, the victim is divinized in death, and a myth emerges to absolve the
victimizers and explain the seemingly miraculous reinstatement of social order. To curb
future violence, mythology gives rise to highly regulated rituals involving surrogatesurrogate victims—often animals—as substitutes for the human victims of more
spontaneous forms of mimetic rivalry. As an added safeguard, caste-specific mores,
norms, and taboos are set in place in an attempt to confine desire within socially
acceptable parameters. As one might expect, the licit ambit of desire is much broader for
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social elites than others—a social stratification reinforced through mythology. However,
if MD is constitutively human, then the powerful can only police it, not eliminate it.
Furthermore, if MD is constitutively human, then Girard’s heuristic evidence and
antiquarian analyses may suggest contemporary applications. As constitutively human,
MD may function in a similar way to what Schillebeeckx and McAuliffe call an
anthropological constant, which include our psychosomatic constitution, our culturallyconstituted identities, our embeddedness within social and institutional structures, our
historical-cultural conditioning, the interplay of theory and practice, our commitments to
the goodness of life, and the synthesis of all these elements. At the very least, MD can be
understood as giving a particularly anthropological character to the biocultural milieu
through which the anthropological constants emerge. Operating at the epicenter of so
many domains of human-being, MD may provide a great deal of explanatory power for
scholars of myriad disciplines who seek to understand the biocultural roots of human
thought and action. Though MD may make good sense of the human condition, it remains
to be seen whether mimetic analysis is able to produce positive moral outcomes—
Gustafson’s second test for ethical truth value. Can the concept of MD help ethicists
expose and describe the sphere of negativity as well as imagine, propose, prescribe,
and/or recognize humanizing visions of positivity, wholesomeness, or salvation?
Analyzing ancient Near Eastern texts like Enuma Elish in contrast with biblical
texts, Girard, like Ricoeur and Middleton, seeks to expose the inherent circularity and
injustice of the myth that violence can create cosmic and social order.525 I explore some
contemporary implications of this contrast more fully below. These and other scholars
agree that myths of creative/redemptive violence only perpetuate victimization. Current
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theorists are able to demonstrate that mimetic violence in socio-economic and ecological
contexts still occurs on a global scale, and that exclusionary forms of desire are what
need to be criticized in the critical reflection on historical praxis. I propose that this
liberating ethical and theological task is a key component of the human vocation to bear
the image of God today.
Others have made similar claims. For example, liberation theologian and ethicist
Jung Mo Sung employs Girard’s mimetic theory to analyze and critique the social
exclusion emerging from the dynamic confluence of mimetic “desire, market and
religion.” Where Girard applies mimetic theory primarily to the critique of religion, from
archaic to contemporary, Sung finds Girard’s work to be fruitful for analyzing,
evaluating, and potentially alleviating many of today’s socio-economic injustices. He
hypothesizes that Christian theology may provide some fruitful ethical tools for
combating injustice.526
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Sung raises three hypotheses concerning the dynamics giving rise to this sacrificial mimetic cycle.
The first is that economic growth is directly proportional to the perceived plausibility of the mythical
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Theologian S. Mark Heim proposes an even more basic ethical reason for
highlighting the mimetic character of human agency. Drawing upon the findings of recent
cognitive- and neuroscientists, Heim argues that on a neuro-cognitive level, “imitation
may be at the heart of the emergence of key elements of what we take to be human nature
itself: consciousness, theory of mind, empathy.”527 In one of the language areas of the
brain, human beings possess a concentration of “mirror neurons,” which fire across
parallel and co-activated neural networks in sensory and motor fields. Integrated with
these other brain regions, mirror neurons enable the brain to translate sensory stimuli into
motion and, with the right symbolic tools, concepts. This neural activity facilitates a
strong capacity and urge to do what one perceives another doing and to anticipate what it
might be like to undergo or enact something happening with another. Mirror neurons
allow delayed and pensive reactions and even predictions of what might happen next,
including what another person might be intending—a kind of mind reading.528 This kind
of off-line anticipation and analogizing is key in developing a culturally-constrained
sense of self and, in turn, a sense of others as other selves. Other persons display
promises of progress (i.e., that everyone’s mimetic desires can or will be fulfilled) (40). The second
hypothesis is that in archaic societies taboos served the purpose of squelching certain mimetic desires
between various castes, since societal position determined the permissible scope of one’s desires. The
ideology of the market economy does away with the idea of caste and praises the refusal to place extrinsic
limits on desire. Where desires are given free reign, scarcity is a matter of necessity, not only because of
the natural limits of environmental resources, but also because there is always something more to desire
(41-42; cf. 37, 57-58). This infinite quality of acquisitive desire leads to Sung’s third hypothesis about the
myth of progress—that the perceived need to fulfill all mimetic desires in the context of scarcity logically
requires “the sacrifice of the [economically] less competent” (42). The poor are demonized where the
market is divinized. In addition, to the extent that the poor have bought into the myth of progress, they
become willing sacrificial and scapegoatal victims (42-43). This willingness to be sacrificed accomplishes
two things—it keeps hidden the mythic or mimetic cycle of desire and violence, and it keeps revolutionary
violence from breaking out. Both phenomena are necessary for perpetuating this or any myth, as Girard
defines the term.
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recognizable signs of joy, pain, elation, frustration, sadness, anger, etc., with which the
observer can identify through past experience, and therefore empathize.
According to Heim, MD guides behavior from birth and is vitally adaptive for
survival because it presents a necessary condition for the exertion of effort toward
wellbeing. He cites studies indicating that human infants do not display a robust instinct
for self-preservation. Babies who lack attention and affection often die, even when all
their immediate physical needs are met. Human babies thrive in response to being an
object of another’s desire. Their own struggle, or desire, to exist (however unconscious)
is brought about in no small way through mirroring the desire of their caretakers for their
continued presence and well-being.529
Andrew Meltzoff, expert on infant and child development, has probed
systematically the mechanisms of mimetic interaction and their impact on psychological
development.530 He has observed imitative responses in infants as young as 42 minutes old
and has catalogued a spectrum of mimetic responses and their complexification as
children grow, develop, and interact with others. Infants, he concludes, “learn through
imitation but don’t need to learn to imitate,” because mirroring neural systems start the
brain on an active mapping course that molds babies into more and more mature selves
like those with whom they interact.531 Infants imitate others’ actions and expressions,
share their objects of attention, and quickly learn through experience to track others’
perceptions and intentions. These intersubjective rapport-building experiences lay the
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foundations for language development, by weaving the psycho-somatically based fabric of
a symbolic universe containing culturally-constrained ideals of who to be like and who not
to be like, of what is “good” and “bad,” helpful and harmful, for oneself and for others.532
MD as making possible the NCE and FME
The mimetic appropriation of concepts like “good” and “bad,” “right” and
“wrong,” “positive role models” and “negative role models” is a large part of what makes
the NCE and FME uniquely human experiences of value for behaviorally modern Homo
sapiens. MD is a powerful driver of perception and behavior that orients the self to the
other, often in a concerted effort to learn, to better, to best another’s behavior. This form
of self-transcendence is a recipe for both development and conflict, but without it, there
would be no imaging God/Christ.
MD is as ambivalent as it is humanizing. As a human wellspring of cooperation
and conflict, good and evil, positivity and negativity, MD makes ethics both possible and
necessary. If from its neurological underpinnings mimetic desire allows human beings to
see others as other selves and as model selves, then it is the sine qua non of both empathy
and envy.
Because of the values-laden MD that makes empathy possible, human ethics is
able to be more and other than an epiphenomenon of self- and species preservation,
reducible to the pain and pleasure principle. The ability to perceive others as other selves
allows those others and their world to become worthwhile objects of moral consideration
for their own sakes, and not just for their potential to benefit or harm the self. Mimetic
desire enables a conscientious NCE that is both self- and other-oriented, an FME that
532
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indicates the intrinsic value of one’s own existence, all other life, and the environment
that sustains it. Good ethics catches on because positive models and moral outcomes
become objects of desire to be imitated.
Professor of neurophysiology Vittorrio Gallese comes to similar conclusions with
similar caveats. He is confident that the co-activation of mirror neurons and other
neurophysiological structures creates an “interpersonal resonance” that erupts into
imitation and other-oriented self-identification. However, he is cautious about calling this
dynamic “empathy,” except in a broad yet technical sense of the term.533 This socially
facilitated neuro-cognitive activity can certainly emerge as empathy in the traditional,
positive, affective sense of the term. Yet mimetic ability can also blossom into envy and
many other phenomena leading to competition, conflict, and violence.
These negative phenomena are where Girard spends most of his energy,
prompting Gallese to wonder why more Girardians do not emphasize the more positive
view that human beings are “equally describable as empathic creatures, capable of fellow
feelings, love, and altruism,” and “that mimesis not only generates violence, but also art,
culture, and creativity.”534 MD is a two-edged sword or double sided coin. Perhaps the
pervasive focus on the negative thrust of MD correlates to McAuliffe’s point about the
epistemological priority of negativity in the NCE. Phenomena grab our attention when
they cause problems.
By the same token, Gallese points out that “Girard acknowledges in his work,
though perhaps with less emphasis, that mimetic desire is also good in itself because it is
533
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the basis of love, viewed as the imitation of a positive model.”535 Because the self is
formed through embodied interaction with other selves, he theorizes “that at the origin of
mimetic ambivalence is humanity’s ontological openness to others. […] Our constitutive
openness to others, of which mimesis is one of the main expressions, can be declined
both in terms of social violence and social cooperation.”536 This “‘ontological’ desire to
be like the other”537 supports the inference that alongside the epistemological priority of
negativity, MD discloses an ontological priority of positivity, through a pre-thematic or
instinctual impulse to obtain those objects and become like those models perceived to be
worthy. Thus, MD resides at the heart of the NCE and FME as a bioculturally constrained
sense of good and bad and those whose image one ought to bear.
MD, ethics, and “the uniqueness of the Bible”—René Girard
Like the NCE and FME, MD is an anthropological concept with ethical
significance and religious affinities. Middleton compares and contrasts the image of God
concept in Genesis with a “mimetic ideal” operating within Mesopotamian mythology,
including that of Enuma Elish. In the latter symbolic worldview, society is charged with
the task of recapitulating the primordial struggles through which the gods established
order among themselves, within creation, and between the divine and created realms.
This divinely sanctioned sociopolitical ideal holds that the might of the gods—and their
royal-priestly intermediaries—makes right and that disruptors of the hierarchic status quo
weaken the foundations of civil society and threaten to visit divine wrath upon it.538
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According to Middleton and Ricoeur, Enuma Elish supplies the mimetic ideal that fueled
the Babylonian conquest of the Israelite people, because it provided
the mythic legitimization of the Neo-Babylonian imperial expansionism,
where the king, standing in for Marduk (and as the image of Marduk),
vanquishes the enemies of Babylon, who are regarded as the historical
embodiments of the chaos monster. As Ricoeur puts it, “Creation is a
victory over an Enemy older than the creator; that Enemy, immanent in
the divine, will be represented in history by all the enemies whom the king
in his turn, as servant of the god, will have his mission to destroy.”539
As ideological critique, the biblical concept of the imago Dei creates an
alternative mimetic ideal which denies the necessity and creative capacity of violence on
two fronts. First, the primeval history democratizes the functional-royal image concept
and cites it as an aspect of human creaturehood designed to “limit or constrain human
violence” (see Gen. 9:6).540 Because all people bear the image of God, there is no
theological justification for social stratification and no excuse for the kind of “violence”
that “grieved” Yahweh to the point of starting over with humankind (Gen. 6:5-11).
Second, the God whose image all people bear does not create through violence, but
through enabling and inviting the earth and its inhabitants to fulfill their own creative
potential, which includes the human vocation to (pre)serve the immanent fecundity of the
earth and one another.
Likewise, Girard locates MD and rivalry at the roots of Mesopotamian and other
archaic religious traditions which rely on sacrificial rites and holy war in order to
maintain harmony on earth and/as in the heavens. He also make a bold claim that from
the standpoint of mimetic analysis Judeo-Christian theology may be uniquely equipped
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among Western religious traditions to expose, dismantle, and reframe the mimetic cycle
of desire, rivalry, violence, and sacrifice.
By citing Girard’s claim for the uniqueness of Christianity and its scriptures, I do
not wish to imply that other religious traditions are ill-equipped to construct valid and
humanizing moral visions. Even from a Girardian perspective, other faiths can be shown
to promote effective measures for nipping mimetic rivalry in the bud. Eastern religions,
like Buddhism, for example, have longstanding and deeply embedded traditions defining
attachment to objects and ideals as a form of suffering that breeds malcontent, envy,
conflict, and violence.541 Girard’s high praise for Christianity may be politically incorrect
in a pluralistic religious environment, but his seeming triumphalism might be mitigated
by the view that he is making what amounts to a Riceourian wager from the perspective
of his own religious tradition, rather than an exclusionary claim for the normativity of
Christianity. Girard, voicing praise for Ricoeur’s systematic study of ancient Near
Eastern and Western religious myth, argues persuasively that anthropological, religious,
and ethical scholars can and ought to proclaim both the “continuity” of Christianity with
earlier traditions and the “cleavage between Christianity and everything else,” especially
for the purpose of providing a mimetic model which exposes the roots of rivalry and
violence and redirects them toward acts of love for neighbor and enemy.542
Girard’s Ricoeurian wager is that the biblical tradition systematically exposes and
condemns the mimetic contagion of insatiable desire, and makes a long anticipated
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exodus from the sacrificial cycle through the passion and resurrection of Jesus of
Nazareth. In this manner, Girard argues that Christianity, with its “Old Testament”
foundations, offers both ethical and eschatological visions of the worst and best that MD
has to offer. On the one hand, Girard is able to cite many instances of mimetic
victimization in both the Old and New Testaments. On the other hand, he shows how
biblical monotheism never allows a false transcendence to legitimate the violence in these
narratives.
Arguing for “the uniqueness of the Bible,” Girard cites the Joseph narrative in
Genesis as a quintessential critique of the single victim mechanism.543 Turning to “the
uniqueness of the Gospels,” Girard begins by pointing out that they complete the mimetic
cycle that the Hebrew Bible strategically leaves unfinished, by professing “the divinity of
the collective victim.”544
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271

The crucified and resurrected Christ reveals divine solidarity with the victims of
social exclusion and violence and presents an eschatological vision of wholesomeness or
salvation through both bodily resurrection and the offer of forgiveness to all victimizers
willing to repent. In these terms Girard constructs a theory of atonement “at the level of
anthropological analysis.”545 In addition, the resurrected Jesus offers a twofold ethical
example to his followers.
First, by offering forgiveness without retribution, Christ short circuits the mimetic
cycle of violence to such an extent that non-retributive forgiveness becomes an option,
even in cases where human life is at stake. With faith and hope in a resurrection that
vindicates the innocent victims of violence, the unique ontological horizons of the
gospels’ symbolic world co-emerge with an ethical vision grounded in eschatology and

for the ineffectual sham it is (135). It lays open what Girard calls the “persecutory unconscious”—the selfdeceptive dynamic by which those in the lynch mob convince themselves “that they are doing good, the
right thing; they believe they are saving their community” (126). For Girard, however, Christ’s Passion,
culminating in resurrection—and only this revelation—dismantles the “founding murder” as the basis for
expunging the mimetic contagion that inevitably arises in all human communities (135). In this way, the
resurrected Jesus is the new Abel, offering what no other victim of sacralized murder could—reconciliation
between the persecutors and the persecuted, between the betrayers and the betrayed.
545
Ibid., 184. Girard analyses the concept of the “scapegoat,” conjecturing that the prevalent use of this
term in contemporary society is a testament to his claim that “[w]herever Christianity spreads, the mythical
systems decay and sacrificial rites disappear” (154; cf. 160). Scapegoats still exist, but they are seen as the
illegitimate victims of “the appetite for violence that awakens in people when anger seizes them and when
the true object of their anger is untouchable” (156). Showing the mimetic cycle of victimization to be
ineffectual at curing societal ills, Girard differentiates between this kind of uneasy “peace such as the world
gives” and the true peace that “surpasses human understanding,” such as only Christ can give (186). While
Girard restricts his investigation of the Passion and resurrection of Christ to “the level of anthropological
analysis” (184), he does not deny the real transcendence of the triune God, who exposes Satan’s false
transcendence and brings it to an end (185). This “evangelical anthropology” (182) is only available and
intelligible in light of a bona fide “revelation” and “miracle.” As Girard puts it, “To break the power of
mimetic unanimity, we must postulate a power superior to the violent contagion. If we have leaned one
thing […], it is that none exists on earth” (189). Relating this anthropological and ethical vision to
pneumatology, Girard describes the Holy Spirit is humankind’s parakletos, an advocate against the unjust
accusations of Satan (189-90). Far from proposing that all people are purely innocent victims before God
and the accuser Satan, the Spirit’s advocacy is predicated on the forgiveness God offers in Christ, through
his triumphal identification with all victims, which continues beyond the resurrection. On the way to arrest
Christ’s followers in Damascus, Saul is confronted by the risen Christ asking, “why do you persecute me?”
(191; emphasis mine). For Girard, then, “The Resurrection empowers Peter and Paul, as well as all
believers after them, to understand that all imprisonment in sacred violence is violence done to Christ.
Humankind is never the victim of God; God is always the victim of humankind” (ibid.).
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an eschatological vision grounded in ethics. Not only does such hope make turning the
other cheek appear to be a viable option, non-retaliation or nonviolent resistance may also
have the more immediate result of humanizing the victim in the eyes of the violator
and/or witnesses to the situation. A humanized victim makes a less attractive target,
turning public outrage away from the victim and toward the violator.
Second, the kingdom or reign of God is an ethical and eschatological vision that is
achieved not through violence but through its utter renunciation.546 Because following
Christ means taking up one’s proverbial cross as opposed to gaining “the whole world,”
discipleship is a kind of mimesis that nips rivalry in the bud.547 As a mimetic model,
Christ preaches and practices a theological ethic that fully humanizes the least and the
lowest and calls for action that alleviates unjust suffering. The Christ event and its
inauguration of the kingdom or reign of God contain a concrete paradigm for bearing the
functional-royal image of God which reorients MD by redirecting its dynamism from
one-upmanship to the wellbeing of one’s neighbors and even one’s enemies.
Offering a very similar description of the kinds of salvation made possible by
forgiveness, Suchocki defines forgiveness as a kind of empathy that involves actively
“willing the well-being of victim(s) and violator(s) in the context of the fullest possible
knowledge of the nature of the violation. As such, forgiveness holds the possibility of
breaking the chain of violence.”548 So defined, forgiveness is a human possibility, as well
as an eschatological one. From a Christian perspective, eschatological forgiveness comes
through the willingness of Christ to take on a cursed fate as a wholly innocent victim of
violent aggression, and through resurrection, to offer reconciliation without retribution.
546
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Through Christ, God achieves the greatest possible solidarity of humanity with divinity,
of creation with creator, and in this act of empathy, wills the wellbeing of the creation,
both victims and violators. In this way, Christ is a mimetic model who offers an ethical
vision with an eschatological horizon, by revealing—imaging—a God who does not
create through violence, even in the face of violence.
In a similar move, Hefner inserts Christ into the myth-ritual-praxis complex “by
which humans move from is to ought.”549 His hermeneutical exercise of faith seeking
understanding is also a Ricoeurian wager that the theologian and ethicist may “provide
genuine knowledge of reality, for the sake of our wholesome living,” through the second
naïveté interpretation of the Christian Scriptures and their myth symbols.550 For Hefner,
Jesus presents a “paradigm” or “model” for being human and an as yet underdetermined
“ontological statement” that altruistic love for the least among us is in “harmony with
what really is.”551 The resurrection vindicates the underdetermined faith and hope that
love—not violence—reveals the way things really are. In McAuliffe’s terminology,
Hefner’s ontological statement is a commitment to the ontological priority of positivity in
spite of the epistemological priority of negativity.
Conclusion
Having accepted Hefner’s challenge to cultivate the explanatory power and moral
fruitfulness of Christian myth-symbols, my interactions with the scholarship of cognitive
linguists, evolutionary psychologists, emergentists, ethicists, biblical scholars, and
theologians have enabled me to expand his thesis that Homo sapiens have emerged as
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free creators of meanings able to construe humankind’s cultural and ecological functions
in terms of bearing the image of God to the creation in ways which model the beneficent
intentions of the creator, redeemer, and sustainer of the cosmos. By construing this task
as the emergent theological vocation of Homo sapiens, I have developed extensively
Hefner’s hypothesis that when integrated with current scientific knowledge, the ethical
and eschatological concept of the image of God/Christ can be morally fruitful on both
social and ecological fronts.
The meta-ethical concepts of the negative contrast experience, foundational moral
experience, and mimetic desire all harmonize with Hefner’s, Deacon’s, and my claim that
the functional requirements of complex emergent dynamics mark the “basis for beginning
to reflect upon values,” a principle I have called the “teleodynamic axiom” in chapters 3
and 5.552 According to a second naïveté interpretation of the primeval history and its
myth-symbols of the image of God and the knowledge of good and evil, the created
purpose of the cosmos is to emerge into the wondrous array of causal powers including
life, sentience, and consciousness. In response, God-imaging creatures bear a moral
obligation to see and celebrate the “very-good-ness” of biotic and ecological systems for
their own sakes and seek to ensure their sustainability—their ability to respond to the
creator’s “Let there be…” If, in connection with this first principle, Homo sapiens’
created function is to cooperate freely and responsibly across cultures and species in the
ongoing co-creation of our social and ecological environments by nonviolent means, then
God-imaging creatures bear a moral obligation to ensure that all people are able to access
the means of actualizing this creative potential to contribute to the common good and
their own wellbeing—their response-ability to mirror the creator’s “Let us make…”
552
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As an outworking of the teleodynamic axiom, this latter principle contains a tacit
endorsement of McAuliffe’s claim that those who experience the negative contrast most
acutely have an epistemological privilege in ethical discourse, since they suffer the
greatest depravation of their functional requirements.553 Emerging as biocultural
creatures, human beings’ functional requirements are cultural as well as biological.
Meeting the biological requirements of all human beings (e.g., food, clean water, reliable
shelter, public safety, sanitation, and healthcare) is only the first step in making it
possible for everyone to lay claim to their reasonable expectation to participate fully,
creatively, meaningfully, and humanely in cultural activities and institutions (e.g.,
educational, occupational, artful, leisurely, economic, political, religious).
From a Christian perspective, these principles and their theological framework
comprise a hermeneutically open schema for gauging moral progress in terms of
humankind’s vocation to bear the image of God. In one sense, a scientifically informed
theological ethic guided by the teleodynamic axiom emerges from the bottom-up. At the
same time, the underdetermined elements of an empirically based ethic cry out for the
supervening influence of something like religious faith or historical revelation. For ethics,
faith is a wager that religious values, paradigms, and eschatological visions comport with
what really is. In the hermeneutical circle of faith seeking understanding and critical
reflection on historical praxis, these ontological commitments guide the FME, NCE, and
MD toward ethical and eschatological horizons where care for the creation and altruistic
love of neighbor and enemy bear the image of ultimacy and matter ultimately.
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Throughout this study and its restatement of the biblical concepts of the image of
God and the knowledge of good and evil, I have attempted to construct a fruitful
framework through which to engage Hefner’s call to embark
on the constructive work that awaits the theologian and philosopher in
fulfilling the task that Paul Ricoeur has set before us—to transport the
traditional symbols, where they are important vessels of information for
us, into the realm of contemporary, second-naiveté [sic] experience, and
enable them to coalesce with our experience to provide genuine
knowledge of reality, for the sake of our wholesome living.554
More pointedly, I have assembled a set of hermeneutical tools and constructed a
conceptual framework with which
to restate [Judeo-Christian] myth […] and its doctrinal elaborations in the
context of the natural and social sciences and as we encounter them in a
global society that is faced increasingly with the question of quality of life
on the one hand and of surviving on the other hand.555
Thus, I have offered in this chapter a fruitful first step in investigating
anthropological foundations for theological ethics in a contemporary context, by offering
evidence that there are already three identifiable schools of thought or “camps” that begin
theological ethics with the premise that human being and agency, qua human, present the
motivations and conditions of possibility for being free and responsible in particular
ways. The human “is” informs the human “ought.” Proponents of these three camps
argue that the phenomenological, heuristic, and neuroscientific evidence for the NCE,
FME, and MD is substantial enough to offer a firm, if indirect or intuitive, foundation for
constructing valid ethical norms and holding persons and communities accountable to
them. This foundation is strengthened by showing how the NCE, FME, and MD camps
mutually reinforce and interpret one another. Because no human response to the negative
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contrast experience, foundational moral experience, or the mimetic desire that drives
them can reach the ethical horizons toward which they point, the confluence of these
camps moves with little effort toward religious visions of wholesomeness, wellbeing, or
salvation.
With the help of many minds from multiple disciplines, I have wagered that an
interdisciplinary re-presentation of what it means to emerge in the image of God with a
knowledge of good and evil can be intellectually and morally fruitful today and offer a
procedural guide for future studies. Throughout this endeavor, I have striven to project
faithfully and creatively the hermeneutical trajectory of the Hebrew Bible’s primeval
history as a theological, anthropological, and ethical statement that human beings have
been wrought of the creation and embedded within it to the same extent as other
creatures, for the purpose of discerning and enacting the beneficent intentions of a creator
who shares power and does not create through violence. The final chapter offers a more
detailed summative reflection on the findings of this study and its likely impact on my
future research.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Emerging in the image of God is an ongoing biocultural process constituted from the
“top-down” by its ethical, theological, and eschatological horizons. These horizons and
our views of them shift continually as our symbolic worlds undergo tectonic shifts
erupting from the “bottom-up.” The chapters of this study are an embodiment of the
Riceourian-inspired wager that a second naïveté retrieval of the image of God and the
knowledge of good and evil might answer theologian Philip Hefner’s call “to transport the
traditional symbols, where they are important vessels of information for us, into the realm
of contemporary, second-naivete [sic] experience, and enable them to coalesce with our
experience to provide genuine knowledge of reality, for the sake of our wholesome
living.”556
In these concluding remarks, I offer a brief, chapter-by-chapter summary of my
argument and its major themes, followed by an overview of this project’s implications for
several areas of theological study. Listed above in chapter 1, these related areas of
research include further studies concerning Christian anthropology and ethics, the
doctrines of creation and divine action, Christology, “fall” and original sin, soteriology,
and eschatology. These considerations have long guided my research, and they are likely
to do so for years to come.
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Summary of Chapters
In chapter 1 I set out to establish the impetus, goals, scope, structure, context,
perspective, and procedure for this study. Citing hermeneutical philosopher Paul Ricoeur,
Hefner has pointed in the direction of some relatively unexplored territory in academic
theological discourse. Accepting Hefner’s challenge, I catalogued some of the past
explorations into these areas by several scholars, looking to them for guidance on how to
develop a second naïveté reinterpretation and reappropriation of image of God and the
knowledge of good and evil as Christian myth-symbols able to encapsulate an
intellectually and morally fruitful conceptual framework for conducting anthropological
and ethical discourse today.
The construction of a second naïveté interpretation is a critical-hermeneutical
endeavor resulting in novel, irreducible, and flexible meanings derived through
interpretation from pre-critical (primitive naïveté) understandings of religious concepts.
This form of interpretation is quintessentially theological because it can be described as
both faith seeking understanding and critical reflection on historical praxis. When this
type of scholarship engages current scientific understandings, interdisciplinary scholar
Ian G. Barbour’s description of a theology of nature perspective provides another helpful
descriptor for the reformative goals of this study. Hermeneutical frameworks like these
from Ricoeur and Barbour help the 21st-century scholar develop up-to-date theological
conceptions of what really is and how our is informs our ought—how to move from
evolution to ethics in a second naïveté understanding of Christian anthropology. With
additional help from cognitive linguists, emergentists, and evolutionary psychologists, I
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constructed a hermeneutic of emergent meanings designed to integrate or blend biblical
and biocultural conceptions of human uniqueness.
From this point, I sought to build a biocultural model of human uniqueness and its
evolutionary development, couched in the terminology of conceptual integration theory
and the salient features of evolutionary psychology. I argued in chapter 2 that the human
person is constituted by the symbiotic confluence of the biological and cultural streams of
our nature. I also presented evidence that behaviorally modern Homo sapiens became
culturally-constituted creatures, or what Hefner calls “created co-creators,” as a result of
the functional singularities precipitating from the neuro-cognitive adaptations subserving
the meaning-making process of conceptual integration across various behavioral domains.
Building upon neuroscientist Terrence W. Deacon’s hypotheses about the coevolution of language and the brain, cognitive linguists Gilles Fauconnier and Mark
Turner present a persuasive argument that uniquely human functional singularities like
linguistic ability emerged when our species developed the capacity for double-scope
conceptual integration. The symbolic ability afforded by this psychosomatic adaptation
allows the rapid and continual development of languages and the cultures growing up
with them.
Evolutionary psychologists John Tooby and Leda Cosmides characterize this
cultural-linguistic dynamic aptly by explaining how “[m]ore nature allows more nurture.”
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Human biology has equipped our species with the requisite functional conditions of

possibility (nature) to create and hold one another accountable to cultural meanings
(nurture). These biocultural processes generate a condition of freedom through which
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emerge values-laden self-descriptions like “full” humanity, the image of God, and the
knowledge of good and evil. Argued more fully in subsequent chapters, the portrait of
human uniqueness painted in chapter 2 implies that behaviorally modern Homo sapiens
bear the image of God with a knowledge of good and evil through the physically
embodied, socially embedded creativity by which they define their biocultural roles and
contextualize their choices.
Adding detail to this natural scientifically informed portrait of human-being, I
turned in chapter 3 to emergence scholarship, in order to describe how the image of God
and the knowledge of good and evil (as aspects of the human condition and values-laden
distinctions) may be understood as developing dynamically from the “bottom-up” to
exert a “top-down” causal influence on human thought and action. I provided a detailed
analysis of Deacon’s three-tiered taxonomy of emergent causality, in which the
cumulative and hierarchic orders of homeodynamics, morphodynamics, and
teleodynamics equate roughly to the Aristotelian concepts of material/efficient causality,
formal causality, and final causality, respectively.
Relating these emergent orders to the concepts of the image of God and
knowledge good and evil, I emphasized that these theological self-descriptions and the
human condition to which they refer emerge from the matter-energy of the physical
universe and belong to the person-constituting teleodynamics of life, evolution,
information, significance, sentience, and consciousness. Because the (teleo)dynamics of
human-being are not reducible to the thermodynamics which sustain them from the
“bottom-up,” the image of God and the knowledge of good and evil cannot be identified
as some thing which subsists in the cosmos. Rather, these realities are borne through the
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values-laden teleodynamics always in the process of dynamically constituting the human
person from the “top-down.”
Beginning with chapter 4, I integrated the contemporary portrait of human nature
outlined above with exegetical scholarship commensurable with a biocultural conception
of human emergence. Striving to remain faithful to the hermeneutical trajectory evident
in the Hebrew Bible’s primeval history, I argued that an evolutionary view of humanbeing brings into focus several thematic elements lying within and behind the redacted
text of Genesis 1-3.
First, in both ancient and current contexts, the meanings of the image of God and
the knowledge of good and evil emerge through a process of conceptual integration—a
complex confluence and clash of meanings across cultural, ideological, geographical,
temporal, and disciplinary boundaries. Specifically, I relied heavily on the scholarship of
J. Richard Middleton among other exegetes and theologians to argue that the image of
God concept in Genesis is largely a critique of Mesopotamian royal ideology. In the NeoBabylonian symbolic world, political, religious, and social elites bear the image of their
despotic deities by conquering and exploiting others. Foregoing the henotheistic
Chaoskampf of Enuma Elish and other parallels, the Genesis cosmology monotheizes the
God concept and democratizes the image concept. This shift generates the inference that
all human creatures bear the image of a generous, beneficent creator who shares power
with created entities and does not create through violence.
Second, I demonstrated the parallel an complementary ways in which the image
of God is a product of nature in Genesis and biocultural evolution, emphasizing the
manner in which the biblical writers depict humankind as being wrought of the creation
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and embedded within it to the same extent as all other creatures. I suggested that this
contiguity with the rest of the natural world supports the claim that human participation
in the created co-creation of the world ought to consist in cooperating conscientiously
with one another and other species in service of the creative potential and wellbeing of all
people, all living species, and their environments.
Third, I explained how a biocultural view of human emergence supports the
interpretive claim that bearing the imago Dei is Homo sapiens’ emergent vocation—a call
to re-present the creator’s beneficent intentions in, to, and through our “very good”
world. Over against a Mesopotamian royal ideology, the implication in the Genesis
cosmology that Yahweh Elohim does not create through violence lends itself to a
functional-royal interpretation of the image of God in which the commands of Gen. 1:28
to “fill,” “subdue,” and “rule over” the creation ought to be interpreted nonviolently.
Finally, I noted that this theological vocation presupposes a condition of freedom through
which humankind is responsible for creating the cultural meanings by which we
contextualize our actions and hold one another accountable.
In the fifth chapter, I argued that in biblical and biocultural conceptions of humanbeing, the condition of freedom through which we bear the image of God is ambivalent,
fraught with all the challenges of knowing good and bad/evil. Structuring chapter 5 to
mirror chapter 4, I submitted first that the meaning the knowledge of good and evil in
Genesis and contemporary interpretation emerges through a creative blending of different
and often disparate concepts. Through this conceptual integration emerge the inferences
that the knowledge of good and evil must be understood as a sine qua non of bearing the
image of God in, to, and through a creation immanently capable of bringing the “bad”
along with the “good” from “the beginning.”
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Second, I described the knowledge of good and evil as a product of
creation/nature in Genesis and biocultural evolution, highlighting the creaturely sources
of godlike wisdom in the Garden Narrative and the natural sources of cognitive
adaptations—i.e., evolutionary processes catalyzed by natural selection pressures. In the
Genesis cosmology, the possibilities for “good” and “bad” can be understood as a sideeffect of the freedom to become connoted in Yahweh Elohim’s fiat, “Let there be…” and
the open-ended commands given to the human creatures in Genesis 1 and 2. Because the
emergence of “bad/evil” in Genesis is not a recapitulation of god-on-god violence as in
Enuma Elish, the Genesis cosmology is able to preserve the primordial goodness of the
creator and the creation. Similarly, an emergentist conception of value holds that the disintegration of the teleodynamics constituting life, sentience, and consciousness is the
necessary shadow side of any reality in which complexification is catalyzed through
natural selection. I cited philosopher Holmes Rolston, III, suggesting that creativity and
tragedy in evolutionary processes are two poles of a dialectic with a track record of
producing positive net results. “Nature, red in tooth and claw,” while amoral, is the
crucible in which humankind’s moral wherewithal has been forged, for good and ill.
Third, I described knowing good and evil as humankind’s emergent vocation. In
Genesis gaining a conscientious knowledge of “good” and “bad/evil” allows human
creatures to respond to their calling to bear the image of God to all creation, which is to
say beyond the relative security of Eden. In this sense, the knowledge of good and evil
completes the image of God. In biocultural terms, the cognitive fluidity through which
our species is able to define itself and its roles is the same cognitive fluidity out of which
values-laden distinctions like “good,” “bad/evil,” and “image of God” emerge. A Godimaging creativity is a conscientious creativity.
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Fourth, this inherent connection between imaging God and knowing good and evil
overturns traditional notions that the process of coming to see the positive and negative
horizons of human experience and action is a negative development in itself. On the
contrary, both biblical and biocultural narratives of human origins imply that the condition
of freedom through which Homo sapiens bear the image of God is an unavoidable aspect
of stepping into maturity, as individuals and as a species. Coming to know good and
bad/evil is as humanizing as it is ambivalent. Knowing good and evil is the curse which is
the epicenter of all blessings and the blessing at the epicenter of all curses.
Understandably, Christian ethics framed by the second naïveté retrieval of the
image of God and knowledge of good and evil outlined above undergo dramatic shifts in
focus, content, and orientation. Or do they? In chapter 6 I tested the notion that
theological ethics could emerge from the “bottom-up” and still serve their “top-down”
purpose of dignifying and relativizing human behavior against a trans-cosmic backdrop.
On the hermeneutical circle of faith seeking understanding or critical reflection on
historical praxis, a Christian ethic is a “bottom-up” proposition, because ethical and
theological concepts all emerge through biocultural processes. At the same time, a
Christian ethic is a “top-down” proposition, because the definitive revelation through
Jesus Christ of what it is to bear the image of God imbues ethical concepts and actions
with eschatological significance.
The insuperable horizons of human-being found in eschatology open up novel and
potentially humanizing possibilities for behavior. Searching for guidance on how to
describe ethics in terms of imaging God with a knowledge of good and evil, I consulted
several theological ethicists and anthropologists whose meta-ethical concepts of the
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negative contrast experience (NCE), foundational moral experience (FME), and mimetic
desire (MD) support an ethic of the image of God in which these self-evidently
constitutive dynamics of human-being provide the impetus and conditions of possibility
for ethics. I showed that these meta-ethical concepts mutually support and inform one
another while sharing an affinity for religious visions of wellbeing, wholesomeness,
flourishing, or salvation.
This orientation toward ultimacy emerges from the fact that biocultural evolution
cannot possibly keep pace with the moral imagination. Eschatological visions of history
allow the moral imagination to reach in faith, hope, and love toward a co-created future
marked by the negation of all negativity and the fulfillment of all flourishing. People of
Christian faith may hold that although an eschatological vision of the creation’s future is
underdetermined by the data of human experience and behavior, the kingdom or reign of
God revealed in the life and resurrection of Jesus Christ is “at hand” when human
attitudes and actions reflect the non-violent, power-sharing spirit of the creator’s “Let
there be…” and “Let us make…”
Blending concepts gleaned from Hefner and Deacon, I suggested in chapters 3, 5,
and 6 that what I have called the teleodynamic axiom supports the inference that bearing
the image of the creator means, in part, ensuring the functional requirements and creative
potential of all persons and their environments.558 Broadly speaking, therefore, to bear the
image of God is to uphold the equal dignity of all others as other selves, the
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epistemological privilege of the impoverished and those in solidarity with them, and the
inherent value and creative potential of the nonhuman world through which our species
has emerged. To bear the image of God with a knowledge of good and evil is to insist
through word and deed, however provisionally and imperfectly, that altruistic love of
neighbor and enemy comport with what really is. To bear the image of the God with eyes
wide open to what really is “good” and “bad/evil” is to recall that according to opening
chapter of Genesis, Yahweh Elohim “sees” the “good” in each and every aspect of the
creation, prior to and independent of the arrival of human creatures. To bear the image of
the God who does not create through violence is to adjust our vision—our knowledge of
good and evil—accordingly.
Implications for future research
Ripples from the tectonic shifts I have proposed for Christian anthropology and
ethics can be felt in many other areas of systematic theology. These final few pages
outline some of these implications, describing topics I intend to explore more fully in my
future research.
The imago trinitatis
As I alluded in chapter 3, the second naïveté interpretation of the image of God
constructed in this study is conducive to an emergentist interpretation of the more
speculative and particularly Christian concept of the imago trinitatis—the image of the
Trinity. One of the most immediate effects of an emergentist anthropology on this
concept is the implication that a physically-based, dynamic understanding of the imago
trinitatis reframes the traditional psychological analogies of the Trinity found in the
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works of Augustine, Aquinas, and others. Not only does evolutionary psychology
discredit the faculty psychology on which these analogies are based, emergentism and its
physicalist ontology preclude the possibility of separating the human psyche/soul/spirit
from its physical embodiment and social embeddedness. Thus, the psychological analogy
can only reemerge as a socio-psychosomatic analogy.
Theologian Karl Rahner’s famed “trinitarian axiom,” also known as “Rahner’s
Rule,” has inspired many scholars at the intersections of theology and the natural sciences
to explore the notion that a trinitarian conception of divinity has something substantial to
add to the discussion of whether and how the eternal God of Christian theism interacts
with a temporal world from within. I listed several of these scholars in chapter 3, citing
works by Ted Peters, Denis Edwards, John Polkinghorne, Arthur Peacocke, and Robert
John Russell.
Beginning with Rahner, all of these scholars develop or can be shown to endorse
the following theses: (1) dynamic and relational creaturely personhood can be understood
as analogous to divine (tri-)personhood; (2) God’s threefold creative and redemptive
activity within the cosmos is the ultimate cause of this imago trinitatis; and (3) the
experience of God as Christ and the Holy Spirit in the (historically mediated) economy of
salvation is the sole primary source for knowledge of God as Trinity.
According to Rahner, if Jesus of Nazareth is presupposed in faith to be an
absolute self-revelation of God, then the incarnation reveals the dynamic trinitarian
structure of both divine and human personhood. He claims:
We need only make the quite legitimate assumption that, on account of
God’s absolute self-communication in ‘uncreated’ Grace, the immanent
Trinity [God in se] is strictly identical with the economic trinity [God ad
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extra] and vice versa, and we are then able to read the doctrine of the
Trinity ‘anthropologically’ without falsifying it.559
This quote contains a restatement of Rahner’s famous axiom, which he formulates in
order to “do justice to the biblical statements concerning the economy of salvation and its
threefold structure, and to the explicit biblical statements concerning the Father, the Son,
and the Spirit.”560 If Jesus, as a human person, is an absolute self-revelation of God, and
not just the Word/Logos/Son of God, then Christ’s humanity, and ours by extension, must
bear a trinitarian structure. Rahner finds this image—this analogia entis—in the dynamic
apperception and actualization of human personhood.561 In this analogy, subjectivity—
“the background ‘feeling of being here’”562—correlates to the Father; the linguisticallyborne knowledge making subjectivity known to itself correlates to the Logos;563 and the
social mediation of personhood orienting the self empathically to others as other selves
correlates to the Spirit or love of God.
This hasty distillation of Rahner’s imago trinitatis anthropology must be
unpacked at a later date. At the present time, I hope only to preview the manner in which
559
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an evolutionary view of human personhood and its emergence has entered the
hermeneutical circle of faith seeking understanding. For Rahner and the other scholars
listed above, personhood, whether infinite or finite, emerges in relation to the other.
However, as infinite, divine personhood cannot be mediated by an other apart from the
self. In Christian theology, therefore, God must bear the relational dynamics of
personhood in se and eternally (i.e., apart from the free act of creation ex nihilo). Hence,
uncreated personhood is immanently tri-personal. Created personhood, by contrast, is
mediated bodily and socially vis-à-vis myriad personal and impersonal beings. Hence, the
analogy of created personhood to divine personhood is a socio-psychosomatic analogy.
I find Deacon’s understanding of emergence to be a particularly apt tool for
exploring this analogy. For Deacon the emergence of higher-order dynamic processes and
their integration in phenomena like life, information, sentience, and consciousness are
constituted diachronically through the self-propagating and mutually-constraining
“fusion” of matter-energy across what he describes as three orders of emergent
dynamics—thermo-/homeodynamics (cp. efficient and material causality),
morphodynamics (cp. formal causality), and teleodynamics (cp. final causality).
Borrowing a term from trinitarian theology, I mentioned in chapter 3 that the emergence
of human personhood involves a kind of perichoresis—a mutual interpenetration or
fusion of constituent “parts”—an irreducible, dynamically self-constituting unity-indiversity. As a scientifically-informed development Christian anthropology, Christology,
and trinitarian theology, I contend that personhood can be described as bearing a dynamic
imago trinitatis. I hold that the tri-unity of divine personhood may be considered the
supernatural condition of possibility for the natural emergence and evolution of living
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beings, their constitutive properties, and causal powers, as emergentism characterizes
these phenomena.
Creation, divine action, and Christology
A rekindled discourse on the Trinity and the imago trinitatis in light of current
cosmological, biological, and psychological understandings begs several questions and
generates profound implications for the doctrines of creation, divine action, and
Christology. If the cosmos is a thermodynamically closed system, how can the infinite,
eternal God be the creator and redeemer of a contingent, temporal world? How can God
enter and interact with a causally closed universe? According to Ted Peters, “As part of
the problem and perhaps also the door to the solution we find the doctrine of God as
Trinity. The first thing to note is that the eternal immanent Trinity already includes
relationality and dynamism.”564
In short, a dynamic conception of created being comports well with a dynamic
conception of uncreated Being. The diachronic emergence of finite, cosmic being(s) may
be understood as a function of the eternal emergence of infinite, divine Being. That which
is not God—the creation—bursts forth as a manifestation of the fecund, free, self-giving
love that is the perichoritic self-constitution of God among Father, Son, and Spirit. God
gives being to nonbeing, while not taking away from or adding to divine Being. In a
sense, the truism that love is the only thing one can give without giving away becomes a
theological statement about the existence of the cosmos as a whole and the emergence of
love within it.
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While this brief description of creatio ex nihilo might shed some light on the birth
of the space-time and matter-energy of our cosmos, what of the more interesting theistic
questions of (1) whether and how God acts in the ongoing process of creation in general
(creatio continua) and (2) whether and how God may be considered to interact with the
creation in any but this general way? Where is there room for things like special
revelation, the incarnation, and the resurrection in a closed universe?
Again, I can only allude to more complete responses to these questions in my
future research. However, having already explored Deacon and Nancey Murphy’s work
in previous chapters, I believe that their distinction between “causal forces” (as
materially-energetically present) and “causal powers” (as constitutively absent) provides
a way of beginning to respond to these tough theological questions. Deacon’s three-tiered
emergentist ontology “requires reframing the way we think about the physical world in
thoroughly dynamical, that is to say, process, terms, and recasting our notions of
causality in terms of something like the geometry of this dynamics, instead of thinking in
terms of material objects in motion affected by contact and fields of force.”565
Allow me to be so bold as to suggest that revisiting the questions of divine action
“requires reframing the way we think about [God’s interaction with] the physical world
in thoroughly dynamical, that is to say, process, terms, and recasting our notions of
[divine] causality in terms of something like the geometry of this dynamics, instead of
thinking in terms of material objects in motion affected by contact and fields of force.” In
this statement I find myself concurring with interdisciplinary scholar Ian G. Barbour
when he places himself “in agreement with the ‘Theology of Nature’ position, coupled
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with a cautious use of process philosophy.”566 Indeed, I believe that Christian conceptions
of God’s activity ad extra must continue to begin with the raw data of “a religious
tradition based on religious experiences and historical revelation.”567 In the same breath,
however, theologians working from theology of nature perspective must hold “that some
traditional doctrines need to be reformulated in light of current science.”568
Scholars writing from a theology of nature perspective generally presuppose a
number of tenets designed to safeguard the freedom and indeterminacy of natural
processes, including cognitive and cultural processes. Many, including myself, presume
that Christological discourse must be conducted within an evolutionary conception of the
world and the living human flesh God incarnates. We hold that divine activity, whether
general or special, does not violate the causal closure of the cosmos at the
thermodynamic level. In short, we assume that God’s self-revelation in/to the creation
does not create or destroy matter-energy, negate the indeterminacy of quantum level
events, or introduce new physical laws or forces.
In light of these exigencies, however, how does one open a door for divine action
into a closed universe? Polkinghorne and Peacocke suggest finding an explanatory
analogy in the concept of “top-down” or “whole-part” causation.569 This is not to say that
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God can be identified as the highest-level cosmic entity or as coterminous with the whole
of the cosmos. Rather, God can be understood as influencing the whole of the cosmos
and complex emergent wholes within it through a form of “information input,” as
opposed to “energy input.”
Once more, I believe that Deacon’s emergentist treatment of both energy and
information elucidates this concept. If divine action involved energy input, it would
violate the first law of thermodynamics (that matter-energy cannot be created or
destroyed) and/or nullify the quantum indeterminacy and entropic tendencies of
homeodynamics, which energize more complex dynamics at morphodynamic and
teleodynamic levels.
This violation of the causal closure principle is potentially avoided if, on the other
hand, one conceives of divine action in terms of information input. According to Deacon,
information is a function of two or more mutually constraining teleodynamic
processes.570 Thus, like all teleodynamics, information is a constitutively absent causal
influence, which supervenes upon lower-level dynamics, as opposed to the matter-energy
those dynamics employ to propagate themselves through various end-directed functions.
Thus, divine action may be thought of as a teleodynamic constraint bridging the
ontological gap between eternity and time, infinite and finite, necessary and contingent,
creator and creation. This conceptual shift entails a replacement of the notion of
intervention with that of supervenience.571 With this conceptual shift, creation may be
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depicted as an act of grace by which finite being is allowed to emerge freely “within”
infinite Being ex nihilo, from the “bottom-up,” from the “big bang” forward.
Evolutionary developments through various orders of emergence reflect the selfconstituting, self-transcending character of divine selfhood, which “acts” as a sort of
constraint, attractor, or boundary condition from the “top-down”—from infinite to finite.
Nature is graced by God’s presence to it and its presence to God.
Describing the way in which the natural world partakes freely in grace, Rahner
states:
The proper topos for achieving an understanding of the immanence of God
in the world in theology, therefore, is not a treatise on God worked out in
abstract metaphysical terms, but rather the treatise on grace, admittedly
taking this as teaching not that some created quality of grace is instilled by
a creative act, but rather as teaching that the existence of God bears a
quasi-formal relationship to the world such that the reality of God himself
is imparted to it as its supreme specification.572
The term “quasi-formal” partakes in the rich etymology behind the term
“information.” To “inform” can be to communicate meaning or to give form to
something. Rahner’s use of quasi-formal presupposed that God does both within the
creation. Divine influence is quasi-formal because God’s Being and that of the creation
remain distinct. God gives form to every aspect of the creation—including the process
and products of evolution—without dissolving into it or overdetermining the courses of
natural and cultural history.
This re-conception of the doctrine of creation yields a kind of strong anthropic
principle, which holds that (finite) personhood was bound to emerge in the cosmos
because the material cosmos and its history are emerging freely “within” (infinite)
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personhood. In contemporary theological parlance, the concept that the dynamic selfhood
of infinite being informs the finite being emerging “within” it could be viewed as a form
of panentheism—the principle that all reality is unfolding within God, as God also
pervades all reality from within. Readily distinguishing itself from pantheism, this all-inGod, God-in-all view specifies that the creator is immanent to but distinct from the
creation. In the language of Genesis 1, this non-deterministic form of immanence and
creativity is able to “let there be” the evolutionary emergence of all that is and all we hold
it to be in our symbolic worlds.
“Fall” and original sin, soteriology, and eschatology
When viewed through the hermeneutical lens through which I have developed a
second naïveté interpretation of Christian anthropology, the doctrines of sin and salvation
also take on new contours. For example, according to a biocultural model of human
emergence colored by evolutionary psychology, Homo sapiens are more accurately
described as originally ambivalent than originally sinful. There is no evidence that our
species “fell” from a state of moral purity or juridical righteousness, no basis for claiming
that every individual is born guilty of a damnable transgression. The more tenable
position emerging from an evolutionary framework is that our species has stumbled upon
the realization that our common biology and various cultures have predisposed us to
“participat[e] through intent or act in unnecessary violence that contributes to the illbeing of any aspect of earth or its inhabitants.”573
Perhaps this “bottom-up” definition of sin by theologian Marjorie Suchocki hints
at an intellectually and morally fruitful way to describe members of our species as
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originally sinful.574 An evolutionarily reconfigured understanding of humankind’s ethical
ambivalence would render moot the traditional Augustinian-Pelagian dichotomy between
sin/guilt as inherited and sinful acts as merely imitated. From a perspective in which
“more nature allows more nurture,”575 these positions are both wrong and both right in
certain ways. From the standpoint of evolutionary psychology, the notion of inherited
guilt is nonsensical. However, a biocultural perspective does provide ways of describing
how humanity’s biological and cultural inheritance has predisposed members of our
species to act in ways deemed morally reprehensible. Human freedom is conditioned,
positively and negatively, by both streams of its biocultural history. Human infants do
not emerge from the womb saddled with an inherently “evil” or “good” disposition or a
predetermined “guilty” or “justified” juridical status. Rather, they are born to emerge into
persons bearing an ethically ambivalent condition of freedom.
Because suffering, death, and violence emerged long before any conscientious act
that could be called sinful, a biocultural reframing of the doctrine of sin has a correlative
impact on doctrines of salvation. In an evolutionary view of the world, salvation becomes
much more than a juridical category. Redemption must come to be viewed as a divinely
accomplished process which is cosmic in its scope, historical in its inauguration,
nonviolent in its means, and eschatological in its fulfillment as a gift of grace.
First, not all negative aspects of creaturely existence are traceable to “sin” or even
human activity. Therefore, Christian soteriology must expand to engage forms of illbeing and negation not attributable to human agency. In this way, a second naïveté
574
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understanding of Christian anthropology may reinvigorate ancient “Christus Victor”
conceptions of the Pascal mystery, in which suffering and death are “enemies” of
creaturely existence distinguishable from moral evil.
Second, given that Homo sapiens have emerged from the material universe as one
among many species sharing common evolutionary origins, there is little if any reason to
assume that an eschatological future is an exclusively human prerogative. Why should all
created entities co-emerge as interdependent in history and not in eschatology? Physicist
John Polkinghorne expresses similar misgivings and offers the following form of
resurrection faith and hope in his “reflections of a bottom-up thinker”:
Surely the “matter” of the world to come must be the transformed matter
of this world. God will no more abandon the universe than he will
abandon us. Hence the importance to theology of the empty tomb, with its
message that the lord’s risen and glorified body is the transmutation of his
dead body. The resurrection of Jesus is the beginning within history of a
process whose fulfillment lies beyond history, in which the destiny of
humanity and the destiny of the universe are together to find their
fulfillment in a liberation from decay and futility (cf. Rom. 8:18-25).576
Third, this vision of “heaven” can be said to take its cues from earth in more ways
than one. The fullest possible flourishing of any creature is anticipated by its functioning,
“the processes by which it functions, the requirements for its functioning, and its relations
with and impact upon its ecosystem.”577 As an eschatological extension of Hefner’s
teleonomic axiom, these teleodynamic exigencies “form the most reasonable basis for
hypothesizing what the purpose and meaning of the thing are”578 in this world and in “the
life of the world to come.”579 One can reasonably conjecture that the natural course and
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contents of evolutionary and cultural history give specific shape to the eschaton toward
which they are proceeding. By extension, efforts to secure the wellbeing of persons and
their environments in history are a form of partial salvation and an irruption of heaven
into history.
Fourth, if God does not achieve creation through violence, there is no reason to
conclude that God achieves redemption through violence. In broad strokes,
substitutionary theories of atonement hold that all sin is meritorious of punishment, and
that sin against an infinite, eternal God is liable to infinite, eternal punishment. Since
mere humans, as finite beings, all sin and cannot possibility satisfy these juridical
demands, a substitute victim is required—one who is both sinless and infinite. Hence
Anselm’s Cur Deus Homo. By this legal-transactional logic, God intends and utilizes the
violent means of Jesus’ crucifixion to accomplish redemption. In other words, God
punishes Jesus violently for the benefit of the rest of humanity. According to the work of
structural anthropologist René Girard showcased in chapter 6, this view of the atonement
is a unique recapitulation of the myth of redemptive violence. From this point of view,
Jesus’ crucifixion is a singular form of ritualized violence in that its supposed finality
forbids all subsequent forms of violent sacrifice or scapegoating.
However, to view Jesus as a surrogate victim of God or divine wrath is to assume
that God requires mimetic rivalry and violence to accomplish salvation and forgiveness.
A violent theology of atonement does not comport with a nonviolent theology of creation.
The violence of the crucifixion may be instrumental toward certain ends, but not because
God requires bloodshed in exchange for pardon. On the contrary, the revelatory nature of
the violence Christ endured may lie in God’s willingness to experience—as a creature—
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the worst our biocultural world has to offer, to empathize with our shortcomings, to
vindicate the innocent victim of violence, and to forgive the repentant without retribution.
In light of the incarnation, Christ is the forbearing divine victim of human violence, not
the human victim of divine violence. In light of the resurrection, the violent nature of the
crucifixion simultaneously exposes the sinful nature of (creation through) violence and
the nonviolent—anti-violent—nature of salvation.
A biocultural restatement of biblical myth-symbols of the image of God and the
knowledge of good and evil emerges with the potential to reframe many anthropological
and theological doctrines. I have listed the examples above in faith and hope that a postcritical blending of ancient and current conceptions of human uniqueness and its
development will lend credence to my Ricoeurian wager, inspired by Hefner, that a
second naïveté understanding of Christian anthropology is able to “provide genuine
knowledge of reality, for the sake of our wholesome living.”580 I hope through this study
to play some small role in the ongoing emergence of the image of God.
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